

Scientific Editors:

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KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT: PROJECTS, SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGIES

Proceedings
of the 11th International Conference
on Knowledge Management: Projects,
Systems and Technologies

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November 27 – 28, 2019
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Coordinators:

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FOREWORD

The papers reunited in the present volume have been submitted to the KM-11: The 11th International Conference “Knowledge Management – Project, Systems and Technologies”, Bucharest, Romania, 27-28 November 2019, hosted in Bucharest by “Carol I” National Defense University.

Throughout the last decades, a wide variety of organizational practices have been proposed to support the acquisition, storage, retrieval, application, generation, and review of the knowledge assets of an organization in a controlled way; despite this, it is often unclear how these practices relate to one another in their contribution to organizational performance.

In the information era, rather than physical assets or resources, knowledge is the key to competitiveness. What is new about attitudes to knowledge today is the recognition of the need to master, manage and use it like any other asset. This raises issues not only of appropriate processes and systems, but also of how to account for knowledge in the balance sheet.

The management literature of these last few years suggests a variety of practices meant to support the creation, storage and transfer of information and knowledge. Knowledge Management (KM) is a relatively new subject matter, being integrated in the curricula of some North-American universities and debated in a few dedicated journals starting with 1995.

As a new scientific area, there are at present quite many schools of thought referring to Knowledge Management, which therefore accounts for the difficulty or even impossibility to set the conceptual framework of this domain, starting from a unanimously accepted definition for it. As a consequence, the approach to the matter differs with each school or even author.

- *KM can be regarded from the following perspectives:*
- *The techno centric perspective, stressing technologies, especially those contributing to knowledge enlargement and sharing;*
- *The organizational perspective, seeking to answer questions such as: How should the enterprise be designed to facilitate the knowledge processes inside it? Or, which organizations work best and based on what processes?*
- *The ecological perspective, regarding the human interactions, the identity, knowledge and environment factors as a complex adjustment system.*

In addition to the above, as the topic is becoming more consistent and gaining ground, more and more academic debates are taking place in the epistemological area, emerging both at the theoretical and practical level of Knowledge Management. Outstanding standardization institutions in the United Kingdom and Australia produced reference documents in a common attempt to outline the conceptual framework and scope of the subject, but so far all of them have been only slightly accepted or insufficiently grasped and adopted.

The papers gathered in this volume are all meant to facilitate communication between international multidisciplinary teams. This year’s Knowledge Management Conference itself provides – as its organizing committee has stated – a forum for discussion of topics related to the development of Knowledge Management and related subject matters.

The mission of the International Conferences on Knowledge Management is to facilitate communication between international multidisciplinary teams. The Conference provides a forum for the discussion of topics related to the development of knowledge management and related disciplines.

Finally, we would like to thank all participants who shared their expertise with colleagues during the conference. We also hope that the papers included in this volume will give new ideas to the readers in their quest to solve various problems.

The publisher is honored to inform the authors and readers that the previous Proceedings of the International Conference on Knowledge Management: Projects, Systems and Technologies are indexed in the BDI - RePEc - Research Papers in Economics, IDEAS (<http://ideas.repec.org>), EconPapers (<http://econpapers.repec.org>) and Economists Online.

The conference would not have been possible without the joint effort of the organizing committee (Security and Defense Faculty / “Carol I” National Defense University, the Academy of Economic Studies and the Project Management Romania Association) and the evaluating board, to whom we are deeply grateful.

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INSTITUTIONALISM, NEO-INSTITUTIONALISM AND KNOWLEDGE IN INTERNATIONAL REGIMES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

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Abstract: *The concept institutionalism, that of neo-institutionalism and the evolution of the concept of regime became a subject of real interest both in Europe and internationally. Nevertheless, some doctrinarians do not approve this tendency, claiming that many of neo-institutionalism and regime theories represent only the reframing of the political issues previously analyzed and demonstrated by political scientists. Emphasizing the case of contemporary policy and regime analysis, we conclude that things are in a continuous evolution and development. All new created doctrines theories are challenged by similar problems, regardless of their national framework, and all new solutions envisaged stem from a common theoretical foundation. In this regard, the article explores the methodological contribution of institutionalism, neo-institutionalism and regime theories, as intrinsic part of the evolution of historical institutionalism - social entrenchment, role of rules and norms, genealogical and structural functionalism approach, critical realism - in the heuristic sense of knowledge paradigms, usually attributed to standard international norms and regimes.*

Key words: *institutionalism, neo-institutionalism, international regimes and social sciences, governance, methodology, international rules, international norms knowledge management.*

Institutionalism and neo-institutionalism explained

Filtering institutional doctrines through Apollonian rationality and Dionysian intuition, we are faced with a paradox. Institutional analysis emanates from Emile’s Durkheim passé view of “social facts as things”¹, but also modern enough to be preceded by the qualifier “neo” in most contemporary works. Institutionalism is considered a particular approach in the analysis of social, political and economic phenomena, but it is easier to come to an agreement on what it is not, rather than on what it really is. There are several reasons for this ambiguity: academics and doctrinarians studying institutions and institutionalism never attempted to clearly define the concepts; institutionalism has different meanings depending on the

different disciplines it applies to; and even in the theory of organizations, the *institutionalists’* view differ according on whether they insist on the *micro* or *macro* characteristics of institutional phenomena, on whether they weigh the cognitive and normative aspects of institutions, and on the importance given to interests and relational networks in the creation and dissemination of institutions.

Of course, it is not to argue that the use of a methodological or theoretical approach would constitute a comprehensive form of institutionalism research; critical appropriation represents an indispensable component of a coherent, *non-syncretic approach*. In our opinion is of crucial importance to first clarify operational concepts like *institutional grammar*², *polycentrism*³, *autonomy* and

¹ See Emile Durkheim, *The rules of sociological method*, New York: Free Press, 1985.

² *Institutional Grammar* represents an approach for assessing *the structure and content* of institutions.

self-governance and their uses, by positioning them on the basis of their intellectual genesis, usually emergent from social sciences, and practice, that is political system and society in general, and, in a comprehensive heuristic perspective, connecting domains, models, theories and closely associated diversified methods.

Institutional analysis experienced a revival in all social sciences.⁴ In some cases, this revival represented a reaction to the behavioral revolution of recent decades that interpreted collective political and economic behavior as the aggregate consequences of individual choices and conceived institutions as epiphenomena - the mere sum of individual characteristics. But the lack of attention to social context and the stability of social institutions have been costly, especially in a world where “social, political and economic institutions have become more significant, considerably more complex and rich in resource and *a priori* more important for the collective life”⁵.

Another school of thought in regard to institutions comes from intellectual universes such as macro-sociology, social history or cultural studies that have never been influenced by behaviorism. In these disciplines, institutions have always been considered as the foundation of social and political life. Recent contributions of anthropology, history, and European sociological theory challenge the deterministic variants of functionalism and individualism, explaining how understanding and knowledge represent social constructs and how work symbolism transforms the concept of action. This perspective of analysis suggests that

³ *Political and managerial processes are creating polycentric networks that transcend the traditional ideas of jurisdictional integrity in state-centric systems.*

⁴ See J. G., March & J. P. Olsen, *The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life*, American Political Science Review, 1984.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 734.

individual preferences and categories of elemental thought such as *self*, *social action*, *state* and *citizenship* are shaped by institutional arrangements⁶.

Of course, one cannot expect approaches rooted in so different substrates to converge in a single set of assumptions and objectives. As a matter of fact, *different types of neo-institutionalisms*⁷ can be described - in economics, organizational theory, political science, *public choice*⁸, history and sociology - which are united only by common skepticism about an atomistic conception of social processes and shared belief that institutional arrangements and social processes matter.⁹

Unlike mainstream approaches, that are often reductionist in nature, a more integrated composition and emergence effects between levels seem to make more sense. How then to understand that a part of the system can be individuated while being affected by its relations with the other subsystems of the whole? The concept of *nested units* sustains this process when referring to the notion of *holon* borrowed from Arthur Koestler¹⁰:

⁶ Institutional arrangements are the policies, systems, and processes that organizations use to legislate, plan and manage their activities efficiently and to effectively coordinate with others in order to fulfill their mandate.

⁷ Paul J, Di Maggio., Walter W., Powell, *Neo-institutionalism in the analysis of organizations*, in *Politix*, vol. 10, nr. 40, Fourth Quarter, Political Science in the United States, vol. I, History and Paradigms, 1997, p. 115.

⁸ *Ibidem.*

⁹ *Ibidem.*

¹⁰ A *holon* (in greek ὅλον meaning “whole”) is something that is simultaneously a whole and a part. The word was used by Arthur Koestler in his book *The Ghost in the Machine* (Last Century Media, 1967, p. 48) and the phrase *to hólon* is a Greek translation from the Latin word *universum*, in the sense of *totality*, *a whole*. Koestler was influenced by two observations in proposing the notion of the holon. The first observation is that complex systems evolve from simple systems much more rapidly when there are stable intermediate forms present in the evolutionary process than if they are not present. The second

“A hierarchically organized whole cannot be reduced to its elementary parts; but it can be ‘dissected’ into its constituent components on which the *holons* represent the nodes of the tree, and the lines connecting the channels of communication, control or transportation, as the case may be.”¹¹ “Thus, explanations occur at multiple levels and different spatial and temporal scales.”¹²

This systemic approach applies to identifying *governance systems* that characterize a subsystem within the social totality, in this specific case, socio-technical systems oriented towards the administration of common resources: irrigation, public police, etc., at the same time as they inform the interactions between subsystems. Empirically, this allows us to delimit an object of study - *the unit of analysis* - while conceptualizing it as a *nested* but identifiable system in an institutional structure of practices and characteristic rules and norms.

Interactions between multilevel systems, for example, central government, regions and municipalities, at the same level, *e.g.*, neighboring jurisdictions, professional organizations, contribute to the complexity of the system, having a multiplicity of decision centers. Hence the concept of *polycentricity*, especially at different territorial scales, known as *multi-level polycentricity*: “local, provincial, national, regional and global units”¹³;

observation was made by Koestler in his analysis of hierarchies and stable intermediate forms in non-living matter (atomic and molecular structure), living organisms, and social organizations. He concluded that, although it is easy to identify sub-wholes or parts, wholes and parts in an absolute sense do not exist anywhere. Koestler proposed the word *holon* to describe the hybrid nature of sub-wholes and parts within *in vivo* systems.

¹¹ Arthur Koestler, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

¹² E. Ostrom (ed.), *Understanding Institutional Diversity*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005, pp.11-12.

¹³ M. D., McGinnis, *An Introduction to Institutional Analysis Development (IAD) and the Language of the Ostrom Workshop: A Simple Guide to a Complex Framework for the Analysis of*

different institutional sectors, where *multi-sectorial polycentricity*, consists of “public, private, and voluntary community-based, hybrid organizations”.¹⁴

These arenas of collective choice can designate a wide variety of *micro* and *macro nested* collective entities, such as a family, a company, a community of users, to the arenas of *constitutional choices* of a nation or group of nations: “*Constitutional Choice*: the processes through which collective agreements are defined, including the legalization and constitution of collective actions involved in collective or operational choice processes. *Micro-constitutional choice*: term used to emphasize the general relevance of constitutional processes to the construction of all kinds of collective entities, from very small to nation-states and beyond.”¹⁵

Long-term cultural patterns structure these *multiple constitutional* arrangements. The *Bloomington School* of thought¹⁶ thus explicitly affirms the historicity of institutions, which cannot be amended immediately by individuals¹⁷: “Meta-Constitutional Level of Analysis encompasses long-lasting and often subtle constraints of the constitutional, collective, or operational choice processes that are considered legitimate within an existing culture; many of these factors can be influenced by other external factors, but cultural factors do not change over time.”¹⁸

Institutions and Their Development, Policy Studies Journal, vol. 39, nr. 1, 2011, pp. 169-183.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ Elinor Ostrom, American political economist and Nobel Memorial Prize winner in 2009, and the Bloomington School of Political Economy can be defined as a distinctive school of political-economic thought, the “Bloomington School”.

¹⁷ H., Kliemt, *ABC – Austria, Bloomington, Chicago: Political Economy the Ostrom Way*, The Austrian and Bloomington Schools of Political Economy, *Advances in Austrian Economics*, Vol. 22, Emerald Publishing Limited, 2017, pp. 15-47.

¹⁸ M. D., McGinnis, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-183.

The strength of *polycentric governance* systems consists in that each subunit has considerable autonomy to experiment with different rules and norms for a particular type of resource and with different capabilities that respond to external shocks. By experimenting with combinations of rules and norms within units at smaller scales, citizens and government agents have access to local *knowledge*, get quick feedback from their own policy changes, and can learn from the experiences of other parallel units. Rather than being a major obstacle to system performance, redundancy builds considerable capacity.¹⁹

If the social actors are not in a situation of optimization because of their limited rationality, so too are socio-ecological systems that cannot be controlled simply and optimally. "It can be expected that any system will operate at levels that are not optimal because of the immense difficulty of fine-tuning any multilevel complex system."²⁰ Gould and Lewontin coined the term "*Panglossianism*" to illustrate the idea that each element of the system would have been selected to contribute to the harmonious functioning of the whole.²¹

The appropriate keys designed especially to better understand operating research concepts like institutional grammar, polycentrism, autonomy and self-governance, are fundamental in order to be able to conceptualize the forms of governance, conceptualize the state in the multiplicity of its configurations and functions, property rights and forms of coordination and collective action.

¹⁹ P., Aligica, *Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development: the Bloomington School. Interviews with Vincent and Elinor Ostrom*, George Mason University, Mercatus Center, 2003, p. 13.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ S. J., Gould & R. C., Lewontin, *The sprandels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm: a critique of the adaptationist programme*, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Biological Sciences, nr. 205, 1979, p. 581-598.

Neo-institutionalism and international regimes

Another important component of neo-institutionalism in political science was born in the field of international relations. In this case, the doctrinarians rejected the anarchic vision of international relations that, until then, constituted the norm. They have explored the conditions under which international cooperation occurs, and have studied the institutions and regimes that favor this cooperation.²² For this trend, international regimes are multilateral agreements, which represent a direct result of and facilitate international cooperation through which states regulate their relations with other states-actors, in particular areas. Some of these international institutions, for example, the United Nations or the World Bank, are formal organizations; others, like the GATT²³, are complex sets of rules, standards, and administrations. These international regimes are institutions in that they build, standardize and reproduce conventional expectations and, in so doing, stabilize the international order.

In the beginning knowledge management on regimes borrowed freely from the language and conceptual arsenal of game theory and institutional economics, and made scarcity and competition the basic features of the international system. Nation-states were understood as agents that maximized their own interest, but yet had powerful incentives to enter into binding agreements

²² See S. D., Krasner, (ed.), *International Regimes*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983; see also R. O., Keohane, *After Hegemony*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984 and O. R., Young, *International Regimes: Toward New Theory of Institutions*, World Politics, nr. 39, 1986.

²³ The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter "GATT") is a legal agreement between many countries, whose overall purpose was to promote international trade by reducing or eliminating trade barriers such as tariffs or quotas.

to maximize their long-term well-being.²⁴ If no benefit resulted from these international agreements or if the cooperation could exist without the implied costs, international regimes would not have emerged. The logic here is the same as that of domestic policy: the regimes appear when the costs of communication, control and implementation of the agreements are lower than the expected benefits. Thus, state-actors, in their efforts to reach common goals, have agreed to bind themselves to regimes that subsequently limited their freedom of action.

Whether realism, liberalism or constructivism, these theories of international relations consider to varying degrees that “international relations are in a state of anarchy”²⁵, which would make it difficult or impossible for cooperation between the key state-actors in the international system. However, despite this anarchy that characterizes international relations, it is clear that “periods of concert between powers follow periods of war, that arms races do not prevent arms control processes or even disarmament that organized free trade is about free trade, and so on”²⁶. In other words, despite the absence of a centralized government that can regulate international relations, state-actors cooperate, in certain instances, in various areas such as international peace and security, trade, monetary and financial relations, race to arms etc. It goes without saying that international cooperation is possible under certain conditions, and the main condition is the existence of international regimes.

Stephan Krasner defines international regimes as “sets of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area

of international relations.”²⁷ Far from being unanimously accepted, this definition is highly controversial. Criticisms are formed on the one hand around the concepts of “principles”, “norms” and “rules” and on the other hand, around the notions “implicit” and “explicit”. In response to these criticisms, other definitions have been proposed. John Ruggie defines international regimes as “social institutions around which the expectations of actors converge in a given field of international relations”²⁸. As for Oran Young, he sees the regimes as “social institutions governing the actions of those who are interested in specifiable activities (or accepted set of activities)”²⁹. Thus, like all social institutions, international regimes are behavioral or practice models around which converge recognized expectations.

Puchala and Hopkins, for the sake of *operationalizing* this concept, identify five characteristics that are recognizable in any regime. First of all, a regime represents a behavior, a phenomenon, an attitude that stems from adherence to principles, norms and rules and often reflects legal norms. But they exist mainly as an apparatus, a system of expectations or beliefs of participants about legitimate, appropriate or moral behavior. Secondly, an international regime includes principles concerning appropriate procedures for decision-making; in the third place, the description of any regime must include a characterization of the main principles it defends. The fourth characteristic refers to

²⁴ See O. R., Young, *op. cit.*

²⁵ D. Battistella, *Théories des Relations Internationales*, Presses de Sciences Politique, Paris, 2012, p. 447.

²⁶ *Ibidem*.

²⁷ S. Krasner, *Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables*, in S. Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 12.

²⁸ J.G. Ruggie, *International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order*, in S. Krasner, *International Regimes*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 196.

²⁹ O.R. Young, *Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes*, in S. Krasner, *International Regimes*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 93.

the fact that each regime has a set of elites who represent the key players within it and, lastly, the fifth characteristic of a regime exists in every key area of international relations where we encounter a visibly motivated behavior.³⁰

From the moment International Relations began focusing on the analysis of international regimes four mainstream theoretical approaches have been used to explain their creation, maintenance, and change. These are the *structural approach*, the *functional approach*, *game theory* and the *cognitive approach*.³¹ The *neo-realist structural approach*, also known as the *theory of hegemonic stability*, constitutes a theory principally based on power, the balance of power and, first and foremost, is power oriented. It links the creation and maintenance of international regimes to the existence of a dominant power and the weakening of international regimes due to a decreasing hegemony. The theory of hegemonic stability is subdivided into two versions that differ from each other.

On the one hand, we have that of Gilpin, for whom the hegemonic power provides coercive leadership by applying the rules of the international regime through positive and negative sanctions.³²

On the other hand, we have Kindleberg's vision on hegemony, which assumes that hegemony represents a "privileged group" for whom the cost of providing the public good is inferior to profit.³³ But since hegemonic power has an independent, unrelated interest in providing public good, regardless of the contribution of others, the beneficiaries of

the international system will have an incentive to behave like profiteers. In the final analysis, Kindleberg argues that, rather than the strong who exploit the weak, it is the weak who exploit the strong in this context.³⁴

Some criticisms can be made against the theory of *hegemonic stability* in regard to its postulate on the supply of public good *via* international regimes. Moreover, regimes are considered primarily as answers to the problems of collective action among advanced capitalist countries and not as an integral part of high politics and alliance solidarity.³⁵

The *game theory approach* has also been used to explain how cooperation can evolve under anarchic conditions. It is based on the *cost v. benefit calculation* made by the states considered as rational actors.³⁶ In other words, game theory can easily explain the conditions under which regimes might emerge as an example of cooperative behavior, and it may also suggest favorable conditions for the respect of international stability. In the analysis of international regimes and international cooperation, the *Prisoner's Dilemma*³⁷ is often used. The interest of the latter is that it "makes it possible to produce cooperative behavior under realistic conditions"³⁸. The main criticism of this approach is that it views the state as a unified actor.

As for the *functional approach*, it explains behavior and institutions in terms

³⁰ D.J. Puchala & R.F. Hopkins, *International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis*, in S. Krasner, *International Regimes*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 62-63.

³¹ S. Haggard and B.A. Simmons, *Theories of International Regimes*, in "International Organization", 1987, p. 498.

³² See R. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge, University Press, 1983.

³³ See C. Kindleberger, *World In Depression*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.

³⁴ *Ibidem*.

³⁵ S. Haggard and B.A. Simmons, *op. cit.*, p. 503.

³⁶ R.H. Wagne, *The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation*, in "American Political Science Review", 1983, pp. 330-446.

³⁷ The prisoner's dilemma constitutes a paradox in decision analysis in which two individuals acting in their own self-interests do not produce the optimal outcome. The typical prisoner's dilemma is set up in such a way that both parties choose to protect themselves at the expense of the other participant.

³⁸ See R. Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, New York: Basic Books, 1984.

of effects.³⁹ It is based on taking into account the interests of the state-actors. Thusly, if international regimes can be used to reduce the costs of information and transactions between state-actors members of the international society, then, undoubtedly, rewards for compliance will strengthen regime adherence. The approach developed by Robert Keohane, identified seven objectives that state-actors can achieve in an institutional framework provided by regimes. It mainly consists in limiting transaction costs between state-actors; creates a structure that promotes orderly negotiations; fosters linkages between different issues and regimes; facilitates the flow of information and, above all, superior information; promotes regular exchanges between state-actors; emphasizes respect for rules and reputation; and, promotes the *principle of generalized reciprocity*.⁴⁰

The criticism regarding the *functional approach*, it is that has a better grasp at predicting when regimes will be needed and not how or when they will be established. Moreover, international regimes and cooperation in a given field may arise as an unintended consequence of cooperation in another area, as is well explained by the *spillover theory*⁴¹ developed by functionalists in the field of integration.

Last but not least, the *cognitive approach* is based on ideology and knowledge.⁴² For the proponents of this approach, cooperation cannot be fully

explained without reference to the ideology, the values of the actors, the beliefs they hold about the issues of interdependence, and the knowledge at their disposal about how they can achieve a specific goal.⁴³ Like the previous theories, the cognitive approach also suffers from some shortcomings. It is criticized, among other things, that it cannot predict when consensual values or knowledge will produce cooperation.

Neo-institutionalism, in the theory of organizations and sociology, encompasses both a rejection of the rational actor model, an interest in institutions as independent variables, a shift to cultural and cognitive explanations, and an attraction to the properties of supra-individual analysis units that cannot be reduced to the accumulation of direct consequences of attributes or individual motivators. In the sociological tradition, institutionalization constitutes both “a phenomenological process by which certain social relations and actions become evident” and a state of affairs in which shared knowledge defines “what makes sense and what actions are possible”.⁴⁴ While economists and public choice theorists regard institution and convention as synonyms, sociologists and theoreticians of organizations limit the use of the first term to those conventions which, far from being perceived as mere commodities, “have a quasi-rule status in thought and action”⁴⁵.

³⁹ A.L. Stinchcombe, *Constructing Social Theories*, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1968, pp. 80-89.

⁴⁰ R. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 106.

⁴¹ Spillover is a concept coined by neo-functionalism in the 1960s in order to give count of the process of European integration. It refers to the inner dynamics whereby the members of a regional scheme would be compelled to either enlarging the scope or increasing the level of their mutual commitments or both.

⁴² See R. Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

⁴³ J.G. Ruggie, *International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order*, in S. Krasner, *International Regimes*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 195-223.

⁴⁴ L. G., Zucker, *Organizations as Institutions*, in S. B. Bacharach (ed.), *Research in the Sociology of Organizations*, Greenwich, JAI Press, 1983, p. 2.

⁴⁵ R. L., Jepperson, J. W., Meyer, *The Public Order and The Construction of Formal Organizations*, in W. W. Powell, P. J. DiMaggio (eds.), *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 46-48.

Neo-institutionalism in the theory of organizations tends to emphasize a broad, albeit limited, sector of the institutional plethora of sociology: organizational structures and processes of industrial, national, or international scope. Indeed, neo-institutionalism in organizational analysis takes as a starting point the striking homogeneity of practices and devices found on the labor market, in schools, companies and states.⁴⁶ The constant and repetitive nature of a great part of the organizational life cannot be explained simply in reference to the maximization of the individual actors' preferences, but more through an analysis that places the persistence of practices in their rational and scholarly character, and their reproduction in structures that are somehow self-sustaining.⁴⁷

A critical overview on international regimes and neo-institutionalism

The sudden interest in the study of international regimes represents, most likely, a passing trend, and one of the reasons for this change is only the temporary reaction to events in the world which, in no way, constitutes long term, a way of contributing to knowledge.⁴⁸ The question of the formation and the rupture of the international regimes constitute, mainly, a trend of the American doctrinarians. At the same time in Europe or in any other corner of the world, researchers of the domain would have other concerns, either on philosophical morality or on questions of historical interpretation.

It is comparable, for example, to the trend associated with the study of

⁴⁶ J. W., Meyer, *Collective Disturbances and Staff Organizations on Psychiatric Wards: A Formalization*, Sociometry Review, 1968, p. 31.

⁴⁷ Paul J, Di Maggio., Walter W., Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

⁴⁸ S. Strange, *Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique Of Regime Analysis*, in S. Krasner, *International Regimes*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 337-354.

international regimes, with that of systems analysis, behaviorism, integration and quantitative methods.

Firstly, the emergence of this new trend is justified by two subjective perceptions among American researchers. On the one hand, we have the perception of external shocks and internal disturbances (*e.g.* the Watergate scandal⁴⁹) of the period that has accelerated a significant decline in US power. So, to answer the nationalists, many liberal international scholars and *Reaganites*⁵⁰ wondered whether the damage suffered by the US as a world power, could not be repaired and restored by multilateral management mechanisms, hence the question of international regimes. On the other hand, we have the mysterious veil of secrecy surrounding the performance of international organizations: "the uneven performance and predicament of international organizations"⁵¹.

Secondly, the term regime can be considered to be, at best, imprecise. The concept seems confusing ("*woolly*" is the term used by Susan Strange⁵²), and will be an endless fountain of discussion since many individuals use it for various meanings. Recalling experiences with concepts such as *integration* and *multinational corporation*, the use of these confusing terms has the ability to mislead researchers, distort the meaning of their ideas, at best, or, at worst, disorient them

⁴⁹ The Watergate scandal was a major American political scandal that lasted from 1972 to 1974, following a burglary by five men of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) headquarters at the Watergate office complex in Washington, D.C. on June 17, 1972, and President Richard Nixon's subsequent attempt to cover up his involvement.

⁵⁰ Reaganite - relating to or characteristic of the principles and policies of the former American president Ronald Reagan.

⁵¹ S. Strange, *op. cit.*, p. 342.

⁵² Susan Strange was a British scholar of international relations who was "almost single-handedly responsible for creating international political economy". Notable publications include *Casino Capitalism*, *States and Markets*, *The Retreat of the State*, and *Mad Money*.

because of the conceptual confusion they induce.

Thirdly, another criticism relates to the connotation of the word *regime*, which is too much value-oriented (*value-loaded*). The meaning of the word regime, in everyday use, commonly refers to “diet” (*to follow a diet*). The second meaning refers to a political analogy. It defines the regime as the governance of a society by a natural person⁵³, a dynasty, party or group that exercises effective power over the rest of society.⁵⁴

Fourthly, the notion of regime tends to exaggerate the static quality of management agreements of the international system by introducing a future confidence in anarchy and order in uncertainty. It states that the concept of a regime “produces stills, not movies”⁵⁵, while reality is much more dynamic, if we take into consideration only the three main branches of a regime - security, trade and finance.

Finally, the fifth source of criticism refers to the fact that regimes’ main issues are mainly state-centered. In posing the question of what are the dominant agreements discussed and observed between governments, one can argue that the important political issues are those that concern governments. However, this answer seems to be valid only internally and not very much so internationally, because, it is clear that the issues on which governments, through international organizations, negotiate and reach agreements are not necessarily the same issues they consider the most important, let alone the problems that the individuals, in general, consider to be vital to their existence.

⁵³ In jurisprudence, a natural person is a person (in legal meaning, i.e., one who has its own legal personality) that is an individual human being, as opposed to a legal person, which may be a private (i.e., business entity or non-governmental organization) or public (i.e., government) organization.

⁵⁴ S. Strange, *op. cit.*, p. 344.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 346.

Indeed, introduced in the early 1980s, the concept of *regimes* continues to be as important in the literature of International Relations. Many studies in this area of expertise continue to be done in order to better analyze this phenomenon.

The tendency can be explained by the fact that theoreticians were forced to recognize that the concept of regime would make more sense if it was structured into a larger theoretical framework. We should emphasize that concepts do not have an objective meaning, independent of the theoretical framework in which they are deployed. This definitional vagueness is not confined to the theory of regimes, on the contrary, we find it in concepts of political science, like *power*, *state*, *nation*, *class*, etc., where each author in an attempt to *operationalize* a concept, adopts a definition that adequately encompasses the purpose of the research.

There has been a strong propensity among *regime* theoreticians to use the concept as a “problem-solving theory” and not to render real criticisms about the type of institutional order established by a regime that has been put in place.⁵⁶ The trend was confirmed because most regime theorists have assumed that regimes are a good thing and that the majority of regimes are even better. Inescapably, for some researchers, the negotiation of an international agreement or convention represents a triumph of order over anarchy, regardless of the content of the agreements themselves.

While it is clear that the implementation of the concept of regime presupposes that institutionalized behavior is possible at international level, the concept itself does not require that such cases be frequent, effective or positive. Although many regime theoreticians have not subjected regimes’ normative structure to a critical

⁵⁶ F. Gale, *Cave ‘Cave! Hic dragones’: A Neo-Gramscian Deconstruction and Reconstruction of International Regime Theory*, in *Review of International Political Economy*, 1998, p. 262.

analysis, this does not represent an admission of an analytical impossibility. The real concern here seems that by focusing on the rights and rules of a regime, could lead a researcher to ignore the interests and ideas that are legitimized by its normative structure. Such a result would reflect the broader framework in which the researcher evaluates the regime's normative structure, which is far from being an inherent aspect of the concept itself.

In the mid-1980s *neorealists*, *neoliberals* and *institutionalists* began by looking more closely at the processes that led to the creation of regimes and the establishment of the rules of the international game. This trend is currently continuing with respect to the creation of certain special regimes.⁵⁷

It should be clear that if we want to take international institutions seriously, we must observe a measure of regularity and order in the international system, which is unfortunately not yet the case today.⁵⁸

Lastly, the proliferation of international agreements and treaties over the last 50 years, in a large number of different thematic areas such as human rights, the environment, gender equality, health, education, nuclear non-proliferation, population control and many others makes the importance of regimes center-stage. The concept of regime is no longer confined to the realms of security, finance and the economy, being exported to other areas of interest. That said, we need to be less concerned that deploying the regime concept necessarily limits us to a narrow set of international economic issues excluding other important problems like

politics, security, policy and social relations.

Conclusions

In nuce, the importance of the cognitive aspect is undeniable but it has a cost: something has been lost in the transition from the old to the new institutionalism. Indeed, neo-institutionalism has, above all, paid attention to the processes of legitimation and institutional reproduction. In doing so, the researchers have especially emphasized the constraints imposed by institutions and the ubiquity of the rules that inform and guide institutional behavior. Institutions are not only constraints for action: they are first and foremost products of human activity. As for the processes by which the rules are constructed, they are essentially conflictual and competitive, as is shown by most political conflicts in modern societies which revolve around the formation and revision of the rule systems that guide political and economic action.

Neo-institutionalists are trying to broaden their perspective by looking at researchers whose work focuses on the political and strategic elements of action and institutional change, seeking to articulate more solidly organizational institutionalism to general sociology, inserting on the scientific agenda concepts like *interests* and *power*, clarifying and deepening the question of what should be a theory of institutional change.

If all doctrinarians agree on how institutions shape interests, showing that actors and their interests are institutionally constructed, that *culture* represents a toolbox from which people choose both institutionalized goals and the strategies to achieve them, they are especially focused on the issue of change, trying to answer the following question: if institutions exert such influence on how people formulate the ends and means of their action, how can institutional change occur? Change is then analyzed both in its institutional facet

⁵⁷ J. McAdam, *The European Union Qualification Directive: The Creation of a Subsidiary Protection Regime*, in *International Journal of Refugee Law*, 2005, pp. 461-516.

⁵⁸ D. Sprinz, *Regime Effectiveness: The Next Wave of Research*, in *Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change*, Potsdam, 2005, p. 16.

- the existence of, for example, *institutional contradictions* or *micro, macro* and *exogenous tensions*, articulating institutional change and collective action.

Neo-institutionalists posed again the largely forgotten question of *power* and *interests*, a question henceforth articulated to the structuring of organizational fields, attempting to renew the question of the elites' role. We seek to reintegrate into research the question of competition, highlighting the historical and inter-societal variability of competitive regimes and the role of institutions in the constitution of these regimes, as well as that of efficiency - the problem of not knowing whether institutions are *effective* but understanding how institutions incorporate historical experiences in their organizational logic and rules.

Despite the evolution of the regime theory, we have noticed that three of the critics still remain relevant or partially relevant. As we emphasized, these are the vagueness of the concept regime, the positive connotation in value of the concept of regime and the static vision expressed by the theorists who developed the regime concept. As for the *state-centrism* and trends in regime theories, recent works have shown that some of the critics are invalid. For the rest, we can ask ourselves if there is yet another form of criticism for the analysis of the theory of regimes as it is today. From our point of view, the answer is positive. Indeed, in order to refine this theory, several authors make criticisms or suggestions. We think in particular of the works of Keeley which invites a *Foucauldian* analysis of the regimes theory⁵⁹; Long, that proposes the Liberal International Theory, as an alternative to the realist and neorealist theories⁶⁰; Gale discusses *Neogramscian*

deconstruction and reconstruction of international regime theory⁶¹; and Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger who suggest combining the neoliberal, realist and cognitive – “*Power-Interest-Knowledge*” - approaches to analyze regime theory.⁶²

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⁵⁹ J.F. Keeley, *Toward a Foucauldian Analysis of International Regimes*, in *International Organization*, 1990, pp. 83-105.

⁶⁰ D. Long, *The Harvard School of Liberal International Theory: A Case for Closure*, in

Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 1995, pp. 489-505.

⁶¹ F. Gale, *op. cit.*, pp. 252-283.

⁶² A. Hasenclever et al., *Integrating Theories of International Regimes*, in *Review of International Studies*, 2000, pp. 3-33.

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THE HISTORIOGRAPHICAL DIMENSION OF INTERROGATING KNOWLEDGE

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Abstract: *In the current environment, subject to permanent change and sometimes hostile factors, an individual would find it very difficult, if not altogether impossible, to preserve his/her material and spiritual welfare without possessing adequate knowledge. Organizations constantly face a state of fierce competition, therefore insufficient knowledge or its erroneous application may result in disastrous consequences, eventually resulting in decline and disintegration.*

The aim of the present paper is to make a historiographical analysis of knowledge interrogation. The aspects and role of knowledge are related chronologically, following the directions set by the researchers in the field.

Keywords: *knowledge, epistemology, data, information processing, knowledge interrogation*

Introduction

Knowledge has always been of utmost importance in society, the most endowed minds being always preoccupied with the problem of knowledge since ancient times. Knowledge studies have resulted in one of the main philosophical disciplines, called epistemology, a name derived from the Greek word *epistími*, meaning „knowledge”, and *lógos*, meaning science, „study of” or „theory of”, epistemology representing human thinking in its superior representation.

In the next pages we are going to present an outline of epistemological research related to the approaches used by the main philosophers in the history of human civilization, starting with the oldest explorations and ideas.

Knowledge in Indian philosophy

The theory of knowledge has had a long tradition in Indian philosophy, resulting in many achievements and interesting information. In his book “Theories of Knowledge”, Rao presents eight directions in the philosophical and methodological studies of knowledge in ancient India:¹ theory of knowledge Samkhya (Yoga); theory of knowledge Vedanta; theory of knowledge Visistadvaita; theory of knowledge Madhva; theories of knowledge Mimamsaka; theory on knowledge Jaina; Buddhist theories of knowledge; theory of logic (Nyaya) of knowledge.

1. *Samkhya* is one of the most prominent and oldest trends in Indian philosophy. It belongs to the six basic schools of classical Indian philosophy,

¹ Rao, V.,S., *Theories of Knowledge: Its Validity and Its Sources*, Sri Satguru Publications, New Delhi, 1998, pp. 10-137.

identifying itself with understanding knowledge. The word Samkhya is based on the Sanskrit word *samkhya*, meaning *number* or *perfect knowledge*.

Samkhya has a theory of knowledge with three valid sources: perception, inference based on Sankhya syllogism and valid confession. Acquiring knowledge is performed when sensitive organs come into contact with an object causing sensations and impressions, subsequently reaching the mind.

In addition, Samkhya identifies two types of perceptions: undetermined perceptions (they do not contain any knowledge of shape or name of the object) and determined perceptions (obtained from the sensations that were processed, classified and correctly interpreted). Samkhya is closely connected to Yoga, a religious system specific to Hinduism.

2. *Vedanta* is one of the most prominent basic schools of classical Indian philosophy. The term “veda” means “knowledge”, while the term “anta” means “ending”. Thus, it means complete knowledge. Initially, Vedanta attested, „Upanishads”, an ancient collection of fundamental texts in Hinduism.

Vedanta theory discovered two types of knowledge: mediated knowledge (the assertion „I see smoke”) and the immediate knowledge (the assertion “I see fire”). This knowledge can be compared to a similar classification by Kant, who considered knowledge as comprising two elements: intuitions, as immediate knowledge, and concepts such as mediated knowledge.

3. *Visistadvaita* is a philosophy of religion, in which the central idea is integrating and harmonizing all the knowledge, while knowledge itself, *jnaana*, is obtained through the perception, inference and revelation of the sense.

According to Visistadvaita, knowledge essentially presupposes self-knowledge and an object of thinking. Knowledge is not an ordinary synthetic construct; actually, it stems from a process through

which things are revealed, natural objects existing by themselves without being created by thinking. Thus, knowledge is the self-revelation of a real object as a holistic system, while neither the object is the copy of the idea, nor is the idea the original of the object.

The Visistadvaita theory of knowledge assumes the entirety of experience on all its levels and forms as being a dual philosophy presupposing the independent existence of the perceptive self and of the perception of the exterior world.

4. *Madhva* supports the theory that God and human soul are separated. Madhava theory considers two means of knowledge as being valuable: knowledge itself and the instrument of knowledge.

The existence of non-valid knowledge acquired through sensorial perception necessitates the permanent interrogation of the knowledge content.

5. *Mīmāṃsā* is a Sanskrit word meaning “worshipped thought”, being, at the same time, the name of one of the six schools of Hinduist philosophy based on Vedas. Its principles are ritualism, anti-ascetism and anti-mysticism. The primordial purpose of school is explaining nature *dharma* in order to maintain the harmony of the universe and ensure the personal welfare of the individual that follows its ritual duties and prerogatives.

The doctrine of knowledge Mimamsa states the fact that world is real. Mimamsa put forward the unique epistemological theory referring to the fact that all knowledge is valid. All knowledge is valid until it is replaced by subsequent knowledge. In conclusion, what needs to be proven is not the true character of knowledge, but its fake character.

6. *Knowledge* (Jnana), according to Jainas, is the intrinsic, inherent, inseparable, and inalienable attribute, without which no soul could exist. Knowledge plays an important role in the idea of soul and its emancipation, the soul being the immortal essence of a living thing. Therefore, Jain’s epistemology or

Jain theory of knowledge thus becomes vital in Jaina philosophy, including here the theory of knowledge, together with various subjects, such as psychology, learning about feelings, emotions, and passions, the theory of causality, logic, philosophy of non-absolutism and the conditional manner of predicting. Moreover, Jainas discovered two types of knowledge: direct knowledge and indirect knowledge.

According to Jainas, it is possible to obtain indirect knowledge through five techniques: silent thinking, acknowledgement, *Reductio ad Absurdum* (Tarka), inference and syllogism.

7. Siddhartha Gautama Sakyamuni (*Buddha*) was absolutely convinced that people can get to know only those things that can be experienced directly. It is impossible to reach further knowledge as long as the madness and weakness of human life bring people onto the verge of despair.

Knowledge, in Buddhist understanding, is of primordial importance to people. One of the principles of Buddhist philosophy says that the pleasure of deepening one's knowledge becomes a duty. The theory of knowledge in Buddhism is not treated as being relative, but it is supposed to be perfectly true and absolute.

Buddhists suppose that at least one of these alternatives is always true, in any significant situation, and they use this assumption to make logical classifications. However, when the question is considered useless, all four alternatives are rejected. At the same time, when the answer is "yes" to each of the alternatives, it is considered deceitful and all four alternatives are, similarly, excluded.

8. Within *Nyaya* theory, knowledge is a special property of the soul, while the mind is a separate substance. Knowledge is obtained through experience and memories. In its turn, experience offers a double valid knowledge and an invalid knowledge.

According to *Nyaya* theory, the sense perception organs—the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue and the skin—have the five elements as domain—light, atmosphere, earth, water, and air, with adequate characteristics of color, sound, smell, taste, and feel.

In the process of knowledge, the mind (*Manas*) mediates between the self and the senses. The mind can be in contact with only one sense-perception organ, being unable to be the same with another one simultaneously. *Nyaya* presupposed that due to the nature of the mind, the experiences of people are discreet and linear, although the rapid succession of impressions may give the appearance of simultaneity.

Knowledge in ancient China

In China, Confucius discovered two types of knowledge: one that is innate and one resulting from learning. According to him, knowledge is of two types: knowing the facts and abilities of reasoning. Knowing facts is a static knowledge, while the abilities of reasoning make up a dynamic knowledge. Contemporary methodology of sciences classify the first type as part of the logic-linguistic as part of the sub-system, which knows declarative knowledge, while the second type is part of the procedural sub-system of a developed system of knowledge, which contains procedural knowledge². For Confucius, having knowledge means to get to know people, as he was not interested in getting to know nature, studied by modern science.

Besides, Chinese philosophers lent special attention to names as knowledge bearers reflecting intrinsic aspects of

²Burgin, M. și Kuznetsov, V., *Introduction to Modern Exact Methodology of Science*, International Science Foundation, Moscow, 1994 (in Russian), *apud*, Burgin, M., *Theory of Knowledge, Structures and Processes, World Scientific Series in Information Studies*, Vol. 5, Los Angeles, 2017, pp. 20.

reality. In this regard, Confucius writes about names and their rectification. One of the main purposes of rectifying the name was to create a sentient representation of knowledge in a language that allows any word to have a consistent and universal sense, offering an exact acknowledgement of things and actions, avoiding confusions.

In the following lines, we are going to continue to present the historiographic dimension of interrogating knowledge, by following the directions identified by Mark Burgin in his work „*Theory of Knowledge. Structures and Processes. World Scientific Series in Information Studies*”.³

Also in ancient China, Sun Tzu wrote a treaty on rectifying names, so that a ruler could adequately control his people without being misunderstood. Sun Tzu explained: “When the ruler’s achievements are long-lasting and his arrangements are accomplished, this can be considered a peak of good governance. All this is due to the names agreed on to be given to people.”⁴

The necessity of rectifying names is both political and epistemological. On the one hand, there is the need to differentiate between the highest step and the lowest step regarding social status, while, on the other hand, it is necessary to discriminate the states and qualities of different things. “When the differences between the nobleman and the poorman are clear and the resemblances and differences among things are discriminated, there will be no danger of misunderstandings, being confronted with difficulties of being neglected.”⁵

According to Sun Tzu, ancient kings chose names that gave correct information about realities, but subsequent generations

misunderstood and misused terminology, they invented new names and, therefore, could no longer differentiate good from evil.

Sun Tzu supposed that using the senses through sight, hearing, smell, taste, and feeling is the essential source for obtaining knowledge, allowing people to give names based on the identity or the differences between things. As a consequence, this was the way of producing the real knowledge of the world, while real knowledge was obtained through different names.

Knowledge in ancient Greece

In ancient Greece, Plato made an even more profound analysis for the knowledge issue, trying to answer the question: “What is knowledge?”

In order to answer this question, three approaches are suggested. The first hypothesis proposed is assuming the fact that “knowledge and perception are identical.” Socrates rejects this idea explaining that it is possible to perceive without knowing just as it is possible to know without perceiving (it is possible to see a text that is in a foreign language without knowing it).

The second hypothesis refers to the true faith that is knowledge. Socrates annihilates this idea, giving the following example: „when a jury considers that a defendant is guilty, listening to everything, it cannot be said that the defendant is guilty although, in reality, he is.”

The third hypothesis is: knowledge is the real faith with a reasonable validation. Despite this, Socrates contradicts this approach as all the interpretations of this definition seem to be inadequate. Thus, Socrates demonstrates the fact that all the three definitions of knowledge: knowledge as being nothing else than perception, knowledge as true judgment and, finally,

³Burgin, M., *Theory of Knowledge, Structures and Processes*, World Scientific Series in Information Studies, Vol. 5, Los Angeles, 2017, pp. 21-39.

⁴Watson, B., *Hsun Tzu: Basic Writings*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1963, pp.142.

⁵ Wing-Tsit, C., *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1969, p. 125.

knowledge as true and justified judgement are unsatisfactory⁶.

Another great philosopher, Aristotle, classifies knowledge on domains and the relative certainty with which these domains may be known. He supposed that certain domains (Mathematics or Logic) allow somebody to have absolute knowledge, fact which is actually always true⁷.

According to Aristotle, absolute knowledge, for instance, Mathematics is characterized through certitudes and precise explanations. However, unlike Plato and Socrates, Aristotle did not require certitude in everything. Some domains, such as human behavior, do not allow for precise knowledge. The corresponding vague knowledge implies expectations, chances, and imprecise explanations. Knowledge in this category is connected to ethics, psychology, or politics. In Geometry or Logic, the level of certitude is not the same as in ethics or politics.

Aristotle strove to organize knowledge in a well-structured, architectural manner, with a solid basis of the first irrefutable principles and a superior structure of the statements attached, naturally, to the foundation, through constant interference. This is how any axiomatic mathematical system is built, having a basis of definitions, postulates, and axioms or common notions as first principles and a superior structure of deduced statements: lemmas and theorems.

Aspects of knowledge in the Age of Reason

The great philosopher Thomas Aquinas supposed that the entire knowledge of people comes from sense perception. In

⁶Cornford, F.,M., *Plato's Theory of Knowledge: The Theaetetus and The Sophist of Plato*, London, 1935. pp. 142-362.

⁷ Burgin, M., *Non-classical models of natural numbers*, Russian Mathematical Surveys, v. 32, No. 6, 1977, pp. 209–210 (in Russian).

turn, sense perception comes from real things while the human mind does not have innate ideas, people possessing a natural ability to conceptualize knowledge. When people see an object, for instance a tree, actually the real tree is what the person notices and for instance a tree, the real tree is what the person notices and perceives reflection through the senses. The mind knows that what the individual sees corresponds to reality and, as a result, an individual acquires knowledge about a tree. The shape of the real object, for instance a tree, is not generated by senses or the mind of the one who perceives it, but it is impressed by the object itself. The mind creates a representation sent to the intellect which generates the universal idea through abstractization and calls it in a certain way, attributing it a word that defines it.

The French philosopher René Descartes evaluates knowledge in terms of doubt and certainty. Descartes considers that doubt and certainty are complementary feelings: whenever certainty grows, doubts decrease and when doubts grow, certainty decreases. As a consequence, according to Descartes, knowledge is a conviction based on such a powerful motive that it could never be shaken by an even stronger one. As a result, knowledge becomes absolute and it is absolutely impossible to fulfill.⁸

The way British philosopher John Locke⁹ approaches the issue of knowledge

⁸ Descartes, R., *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Cottingham, J., R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch (Eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, la adresa:

[http://users.clas.ufl.edu/burt/spliceoflife/Descartes med.pdf](http://users.clas.ufl.edu/burt/spliceoflife/Descartes_med.pdf), accessed on 01.10.2019

⁹John Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, The fourteenth edition, Volumul 1, S. Birt, 1753. *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* is one of John Locke's works regarding the foundation of knowledge and human understanding. It first appeared in 1689 and described the mind of a new-born as an empty slate (tabula rasa, although he did not use these exact words) subsequently completed by experience. The essay was one of the main sources of empiricism

explains the origin of ideas that people have and the use of words in order to obtain meanings. His assumption, in accordance with Chinese philosophers, was that the manner in which substances were named was a kind of discovery through a general abstract idea which is first named and then introduced into the language. According to Locke, the name of substances has to borrow the properties of substances they refer to; thus, real knowledge occurs only when people perceive reality. Another British philosopher, George Berkeley, stated that the mind cannot conceive abstract ideas and that notion (words), such as names, do not mean abstract ideas. General ideas represent any of the particular ideas, while the existence of an idea of a thing actually was the perception state of a sensor. Based on this approach, Berkeley came to the conclusion that all movement is relative, this conclusion being in perfect correlation to current physics.

Human minds know ideas, not objects. Ideas that constitute knowledge are generated by sensation, thinking, and imagining. When several ideas are put together they are understood as ideas of a distinct thing which is afterwards signified by a single name.

Another British philosopher, David Hume, also tried to solve the mystery of knowledge. He pretended that all knowledge results from sensorial experience, this belief being justified by what peoples of the world were thinking. Thus, all knowledge is made up of impressions and ideas. Impressions are lively and clear perceptions, while ideas are copies – less lively but clearer – of impressions.

Hume said that it is possible for knowledge to be based on relations between ideas. “Relations between ideas can be known with absolute certainty” and

can be known through “simple operations of thought”. In his work, Hume gives only the example of Mathematics as an example of relations between ideas.

Hume was especially interested in the different ways used for justifying the fact that a certain belief we had in essence was knowledge which stated that all the information we have comes from experience and has therefore to be justified by experience. For instance, facts are justified by probable arguments, not deductive reasoning.

One of the most influential philosophers in the history of Western thinking was German philosopher Immanuel Kant. His ideas in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and aesthetics had a profound impact upon almost any philosophical movement

Kant discovered three sides of theoretical knowledge: *logic*—offering absolute knowledge, *arithmetic and geometry* – offering the most reliable knowledge, *the fundamental principles of natural sciences*, which change along the passage of time, offering relative knowledge.

Kant defined two types of knowledge: *analytical knowledge*, expressed through self-justified reasoning of the properties of objects that exist in these objects by definition and *synthetic knowledge*, which is expressed through reasoning related to the properties of objects that are added to these objects.

Mathematics on the whole is, in a large sense, an empirical science in which experiments play an important role. As a consequence, most mathematical relations, even a lot of axioms are *a posteriori* by nature.

Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein analyzed the manner in which the word knowledge is used naturally. He perceives knowledge as an example of resemblance of the family which rebuilds the knowledge concept so as to comprise relevant features, but which cannot be adequately governed by a precise definition.

modern philosophy and influenced a lot of enlightening philosophers, such as David Hume and George Berkeley.

At the same time, Wittgenstein debated the difference between sensorial data and reality, showing that actually people learn what a tree is due to the fact that trees are part of a natural category and not because they have received sensorial data about the tree. According to him, the sensorial data of trees are irrelevant in this case and do not give anything useful to people.

However, according to contemporary psychological and neuro-physiological theories, an individual sees a tree only if he/she receives sensorial data about it through his/her senses, the receiving of sensorial data not being enough. In order to see a tree and associate it with other trees, the brains have to correctly process sensorial data, build a relevant image and assign the copy the correct name of this image. Furthermore, a tree may be perceived not by observing trees as such, but their images, for instance photos or films with trees. After the images of trees are stored in memory, an individual can see a tree in his dreams. In this case the brains simulate accepting sensorial data the physical species it belongs to or its image.

Conclusions

In order to survive and thrive, people have always needed knowledge. Throughout the centuries, philosophers have treated the issue of knowledge from heterogeneous, different positions, without being able to reach a widely shared point of view. Yet, in practical terms, the importance of knowledge has grown more and more and, nowadays, the deposits of knowledge have become crucial non-tangible goods for all the levels of society. In order to function and develop in contemporary society, any individual needs a solid basis of knowledge.

Knowledge is a class of situations, entities, processes, playing an essential

role in the lives of individuals, in the functioning of organizations and in the entire existence of contemporary society, being a permanent source of change and development. At individual level, valid knowledge and its correct application can lead to bigger achievements and, consequently, a better life. At the level of an organization, knowledge may increase the expansion of activity in new fields and, implicitly, the renewal of organizational culture and practices. At the level of society itself, knowledge brings a constant level of economic and technological progress, progress which is becoming increasingly accelerated.

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THE ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

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Abstract: *The knowledge-based society, in which knowledge is much easier to acquire due to the rapid access to information and the alert pace of development of information technology, needs rapid solutions to find reliable sources of information.*

The article analyses the role of knowledge in contemporary society and the transition towards the organization oriented towards knowledge.

Key words: *knowledge, information, knowledge-based society, knowledge-based organization.*

The literature in the management field of the latest years has shown a large variety of practices that might create, store and transfer information and knowledge. Knowledge management (KM) is a relatively new discipline, being accepted in certain universities and being covered in reviews and journals in the field, starting with 1995.

In the latest years, knowledge has acquired special importance, obvious both in relation to quality and quantity, due to the development and use of technologies for processing and communicating information.

All the basic questions related to knowledge are connected to the manner in which they organized and directed the development and application of knowledge on different levels: individual, organizational, and social. In very many organizations, knowledge management has come to occupy a central role in their functioning and development, being a role that creates high requests for the strategic understanding of an organization, for the capacity of solving problems and for a

successful development. In the contemporary economic and social environment, the efficiency of knowledge management is necessary for allowing an organization to function with resources on long term.

Knowledge management can be regarded from several perspectives¹. The techno-centric perspective, that places special emphasis on technologies, especially those that contribute to the enriching and sharing of knowledge.

The organizational perspective that seeks an answer to the questions: How should the organization be thought of in order to facilitate the knowledge processes within it? Which organizations function in the best manner and on the basis of which processes? The ecological perspective, which regard people interactions, the identity factors, the knowledge and environment factors as a complex adapting system.

¹ Stakonsky, M. (ed.). *Creating the Discipline of Knowledge Management: The Latest in University Research*. Butterworth - Heinemann, 2004, ISBN 0-7506-7878-X

In the past, the common attitude of most people was to keep the knowledge acquired only for themselves, without sharing them with the other members of the organization. Nowadays, knowledge is considered a true necessity, the perception of current society changing significantly, the knowledge held by individuals being shared with all the members of the organization in order to develop it.

More and more people understand that the optimal generation, acquisition and application of knowledge is the key for success in current society.

There are a lot of societies that, only in order to keep up with the competition, feel compelled to conduct their activity only on the basis of an efficient management of knowledge. Knowledge is capable to valorize the competitive advantage of the organization. This competitive advantage is made through the thorough use of information and data associated with valorizing people's abilities and ideas, as well as their initiatives and motivations.

In contemporary society, it is important that one might take advantage of as many sources of knowledge available as possible. Some authors even argued in favor of acquiring a competence specific to knowledge management at any person willing to invest in increasing the own capacity of processing information.

At present, we are going through a rapid transition, from an "industrial society" to a „knowledge society”, the latter being based on the increasing importance of knowledge as a production factor.

Actually, the "age of knowledge" has its beginnings in the ninth decade of the previous century and proposes concepts such as: knowledge-based society, knowledge-based economy, knowledge-based organization and knowledge-based organization.

Of all the concepts mentioned above, the most commonly used one is the knowledge-based society, being used in order to emphasize the fact that, the role of communications and information technology (CIT) has turned from an instrument of technological change into an instrument used for increasing knowledge, offering a new potential for combining the information stored in CIT systems with the creative human potential.

Ilkka Tuomi identifies knowledge as a resource, as a product². Indeed, knowledge is clearly a primary resource in technologically advanced industries, such as computer industry, communication industry, software industry, pharmaceutical products' industry, etc.³

Unlike other resources, knowledge is produced by people and it plays the role of product. The importance of producing and creating knowledge increases rapidly, both at the level of governmental and non-governmental organizations, as they invest more and more in the production of knowledge.

Knowledge has become an intellectual property attached to a name or a group of names and certified through copyright or another form of social acknowledgement, such as, giving awards.

The production of knowledge is most often encountered in the domains of research, communication, and education, knowledge being found in books, articles, patents or various computer software, written, published or recorded at a certain time in order to transmit and use.

² Tuomi, I., *Data is more than knowledge: Implications of the reversed knowledge hierarchy for knowledge management and knowledge memory*, Journal of Management Information Systems, v. 16, No. 3, 1999, pp. 103–117.

³ Stata, R., *Organizational learning: The key to management innovation*, Sloan Management Review, v. 30, No. 3, 1989, pp. 63–74.

Our civilization is based on knowledge and processing of information. In contemporary economy, a knowledge-based economy, organizations gain more from intellectual assets based on knowledge, than from material goods. The good management of knowledge results in solving the various issues identified at the level of organizations be more efficient for the great companies and institutions.

People rely more and more on the systems of artificial intelligence processing (AI), in which information is processed for seeking knowledge in time, these systems depending on the dedicated software.

The software is incorporated in a variety of systems in most industrial sectors, from care and air industry to the energetic and maritime industry, being a form of representation of operational knowledge⁴. Knowledge creates areas of knowledge; a lot of intelligent systems access these areas that are explicitly or implicitly pre-defined through choosing the representation of knowledge.

Nowadays, the significance of knowledge has rapidly grown, together with the development of society. Thus, in the 20th century, together with the occurrence of computers, knowledge has become a preoccupation of science.

As a result, that was the time when knowledge was created in fields such as: artificial intelligence (AI), information technology (IT), data and knowledge bases, global networks (internet), information science, engineering and knowledge management⁵.

At the end of 20th century and the beginning of 21st century, special attention was given to knowledge management, this becoming such a hot topic that it was called the sacred formula, a magic and educational asset for business⁶. In order to explain this situation, new terms were introduced such as knowledge-oriented organization⁷ or the knowledge generating organization. The transition towards the knowledge-oriented organization presupposed successive models of organizational configurations (Figure 1).

⁴ Kandel, A., Dick, S., *Computational Intelligence in Software Quality, Series in Machine Perception Artificial Intelligence*, World Scientific, Singapore, v. 63, 2005, pp. 13-16.

⁵ Land, F., Land, N., Sevasti M., Amjad, U., *Knowledge management: the darker side of KM*, *EthiComp Journal*, v. 3, No. 1, 2007 at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/220064162_The_Ethics_of_Knowledge_Management, accessed on 05.10.2019;

⁶Hallal, W. E., *The Infinite Resource: Creating and Leading the Knowledge Enterprise*, Jossey-Bass Publishing, San Francisco, 1998, *apud*, Burgin, M., *Theory of Knowledge, Structures and Processes, World Scientific Series in Information Studies* Vol. 5, Los Angeles, 2017, p. 714.

⁷ Dragomirescu H., *Organizații bazate pe cunoaștere*, Studiu tematic elaborat în cadrul proiectului prioritar “Societatea informațională – societatea cunoașterii” al Academiei Române, academiaromana.ro/pro_pri/doc/st_g06.doc, accessed on 12.11.2019.




Fig. no. 1 – Succession of organizational configuration models

Source: Joy Palmer – *The human organization*. *Journal of Knowledge Management*

(Palmer, J., *The human organization*. *Journal of Knowledge Management*, Vol. 1, nr. 4, 1998, pp. 294-307.)

Knowledge management is a vast and complicated process. A large range of technologies have to be employed in order to answer the knowledge demands, from acquiring, modeling, maintaining, conveying, sharing, recuperating, reusing and publishing knowledge. Knowledge is an asset and a valuable resource, so, any set of instruments capable of providing support for operating knowledge may turn out as valuable, since its efficacy may penetrate all the domains in which it can be applied, structured around the representation of the domain.⁸

In order to reflect the importance of knowledge, the notion of knowledge society was invented as a description of contemporary society. Some researchers suggest that the knowledge-based society is the next step of information society. Essentially, each society has its own

knowledge. However, in our age, knowledge together with information becomes the key-instrument, not only for subsequent development, but also for the current survival in the circumstances of knowledge-based economy.

In order to describe the role of knowledge in contemporary society, Fritz Machlup, in his work *“The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States”* introduced the concept of economy of knowledge⁹. The economy of knowledge is a special stage of economic development, based on knowledge and physical assets, such as labor force, energy and matter. Knowledge plays an important role in the process of replacing labor force and other resources that allow obtaining better results, with less labor force and fewer resources. Knowledge is replaceable, which means that knowledge may replace, in certain measure, the capital, the work, or the physical materials; namely, knowledge allows using financial

⁸ Kalfoglou, Y., Dasmahapatra, S., Chen-Burger, Y., *Formal Concept Analysis in Knowledge Technologies. Experiences and Opportunities, in Concept Lattices*, Second International Conference on Formal Concept Analysis, LNCS, v. 2961, Springer, Berlin, 2004, pp. 252–260.

⁹ Machlup, F., *The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1962, pp. 13-42.

resources, work, or physical materials in a smaller quantity than it would be possible without the existence of this knowledge. As a result, the profit created is quantified less by the result of work itself, but increasingly more by the general level of scientific and technological development, the incorporated knowledge often being more valuable than the products, services or materials it contains.

Lucian Culda, in his work „*Analysis of the Social*” treats knowledge from the perspective of processual-organic theory, according to which the human body is made up of two types of processors: bio-processors and interpreters. All living things have bio-processors, satisfying the functioning and reproduction necessities of the body. Bio-processors provide coded data about the aspects received by analyzers, obtaining the capacity to know. In comparison to bio-processors, interpreters are found only in the human species. Interpreters perform awareness raising, namely the processes through which the individual not only knows, but he also finds out that he knows, except that he/she does not know that this „known issue” may be erroneous. The distinction between bio-processors and interpreters is given by the capacity of deliberate processing. The capacity of deliberate processing stems from the fact that people may become aware of interpretations given to the encoding performed by bio-processors, processing rules, results of own processing, own states of functioning¹⁰.

The essential part of knowledge structure is the cognitive one or the symbolic component of knowledge. The cognitive activity is a constructive activity resulting from the connections that may be achieved between types of logical-mathematical activities (information useful to research for outlining working hypotheses, theories and research projects)

¹⁰ Culda, L., *Analiza socialului. Repere epistemologice*, București, 1999, p. 74.

and from performing experiments in order to evaluate hypotheses and theories.¹¹

Cognitive activities make up a number of processing deliberately oriented on the following stages: empirical, mythical-mystical, philosophical and scientific. The thinking modes of the scientific stage are causal, interactionist, systemic and processual.

According to Lucian Culda, knowledge is a type of activity whose finality cannot be compared or reduced other kinds of activities.

A great number of scientists, economies, many governments, international organizations and reflection groups state the fact that people live now in a knowledge-based economy, as knowledge is the basis of various decisions made in various fields and therefore a priceless asset to individuals and organizations. There were few concepts introduced by economists that were more successful than that of a knowledge-based economy, reflecting a qualitative transition in economic conditions.¹²

Naturally, world economy nowadays gives an increasing value to activities of producing and disseminating knowledge, such as design in research-development, including education and training, marketing and communication. Information is a source of knowledge, while knowledge is a basis for producing and extracting information.

Obviously, as society advances at an alert pace, the importance of knowledge also grows in a very alert way.

Conclusions

Learning, education, knowledge as such have become very important in the last decades. Education at macro-

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 87.

¹² Foray, D., Lundvall, B. A., *The knowledge-based economy: From the economics of knowledge to the learning economy*, conținut în *OECD Documents: Employment and Growth in the Knowledge-Based Economy*, OECD, Paris, 1996, pp. 11–32.

organizational level is the core of organizational education in 21st century. Due to this shift in education, knowledge has become a crucial factor for any company for maintaining its competitive advantage through continuous innovation and technological changes. Only thus, through constant learning and acquiring knowledge, will dynamic organizations obtain products with high added value in an increasingly globalized world.

Knowledge is capable of capitalizing the competitive advantage of the organization. This competitive advantage is achieved by making full use of information and data associated with capitalizing people's abilities and ideas, as well as their commitments and motivations. Within corporations, knowledge is the product of organization and the systematic reasoning applied to data and information, offering a lasting competitive advantage to organizations.

The development of information society, based on knowledge, is going to impose a growth in competition and fight for supremacy, in the context in which companies are going to saturate the market with various products and quality services. In order to survive in nowadays' competitive environment, most companies admit the importance of the goods produced by knowledge in order to reach performance objectives. Despite this, when knowledge is separated from the context of the business process, they cannot contribute to the accomplishment of goals, as knowledge is used and created during the business processes.

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USE OF THE BALANCED SCORECARD CONCEPT AS AN INSTITUTIONAL COMMUNICATION INSTRUMENT

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***Abstract:** Due to the accelerated dynamics recorded in the globalized market of goods and services driven by technical and technological advancement, public or private organizations have been subjected to the pressure of increasingly sophisticated and directly based instruments, concepts or rules in strategic management policies on the products of the information age.*

The Balanced Scorecard concept is part of the social sciences products field and provides a set of tools, concepts, principles, and rules specific to strategic management for private sector companies and/or government organizations.

With the advent of the Balanced Scorecard concept in the early 90's, we are witnessing to date a refining and multiplying of the valences of its use in three main directions: system for measuring and evaluating performance; strategy management system; internal and external communication tools.

The present article presents the use of the Balanced Scorecard concept as an instrument of institutional communication, oriented both inside the organization with motivational role and outside it with the role of informing the civil society.

Due to the concepts and functions developed within the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) and confirmed over time, the concept is recommended for use in institutions within the defense system, public order, and national security.

***Key words:** Balanced Scorecard, communication tool, organization, national defense.*

Introduction

Balanced Scorecard (BSC) is a concept used by public and private sector organizations to score/highlight the strategic objectives of an organization, to measure the performance of the strategy implementation process and can also be used as an effective internal and external communication tool, aspects that over time and in many parts of the world have proven successful many times.

The strategic organizational management approach through the BSC guides the military structure towards flexibility, performance, efficiency, and progress in fulfilling the assigned tasks and missions.

The starting point for the successful application of the instruments, concepts, principles, and rules defined by the Balanced Scorecard is the definition of the vision, the mission, the strategic objectives, respectively the definition and implementation of an organizational strategy that will support the transformation effort and the success of the approach. The BSC concept offers the management team an integrated vision of the institutional effort by defining four perspectives:

- the financial perspective;
- the customers perspective;
- the internal processes perspective;
- the learning and growth perspective.

The analysis and evaluation of managerial performance from the point of view of the four perspectives ensures the continuous alignment of the individual and organizational effort, starting from the personnel situated at the base of the organization and up to the senior management, for the successful implementation of the strategy, the achievement of the strategic objectives and the vision.

The evaluation of how the institutional effort is aligned with the transformational strategy is performed by defining a set of key performance indicators closely linked to the defined strategic objectives.

This aspect gives the command team the statistical, mathematical dimension on the exact assessment of the level reached in the performance of the strategic management related to the set target thresholds, the human performance, the expenditure of resources, the overall efficiency or effectiveness in the actions taken.

The use of the strategic map offers the command team a graphical tool by which it presents to the personnel and civil society a concise visual image of their strategy, the main directions to follow and the cause-effect relations between the actions taken and the strategic objectives stated in the four perspectives. For a military organization, the strategy map can show how an investment in human resource development can improve internal processes and ultimately direct the effort towards the performance needed to accomplish its mission.

From this perspective, the BSC concept provides command teams with a series of data and information necessary to substantiate decisions and implement corrections, when they are needed.

The third approach of the BSC concept in strategic management, with a strong potential in aligning the individual and collective effort of the personnel in carrying out the daily tasks, is represented by the internal or external, horizontal and

vertical communication. Translating the vision, the strategic objectives and the mission into simple phrases, with an action and motivational effect, addressed to all the management or execution personnel, allows understanding the individual role in the effort of the whole institution to reach the objectives and the accomplishment of the missions.

In the case of the military institution, the strategic communication must also be directed to the outside of the institution in order to facilitate the transparency of the entire spectrum of activities, but also to maintain control over sensitive situations with a strong impact on the media, an aspect whereby the secrecy of the actions and subsequently, the obtaining mission success. The truth will be revealed once such a mission is completed, the personnel involved are no longer subject to external or other external pressures that could have jeopardized the successful execution of the mission.

Element of internal and external communication using Balanced Scorecard

A strong applicative side of the strategy map offered by the BSC concept is the internal communication within the military organization by disseminating information to directly subordinate personnel and subordinate structures and external communication, for the correct and prompt information of citizens and society as a whole about the actions undertaken by the institution military.

Communication is the process of transmitting information, ideas, opinions, beliefs, either from one individual to another or from one group to another. Communication is an attribute of the human species. No kind of activity, from the ordinary individual activities of the daily routine to the complex activities carried out at the level of the organizations, can be conceived outside the communication process.

Communication is an indispensable element for the optimal functioning of any human community, regardless of its nature and size. The continuous exchange of messages generates the unity of views, and implicitly of action, by harmonizing the knowledge regarding the goals, the ways and means to reach them, by promoting the necessary skills, by the relative homogenization of the groups in affective (emotional, sentimental) and motivational (opinions) aspect, interests, beliefs, attitudes).¹

Basically, through communication, the unitary coordination of efficient organizational behavior is achieved. Resuming the idea in another form, to communicate means to inform, to say, to explain, to share, to give order, to convince, to connect, to listen, to unite to act.

In managing the organization, communication is the key element that determines the efficiency, effectiveness, and performance of the organization in fulfilling its tasks.

As part of the social body, the army is a system intended to act in special situations. For this, she is preparing herself for an intense training activity, during which she needs an equally intense communication between the commanders and executives.

As a human action and within the military system, communication has a structure well defined by the five questions in the so-called paradigm of Harold D. Lasswell: Who (says) What (to) Whom (in) What Channel (with) What Effect?

In more details, the phenomenon of human communication implies the simultaneous existence of the following components:

- a need for change felt strong enough to push the action;
- leaders and managers, in other words at least one person with the role of the issuer and one with the role of receiver;
- information in the form of messages on the situation demanding change and on human forces, ways and means to achieve it;
- channels (means) of connection, often organized in a system through which the messages between senders and receivers are to circulate;
- a code, a common language of communication between the sender and the receiver;
- rules of communication and the ability acquired through training to respect them;
- a strong enough motivation for participants to make the necessary efforts to prepare for the change (to engage in the exchange of information).

A characteristic aspect of the military organization is given by the organization and functioning mode based on groups that are constituted according to the military regulations: group, platoon, company, battalion, brigade, etc. and national legislation: compartment, office, department, service, office, etc.

Within the group, the following features are manifested²:

- "There is a motivation to be together;
- there is the perception of the group as a unit of human interaction;
- individuals contribute in different proportions to the processes that take place in the group;
- agreements (agreements) and disagreements appear between individuals."

The strategy map made in the form proposed by the BSC concept, together

¹Ana Maria Hojbotă, Constantin Ticu, *Determinanți afectivi ai persistenței motivaționale*, în *Persistența motivațională – de la determinări afective și cognitive la condiționări contextuale*, proiect finanțat de CNCIS prin Programul "IDEI", „Proiecte de Cercetare Exploratorie” (PN-II-ID-PCE, cod 2206), 2012.

²Cristea Dumitru, *Psihologia grupurilor*, Editura Universității Titu Maiorescu, București, 2012, p. 23.

with the entire internal normative framework of the military institution fully supports the idea of effective internal and external communication:

- dissemination of the operational objectives that compete in achieving the strategic objectives;
- obtaining a high level of understanding of the strategy;
- motivating staff and aligning individual and collective efforts;
- transmission of information in a dense format, easy to follow and applied in daily activity;
- the interdependence and interconnection of the operational objectives when developing and implementing the strategy.

This type of internal communication is also specific in the dissemination of information vertically, to the subordinate military structures, for information, and to the upper echelons, for reporting.

In addition to internal communication, we also talk about external communication to the social partners of the state and the military organization, which is equally important. The printing of the strategy map on leaflets, its publication on the INTERNET, the whole spectrum of related promotional activities, we can catalog, as we have found in some specialized works³, the communication with promotion role. It is conducted unilaterally, from the organization to its external environment. In this situation, the military institution provides information about the products or services it offers, tries to improve its overall image or simply wants to make itself known and promote its values.

The main forms by which this particular type of communication materializes are:

- advertising - through its own published materials, but also through its own site on the page of the General Staff of the Naval Forces,

through INTRAMAN and through the Facebook page;

- participation in various symposia, conferences, book fairs, etc;
- promoting the career in the Naval Forces through information activities carried out in high schools;
- realization of radio and TV shows to promote the image and military career.

From a technical point of view, it uses the own computer network, the INTRAMAN network, and the INTERNET network to allow the rapid, direct and timely information of the users, shortening to the maximum the information flow path and achieving good security of the information disseminated through these communication channels.

External communication must be fully consistent with the entire spectrum of actions or internal processes that highlight and support the strategic vision, mission or goals. It must be aligned with the individual effort to fulfill the legislated missions.

There is also a strictly military dimension attached to the concept of external strategic communication. This has applicability both during peacetime but especially in crisis, mobilization or war situations, starting from high-intensity combat actions to military stability actions. Armed struggle is based on other principles and methods that ensure success in confronting the adversary, the communication used during the armed struggle becoming sometimes propaganda. The purpose of this type of communication is to create a false image on important aspects of the war economy, masking military actions, lowering the adversary's morale, etc. The military confrontations registered in the last 30 years confirm the use of this type of communication through the excessive use of the media, especially television, for imposing in the collective consciousness of the society certain predetermined patterns, a process called the CNN effect. This type of

³P. Zemor, *La communication publique*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1995, p. 56.

communication is not the subject of our article or the concept under debate - Balanced Scorecard.

Conclusions

In the field of defense, communication is an essential function in the exercise of the command and control of military actions and tasks. The communication act represented and has still represents a lever and an instrument in the hand of the command team for achieving cohesion and optimizing managerial processes.

Some of the challenges encountered in the organizations that have implemented the BSC concept through its distribution and branching within the organization include⁴:

- the personnel employed do not understand the process well enough to become efficient themselves;
- the cascade approach was wrongly planned;
- there is no optimal and efficient interconnection between departmental levels;
- performance evaluation using BSC is misunderstood or difficult to communicate.

The existing solution for the remediation and optimization of the strategy implementation processes consists of efficient communication, internal and external, horizontally and vertically.

The military institution must practice a pro-active external communication policy, by creating and supplying transparent information flows on the field and the issue of defense.

The internal use of the instruments and rules stipulated by the BSC concept, together with the classical ones offered by the media, contributes to the awareness and strengthening of the role of the military institution in the Romanian society.

⁴<https://www.balancedscorecard.org/BSC-Basics/Cascading-Creating-Alignment>, accessed at 19.10.2019.

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THE CONCEPT OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING

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Abstract: *The acquisition is a discipline of multifunctional technical management that aims to design, develop, test, produce, install and support the products/systems considered through the improvement of the effective cost system. The basis of the acquisition system consists of a complete set of undivided instructions, standards and procedures, and the transition to acquisition management through programs, by acquisition categories. The acquisition strategy establishes the conditions for obtaining affordable defense systems, including operating and support costs, by determining the objectives that involve very high costs and how to approach them. This paper summarizes the cost estimation process based on the concept of systems engineering.*

Key words: *system, systems engineering, system of systems, family of systems.*

Introduction

The systemic paradigm assumes matter and spirit as indissociable elements of an evolutionary process that develops nonlinearly, within a complex system. The «*General Systems Theory*» does not have to be understood as a particular theory (such as the theory of complex numbers), but as a model that can be illustrated in different branches of knowledge (*such as the Theory of Evolution*).

Systems Engineering Guide for Systems of Systems provides the following definitions¹:

- The system is a functional, physical and/or behavioral group associated with regularly interacting or interrelated

elements; that group of elements that form a unified whole.

- The capability means the ability to achieve a desired effect under standard and specific conditions by combinations of ways and means to perform a set of tasks.
- The system of systems (SoS) is defined as a set or arrangement of the systems that result when independent and useful systems are integrated into a larger system that offers unique capabilities [Department of Defense (DoD), 2004(1), Defense Acquisition Guidebook Ch. 4 “System of Systems Engineering,” Washington, DC: Pentagon, October 14]. Both individual systems and SoS are in line with the accepted definition of a system in which each consists of parts, relations and a whole which is greater than the sum of the parts; however, although a SoS is a system, not all systems are SoS.

¹ Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, *Systems and Software Engineering. Systems Engineering Guide for Systems of Systems*, Version 1.0. Washington, DC: ODUSD(A&T)SSE, 2008, p. 16, accessible at <https://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/SE-Guide-for-SoS.pdf>, accessed on August 12th, 2019.

- The family of systems (FoS, family of systems) is defined as a set of systems that offers similar capabilities through different approaches in order to achieve similar or complementary effects [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), 2007(1), CJCS Instruction 3170.01F “*Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System*”, Washington, DC: Pentagon, May 1]. The FoS is fundamentally different from the SoS because a family of systems does not have the synergy of a system of systems. The family of systems does not acquire new qualitative properties as a result of the grouping. In fact, the member systems cannot be connected as a whole.

Systems Engineering, subject-matter and implementation field

The Systems Engineering (SE) is an interdisciplinary approach meant to develop and verify an integrated and balanced set of system-level decisions and process solutions that meet the customer's expressed needs.

The concept of *systems engineering* defines the interdisciplinary activities that are needed throughout the life cycle of a system to transform the customer's needs, requirements and restrictions into a system solution.

Systems engineering focuses on support preparation activities for the decisions needed to guide the development of a system, ensuring that it is properly designed so that it can be accomplished, installed in troops, used safely, maintained and removed from service without endangering either health or the environment.

The content of systems engineering describes an integrated approach for the development of complex systems that represents the total effort for:

- understanding of the associated environments and conditions in which the system will be used and for which it must be designed;
- defining the system requirements in terms of functional and performance requirements, quality factors, ease of use, production, support, safety and environmental influence;
- defining the life cycle processes for the design, manufacture, testing, maintenance, training and decommissioning.

Establishes the management of a system from the initial concept to the development, operation and removal from service, meaning throughout its entire life cycle.




Fig. 1 Environment for Systems Engineering within an Organization
 Source: Attachment A (for reference) from STPM M 40546-99 Implementation and Management of Systems Engineering Process. General requirements, Fig. 22

The Figure no. 1 presents a perspective of the systems engineering process and its role in an organization environment and of the external environment, in order to establish a system project associated with a product required by the market. The process is initially implemented to identify the best concept or approach to meet the market opportunity. Such implementation allows the further development of the subsystems, components and elements of a total system or of the specific parts of an existing product that is subject to gradual improvement.

From the figure above one may observe that the *systems engineering* is represented as the absolute effort responsible for establishing the system project, as well as the concurrent establishment of the processes of development, testing, manufacturing, support, operation, training, distribution and remove from service.

The system engineering process establishes the system design and the supporting infrastructure of its life cycle. The project development environment, using the concept of systems engineering,

supports the development of the system by defining the objectives, the success criteria, the decision points and the management priorities that will keep under control the integrated activities.

The organization applying the concept of systems engineering (SE) must establish the policies and procedures to keep under control the project activities, which must be associated with the product development.

Usually, the management of the organization allocates the resources in order to carry out the systems engineering activities, in support of establishing the processes of product design, manufacture, testing, operation, support, distribution, training and putting the product out of use. The activities of the organization include the training of the personnel, the establishment of the essential technologies of application and the implementation of the information infrastructure for the management of the projects at the organization level. The technologies specific to a certain field restrict, also, the availability and use of tools, the design alternatives and the process solutions.

The external environment provides the political and social considerations or restrictions that affect the organization's efforts to market new products. At the same time; we must ensure that the product is designed to comply with the

applicable social and political restrictions. Such restrictions constitute socio-political climate in which commercial and industrial activities are regulated and include: regulations on environmental and human factors protection, safety regulations, technological restrictions and other regulations established by the international central and local government bodies that protect the interests of customers.

Another restriction on product solutions is provided by the natural or induced environments in which the product operates. The impact of these environments, as well as the impact that a given product has on these environments, largely determines the degree of acceptance of the product on the market by the customer.

A fundamental interest of an organization is to launch products that meet customer's expectations and which are accepted by the public. Acceptance degree includes the distribution, training, support, and decommissioning services, available when required to support the product use.

Systems engineering is responsible for the total development effort required to establish a system project that can be tested, manufactured, supported, operated, distributed and decommissioned.




Fig. 2 The problem field and the solution field for Systems Engineering
 Source: Attachment A (for reference) from STPM M 40546-99 Implementation and Management of Systems Engineering Process. General Requirements, Fig. 23

The Figure no. 2 shows the field of the problem that needs to be investigated and understood in order to start developing a system / product solution.

On a general level, there are technical, biological, political, legal, financial, ecological systems, etc. Thus, a system can be seen as an element of a larger system and a problem arises when understanding the limitations of the system that is the center of the development effort, as well as the relations and interfaces between this system and other systems.

Systems Engineering Process

The systems engineering process is a generic problem-solving process that provides the mechanisms for identifying

and elaborating the product and process definitions of a system.

The systems engineering process is applied throughout the life cycle of the system for all the activities associated with the development, check-up/testing, manufacturing, training, operation, support, distribution, decommissioning of the product and for human systems engineering.

The Figure no. 3 describes the elements of the system engineering process and shows how they are repeated to produce a compatible set of requirements, functional combinations and design solutions.

There can be noticed that the systems engineering process is an iterative process and the interacting elements may have different properties within this process.

The contradictions between the requirements and the specific restrictions of the system which is to be developed must be taken into account permanently.

The systems engineering is responsible for the total development effort required to establish a system project that can be

tested, manufactured, supported, operated, distributed and removed from service. Training for operation, support, distribution and decommissioning should also be taken into consideration.




Fig. 3 Systems Engineering Process

Source: The Standard STP M 40546-99 (1999) Systems Engineering, Figure no. 4.

Taking over from STP Standard M 40546-99 (1999) Systems Engineering, Figure no. 4.

In the most general case in the systems engineering process, for each stage of the life cycle, several sub-processes are distinguished (Figure no. 4).

The SE process involves the following important activities: requirements analysis; requirements validation; functional analysis and distribution; synthesis; project check-up; system analysis; system control.

Entry requirements may include: the conditions set by the beneficiary (the mission, the environment of use), limitations, efficiency measures, standardization measures, etc.

The specific output measures resulting from the SE process can be: specifications, control documents for interfaces, technical data package, management plans, development strategies, etc.




Fig. 4 The Generic Process of Systems Engineering

Source: MALOȘ Gavrilă, BODEA Constanța, “Systems Engineering and Defense Industry Restructuring”, în: *Revista Informatica Economică* (Economic Computer Science Magazine), no. 3 (23)/2002, The Academy of Economic Science, Bucharest, accessible at <http://revistaie.ase.ro/content/23/Bodea.pdf>

Systems engineering is an interdisciplinary way of developing and verifying some integrated and acceptable products (from the point of view of the life cycle) and some solutions of the processes that satisfy the specified needs of the beneficiary.

A total project of the system is mainly characterized by the unity of the essential elements of the hardware, software and resources planned for logistics in their interconnections. The result will always be a balance between the total system solutions that meet the operational needs and other objectives of the program. The systems engineering process can and should be used to transform users' operational needs into requirements and the requirements into projects that meet the program performance, the costs and the objectives.

The systems engineering process follows a logical sequence, from top to bottom, of the development and

improvement of the project by using an iterative process in which the operational requirements are transformed into performance requirements for the functional elements of a system. For each element, the design variants are identified and analyzed and the best combination of the element projects is selected in order to achieve the system objectives.

The performance requirements are refined based on selected alternatives and updated requirements and are further decomposed to the next level of the performance function. Once again, the alternatives are identified and analyzed, the process repeating itself.

It is quite possible that, in the course of this process, there would be failures, situations in which the functional decomposition of the requirements to the lowest level of a performance function would continue. In this way the pyramidal structure of the project built on

hierarchical levels “from top to bottom” becomes a solid, viable construction.

The synthesis of a physical project begins when “hard” articles are chosen to provide the identified performances and are arranged in a physical relation of compatibility and functionality with each other. During this stage of project development the analysis is used to verify the extent to which the elements and subsystems added progressively correspond to the satisfaction of the highest level of requirements. The estimates made are verified directly by demonstrations, tests and assessments.

Conclusions

Modern management, in the systemic approach, starts from the consideration that organizations are dynamic, open systems, in permanent communication with the environment which they are part of. The management must take into account the development of both society and information technologies.

General considerations of systems engineering refer to an entire project development cycle, but the design and approach can also be applied punctually only to certain requirements. This brings real advantages (reducing the time, cost and risk associated with any new design activity) highlighted by using the available projects for the product hardware and software and for the resources and services of the logistic support.

The systemic approach improves the management performance by creating the possibility to take into account, in the decision plan, as many variables of which the results of the organizations depend on.

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COST ESTIMATION PROCESS BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING

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Abstract: *The acquisition is a discipline of multifunctional technical management that aims to design, develop, test, produce, install and support the products/systems considered through the improvement of the effective cost system. The basis of the acquisition system consists of a complete set of undivided instructions, standards and procedures, and the transition to acquisition management through programs, by acquisition categories. The acquisition strategy establishes the conditions for obtaining affordable defense systems, including operating and support costs, by determining the objectives that involve very high costs and how to approach them. This paper summarizes the cost estimation process based on the concept of systems engineering.*

Key words: *cost, life cycle cost, system, systems engineering.*

Introduction

Romania, just like every other state, applies its own acquisitions system. Each of these systems is more or less procedural and integrated, based on their own conceptions regarding the financing and functioning of the commercial relations from an economic and political point of view. The basis of the military acquisition system consists of a complete set of undivided instructions, standards and procedures, and the transition to acquisition management through programs, by acquisition categories.

The acquisition strategy establishes the conditions for obtaining affordable defense systems, including operating and support costs, by determining the objectives that involve very high costs and how to approach them.

The systems engineering process is applied throughout the life cycle of the system for all the activities associated with the development, check-up/testing,

manufacturing, training, operation, support, distribution, decommissioning of the product and for human systems engineering. Systems engineering focuses on support preparation activities for the decisions needed to guide the development of a system, ensuring that it is properly designed so that it can be accomplished, installed in troops, used safely, maintained and removed from service without endangering either health or the environment. The content of systems engineering describes an integrated approach for the development of complex systems and it is based on specific national regulations, which, in their turn, are in conjunction with the international regulations.

The management of the acquisition programs for weapon systems are very complex and require the existence of an organized environment such as the one provided by the system engineering. The costs divided structures used by various military systems take into account the

elementary costs with the highest weight. They are detailed differently, and their identification is awkward, because of the differentiated way of costs' understanding and accounting at national level. At the same time, nations use different terminology in order to define an elementary cost.

Specific National Regulations

The acquisition strategy of a complex military product details the requirements, objectives and how to implement a program for building a system. Strategy development starts from the results of the acquisition decision-making process. The decision is supported both by the study of the preliminary analyzes and operation requirements, and by the results of the market survey. The strategy is developed on a structure formed by the acquisition decision, the systems engineering associated with it and other requirements of the program of activities specific to the type of acquisition, requirements defined starting from the needs and constraints formulated and acknowledged yet from the preliminary phase.

The compatibility and interoperability between the weapon systems of our country and those of NATO begin with the similarity of acquisition practices (policies, strategies, regulations and standards). They are, in fact, the basis for developing a new acquisition concept, which is one of the major objectives of the Ministry of National Defense.

Leading the acquisition process in the right direction requires transparency and clear regulations to ensure, on the one hand, that the taxes paid by the taxpayers are spent under optimal conditions for the endowment of the army and, on the other hand, to ensure a fair treatment to all bidders who want to become suppliers of the Army.

The mandatory implementation of the 1000 Series Instructions was approved by the Minister of National Defense Order no.

M33/April 8th, 1999, regarding the integrated defense acquisition management system (SIMAPA), as revised and updated in 2001. Thus, the Ministry of National Defense has a well-defined acquisition management system, the first one used by the state administration, similar to the systems existing in the armies of NATO member countries, which systems were, moreover, taken into consideration in the development of our own system (Attachment no. 2).

With time, specific instructions, regulations and standards have been developed and implemented within this integrated process:

- MApN (the Ministry of National Defense) Instruction I.1000.1-01 regarding the Regulation for issuing the requirements: regulates the issuing manner of the requirements (*the Mission Needs Document and Operational Requirements Document*) and defines the organization and functioning of the Resources Supervisory Board;

- MApN Instruction I.1000.2-01 regarding the Management of defense acquisitions: defines the acquisition policies and procedures in the field of defense regarding management, definition, structure, strategy, deployment, evaluation and reporting of the acquisition program;

- MApN Instruction I.1000.3 regarding the interaction between the System of Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation, the Requirements Issuing System and the Defense Acquisitions Management System, with the purpose of correlating these three systems;

- MApN Instruction I.1000.4 regarding products testing, evaluation and approval processes, as approved by the Order of the Minister of National Defense M15/February 1st, 2006. In accordance with the provisions of this instruction, any product, system, equipment which the Army is provided with, must be approved;

- MApN Instruction I.1000.5 regarding the management of scientific

research activities for military techniques and technologies, specifying the bodies with specific responsibilities in the field of scientific research for military techniques and technologies, in accordance with the provisions of the "Military Technical Research Strategy for the period 1997-2015", as approved by the Decision of the Supreme Council of National Defense no. 114/September 23rd, 1997;

- Program Management Procedure, code P-DCD-01;

- Contract Management Procedure, code P-DMC-01;

- STP M 40530-99 Systems Engineering. Guide Regarding the Evaluation Criteria and Procedures. This standard corresponds to MIL-STD-499A, Systems Engineering Management;

- STP M 40531-99 (1999) Work Breakdown Structures for Military Technical Products. Criteria of Use. This standard corresponds to MIL-STD-881B. It provides at paragraph 2.9: *The life cycle cost. It represents the total cost for research, development, investment, exploitation and maintenance or for the arrangement of the means of combat. This element starts with the design stage and ends with the system withdrawal / demilitarization. The requirements of the work breakdown structure established by this standard are only associated with the*

purchase of defense products (or with major changes) and, specifically, with those elements of research, development and with the investments that are applicable to the contracted activities;

- STP M 40533-99 (1999) *Technical Reviews and Audits for Systems, Equipment, and Computer Software.* The Standard corresponds to MIL-STD-1521 B;

- STP M 40546-99 (1999) *Implementation and Management of Systems Engineering Process. General Requirements,* Bucharest.

STP M 40546-99 (1999) Standard defines the interdisciplinary activities that are needed throughout the life cycle of a system to transform customer's needs, requirements and restrictions into a system solution. The standard is intended to guide the development of systems for commercial, government, military and space applications. This standard applies to an organizational entity within an organization that has the responsibility of developing a product design and establishing the life cycle infrastructure needed to support it. The standard specifies the requirements for the systems engineering process and its application throughout the product life cycle.




Fig. 1 General diagram and the main responsibilities of the integrated defense acquisitions management system

Source: MAPN I.1000.3 Instruction, Attachment no. 1 (Art. 2).

The Integrated Management System

The entire activity optimization need in the field of defense has also dictated the introduction in the army of the integrated management as a voluntary managerial approach assumed by the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense in order to continuously improve the overall performance of the military establishment, by joining all the military activities in a coherent whole.¹

The purpose of integrated management system (I.M.S.) is to ensure the achieving of goals and the sustainable competitiveness of the military establishment, as well as to satisfy the demands of both the army personnel and of the society in which it operates.

¹ Ovidiu – Mihai Cocenescu, *Integrated defense planning, a mechanism for optimizing the management of defense resources*, The „Carol I” National Defense University in Bucharest, 2013.



Fig. 2 Elements of the Integrated Management System

Source: Adaptation after COCENESCU Ovidiu – Mihai - Integrated defense planning, a mechanism for optimizing the management of defense resources, The National Defense University „Carol I” Bucharest, 2013, fig. 14.

The integrated management (fig. 2) is based on the principles enabling the provision of task fulfillment, the performance-oriented operational management, the compliance and risk management, in accordance with the quality, security and environment demands. This management system is based on norms/standards such as: TQM (total quality management system); ISO 9000/2008 (quality management system); ISO 14001/2005 (environmental management system); SR OHSAS 18001/2008 (occupational health and safety management system); ISO 27001/2008 (information security management system).

The defense integrated management represents the mechanism by which the process of achieving the strategic objectives assumed by designing, developing and maintaining the national military capabilities based on the defense resources estimated to be available (according to multi-annual planning - correlated with the national economic capacity).

The Weapons Department represents the *technical authority* within the Ministry of National Defense, providing the management of major acquisition programs for all categories of military forces (fig. 3).

In the management of major acquisition programs, the *systems engineering and acquisitions management* are applied as an *unitary, integrated system*, focused on the management activities required for the development of a Weapons system, ensuring that it is properly designed and it has the appropriate logistics in order to be manufactured, suitable, used, maintained and removed from service, without endangering either the health of the fighter or the environment.

The integrated defense acquisition management system (SIMAPA) is, in turn, integrated into a system of systems. By applying the SIMAPA, the Weapons Department has the role to transform the operational requirements elaborated by the end users into weapons systems and military equipment within the major programs of military technique acquisition and of research and development projects.




Fig. 3 Weapons Department areas of responsibility

Source: <https://newstrategycenter.ro/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Prezentare-Dl.-Marian-Vatavu.pdf>, accessed on July 15th, 2018.

This integrated system is mandatory for the purchase of all products (combat technique, equipment, gear, machinery, spare parts, fuels, lubricants, special liquids, military uniforms and accessories, food products etc.), as well as other services necessary for the proper operation of the Ministry of National Defense.

Based on the operational requirements approved by the Requirements Supervisory Board (CSC) and on the planned funds, as approved by the Defense Planning Council (CPA), the Weapons Department practically provides for the management of major programs and of the

acquisition contracts, according to the decisions taken at CODA, CPA or Government level (fig. 4).

The main aspects in the acquisition system management, where the management of the program is supported by the contract management and the resource management, refer to: the technical management; the contract management; the financial management; the management of industrial resources and relations; the management of integrated logistics support throughout the product's lifetime.




Fig. 4 - Procedural acquisition steps

Source: <https://newstrategycenter.ro/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Prezentare-DI.-Marian-Vatavu.pdf>, accessed on July 15th, 2018.

The technical management is provided by the Major Acquisition Programs Division within the Research and Development Department, by Program Managers and by Program Teams. The main activities refer to: defining the system/program/project; the basis of the acquisition program; activities plan (SOW); system design and development; *estimating the lifetime costs*; designing the integrated logistics support and defining the product infrastructure; systems testing and evaluation; reliability and maintenance; standardization and interoperability; the transition from development to production; standards and specifications; technical analysis and audits; configuration management; risk management; process and control management; system security, safety and quality; total quality management; management of integrated program teams.

Conclusions

For the life cycle cost analysis in the process of military acquisition, which

covers the entire life cycle of a weapon equipment / system, specific to complex weapon systems, the system of systems (SoS, System of Systems) has been defined according to standards, showing that there are several definitions of the system of systems, some of them depending on the particularity of an application area. We consider being the most useful for the topic of our research the one of ISO / IEC / IEEE 15288:2015: Life cycles processes of the systems and software. Furthermore, the Attachment G to the standard ISO / IEC / IEEE 15288 also describes the impact of these features in the implementation of systems engineering processes.

It can be concluded that there are no fundamentally different concepts, as there is a starting point for developing a unique acquisition system for NATO member states. This system would give the possibility of joint acquisition of weapon systems, which at the same time would be needed for several states, in order to reduce the costs and, generally, the

resources involved and to provide the required interoperability at Alliance level.

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EU ON ITS WAY FROM “A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD” TOWARDS A “SHARED VISION, COMMON ACTIONS: A STRONGER EUROPE”

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Abstract: *In the context of today's world, facing older or newer dangers and threats, the EU is one of the greatest powers acting in the spirit of promoting stability and security for Member States and partners. Thus, in difficult times, a strong political-economic organization like the EU has had and needs a strategy covering the areas of security and defense. The European Security Strategy of 2003 and the Global Strategy of 2016 represent the EU's response to threats and challenges from outside and from within the EU. The content analysis of the texts of the two strategies shows an EU determined to support a firm commitment of an initially politico-economic organization that evolves into a comprehensive one that includes the components of defence, security and foreign policy.*

Key words: *threats, defense, autonomy, security, politics, strategy.*

Today's world faces older or newer dangers and threats. The old ones were characterized by the classic interstate conflicts evolved into the intrastate conflicts and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The treats of the new generation include: the presence of non-state actors who commit terrorist attacks; threats from the cyber spectrum; the use of information operations and, last but not least, actions specific to hybrid threats. In Lawrence Freedman's opinion, the conflict of the future will be *a blurred concept and a range of speculative possibilities*¹.

In this context, the EU represents one of the largest economic, political, commercial and financial powers in the world, acting in the spirit of promoting stability and security for both Member States and partners. The EU through its member countries is trying to find solutions to respond effectively and efficiently to the dangers and threats specific to the turn of the century. Thus, in difficult times, a strong political-economic organization like the EU has had and needs a *strategy* covering the areas of security and defense.

Hence, the EU has set on an interesting path that began in 2003 with the *European Security Strategy*² and then evolved in 2016 into the *Global Strategy*³. The present article will examine, using content analysis as a research method, the main elements characterizing the two strategies, as well as the common points and the differences identified by comparing the texts of the strategies mentioned above.

European Security Strategy “A Secure Europe in a Better World”

Created in 2003, under the mandate of Javier Solana, the European Security Strategy can represent the EU's reply to a similar document prepared by the Bush administration following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. EU

² *A Secure Europe in a Better World– European Security Strategy*, 2003,
http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/307_European%20Security%20Strategy.pdf accessed on 24 Sep. 2019.

³ *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*, 2016,
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf accessed on 24 Sep. 2019.

¹ Lawrence Freedman, *The Future of War*, Penguin Random House UK, 2017, p. xxi.

Member States succeeded, through the historic decision of December 12, 2003, to issue an official EU document regulating for the first time a strategic vision of the EU on common foreign and security policy (Common Foreign and Security Policy – CFSP).

The 2003 strategy represented a document organized on the following structure: an introduction, three chapters: Security environment: global challenges and major threats; Strategic objectives; Implications for Europe at policy level and a final conclusion. The document has fourteen pages presenting in a clear and emphasized language the elements specific to the first EU strategy in the area of foreign and security policy, against the background of an extremely optimistic statement from the very beginning of the strategy: “*Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free*”⁴. At the end of the strategy, the optimistic tone is modified through a realistic and balanced perspective. Thus, it is stated that “*the European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realize the opportunities.*”⁵

On December 11, 2008, the EU prepared through the European Commission and the European Council, five years after the emergence of the European Security Strategy, an interesting 2003 strategy evaluation document called the *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World* -⁶. This report highlights the positive results of EU involvement in the Balkan crises, the

framework for discussion with EU partners, in the form of the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership, and, last but not least, the involvement in the crises in Afghanistan and Georgia. The 2008 report also identifies new problems arising from globalization and the emergence of complex and interconnected threats such as: financial crisis, vulnerability of information systems and electricity supply systems, piracy. The report concludes that “*to build a secure Europe in a better world, we must do more to shape events. And we must do it now.*”⁷

Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe”

The global strategy of 2016 brought about a modified and improved perspective of the previous 2003 strategy amid major crises that the EU and the Member States faced while devising the two strategies. The new strategy addresses the internal problems of the EU and the external nature of the new challenges and threats that have emerged in the international environment.

The document is organized on a unitary and logical structure that includes: a foreword by Mrs. Federica Mogherini, a brief summary, four chapters: A global strategy for promoting the interests of our citizens. The principles underlying our external action, the priorities of our external action, from vision to action and finally instead of conclusions a Way to follow. The strategy has sixty pages in total and starts with an alarming statement by the High Representative “*The purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned*”⁸ and ends in an optimistic

⁴ *A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy*, 2003, http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/307_European%20Security%20Strategy.pdf, p. 1 accessed on 24 Sep. 2019.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 14.

⁶ *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy -Providing Security in a Changing World-*, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf accessed on 28 Sep. 2019.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 12.

⁸ *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy*, 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf, p. 3, accessed on 24 Sep. 2019.

note that states “*This Strategy is underpinned by the vision of, and ambition for, a stronger Union, willing and able to make a positive difference to its citizens and in the world.*”⁹

The 2016 strategy was followed annually by reports and so far a number of three implementation reports have been prepared¹⁰. These reports point out the elements of progress that the EU and the Member States have been able to achieve compared to the initial elements presented in the 2016 Global Strategy. These points are usually presented on the framework of the four chapters of the 2016 strategy. These implementation reports represent a major step forward from a single report for the 2003 strategy and also demonstrate the importance that the EU attaches to the global strategy for foreign and security policy.

Common points and differences present in the text of the strategies

The common point present in both EU strategies is the premise from which the two documents start, namely that the European Union is facing a series of crises, manifesting both within and beyond the organization. These crises are the result of threats. Thus, *threats* to the EU from the perspective of the European Security Strategy of 2003 are presented in the first chapter and include five types: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 51.

¹⁰ These reports are: in 2017 *The EU Global Strategy – Year 1*, https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy/49750/eu-global-strategy-%E2%80%93-year-1_en; in 2018 *Implementing the Global Strategy: EU delivers on security and defence*, https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy/47517/implementing-global-strategy-eu-delivers-security-and-defence_en; in 2019 *From Vision to Action: The EU Global Strategy in Practice - Three years on, looking forward*, https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy/64034/vision-action-eu-global-strategy-practice-three-years-looking-forward_en accessed on 24 Sep. 2019.

and organized crime¹¹. These threats listed in the 2003 strategy as *key threats* are reinforced by a series of *global challenges* including: the progressive opening of borders, interconnected infrastructure of Member States, poverty and disease, competition for natural resources and energy dependence.¹²

The structure of the 2016 Global Strategy results from establishing clear *priorities* in terms of foreign policy and security and not from identifying risks and threats. Although they do not occupy a specially nominated section, as was the case with the 2003 strategy, the threats are listed in relation to European interests, CFSP priorities and lines of action. Thus, the threats identified in the strategy text are: economic volatility, energy insecurity, climate change, and terrorism and hybrid threats¹³. The threats cyber¹⁴ and organized crime¹⁵ are also mentioned in different contexts.

In comparison with the previous strategy we notice that the number of threats differs, respectively five in the 2003 strategy and seven in the 2016 strategy, the only threats common to the two strategies being *terrorism* and *organized crime*. Compared to the 2003 strategy, the 2016 strategy takes the threat of “*regional conflicts*” to another level. These are analysed in a stand-alone sub-chapter entitled “*An integrated approach to conflicts and crises*”, proving awareness of the evolution of conflicts and the need for their management at an integrated higher level. Also, we can see that the

¹¹ *A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy*, 2003, http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/307_European%20Security%20Strategy.pdf, pp. 3-5 accessed on 25 Sep. 2019.

¹² *Ibidem*, pp. 2-3.

¹³ *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*, 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf, p. 18, accessed on 25 Sep. 2019.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 21.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 50.

remaining threats listed in the two strategies correspond practically to the different years when the documents were being prepared and the events, from the European and global security environment, specific to those time periods.

A different approach in the two strategies concerns the EU's relationship with the Russian Federation. The 2003 strategy states that the EU "*should continue to work towards closer relations with Russia*"¹⁶. It is also considered that "*respect for common values will strengthen progress in the direction of a strategic partnership*"¹⁷. These desires must be viewed in the light of strong economic relations between some influential states in the EU, especially in the area of insurance with various energy resources "*EU-economic ties with Russia are incredibly strong and therefore, the source of all evil*"¹⁸.

In contrast, the 2016 strategy shifts the approach towards the Russian Federation through the perspective of the events in Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea. Thus, according to the 2016 strategy, the relations with the Russian Federation are seen as a "*the key strategic challenge.*"¹⁹ Even if the economic

relations and energy interdependencies still exist, the EU asks the Russian Federation to respect international law. The text of the strategy clearly confirms the non-recognition of the annexation of Crimea and the failure to accept the destabilization of eastern Ukraine. There are basically some red lines drawn by the EU which show that the force of law cannot be replaced by the law of force. Moreover, the need to strengthen the resilience of states in the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood and to defend the right of these states to choose their own path is stated.

The 2016 Global Strategy states that the EU faces opportunities and challenges from five regions: the European neighbourhood, North Africa and the Middle East, Africa, the Atlantic Partnerships and Asia. The EU intends to provide support for reforms in the Western Balkans and for Turkey in terms of integration and association in relation to the European neighbourhood. The 2016 strategy stresses the need to strengthen relations with Turkey and counteract the phenomenon of border migration. The old 2003 strategy also placed an emphasis on the relations and negotiations with Turkey²⁰, the progress of the Western Balkans, the situation of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the deployment of EULEX²¹ in Kosovo, the association agreement with Ukraine and the negotiations with the Republic of Moldova.

For North Africa and the Middle East, the 2016 strategy emphasizes the adaptation of EU instruments of action to the security and defence realities in the region and the ways to prevent humanitarian crises. The old strategy mentioned the conflicts generated by state

¹⁶ *A Secure Europe in a Better World– European Security Strategy*, 2003, http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/307_European%20Security%20Strategy.pdf, p. 14 accessed on 25 Sep. 2019.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸ Oana-Elena Brânda, *Can 21st Century Appeasement Be Successful? The European Union Case*, International Scientific Conference "Strategies XXI", Vol. 1, "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest, 2018, p. 14, <https://www.strategii21.ro/A/2018-04.%20STRATEGIC%20CHANGES%20IN%20SECURITY%20AND%20INTERNATIONAL%20RELATIONS/Security%20and%20Defence%20Faculty%20Vol%201%20Strategic%20changes%20in%20security%20and%20international%20relations%202018%20online.pdf> accessed on 25 Sep. 2019.

¹⁹ *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*, 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf, p. 31, accessed on 25 Sep. 2019.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 35.

²¹ The European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo is the largest civilian mission under the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. For more details <https://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/>

fragility such as the case of Somalia, Guinea-Bissau or Congo.

Regarding the Atlantic Partnerships, of course, the 2016 strategy emphasizes the central role of the privileged partnership with NATO. It also presents the relationship with the US through the Transatlantic Partnership for Trade and Investment (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – TTIP), with Latin American countries both bilaterally and through interregional commitments. The 2003 strategy only emphasizes the EU-NATO partnership, presenting the Berlin plus commitments as aimed at improving the EU’s operational capacity and providing the right framework for the two organizations to act in the field of crisis management.

Last but not least, Asia is mentioned in the text of the two strategies. Thus, the 2016 EU strategy identifies the important developments of connectivity with the Asian region, underlining the Union’s capacity to support a conflict management framework and regional cooperation efforts. The 2003 strategy, on the other hand, is focused on clarifying the difficult situation in Georgia, the presentation of the importance of the Mediterranean basin (Israel and Morocco), and expressing concern about the Iranian nuclear program.

Although both strategies aim for a “safer” and “stronger” Europe, we can see that only the 2016 strategy brings a comprehensive and integrated approach to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In addition, the concept is used nineteen times in the text of the strategy to further highlight the growing role of CSDP at EU level. According to the global strategy, in order to respond effectively to the challenges of the present and future security environment, this policy must go beyond the pioneering stage. The overall vision of the strategy is the premise that the EU needs action tools at global, regional and local level, with the CSDP being such an instrument meant to contribute to the fulfilment of the strategic

directions of the EU. The CSDP can evolve from the perspective of the 2016 strategy by increasing interoperability, the efficiency of military operations and the development of civilian missions.²²

A key concept characterizing the EU from the perspective of the 2016 strategy is *strategic autonomy*. Found eight times in the text of this strategy compared to the previous strategy in which it never appeared, the concept of strategic autonomy shows the EU’s desire to be itself stronger, with a shared vision and joint actions with NATO and other regional and global partners. A strong point in achieving this strategic autonomy can be achieved through the European defense industry and through cooperation in defence. Of course, the road to strategic autonomy will not be easy because “*EU is still dependent on NATO infrastructure more than it would like to acknowledge.*”²³ This dependency is particularly visible in the implementation of CSDP specific missions and operations.

An element common to both strategies is that of multilateralism. The 2003 strategy states this principle as the basis for the creation of a “*stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order*”²⁴. In the 2016 strategy the vision is that “*the EU will promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core*”²⁵. Applying

²² *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy*, 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf, pp. 38-39, accessed on 25 Sep. 2019.

²³ Maria Eleni Koppa, *The relationship between CSDP and NATO after Brexit and the EU Global Strategy*, Foundation for European Progressive Studies, April 2016, p. 4.

²⁴ *A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy*, 2003, http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/307_European%20Security%20Strategy.pdf, p. 9 accessed on 25 Sep. 2019.

²⁵ *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European*

this principle in an increasingly connected and shrinking world can generate the added value needed for the EU to evolve as an organization within the integrated global framework.

Conclusion

In his book *Revenge of Geography* Robert D. Kaplan stated “*Europe remains a very ambitious building under construction, which will be influenced by the trends and convulsions from the south and from the east, in a world where there is a great lack of space problem*”²⁶. This is how Europe was seen by a well-known US author and geopolitical analyst in 2012 when his book was published. This view has elements in common with the EU strategies, in particular with the 2016 strategy, which speaks distinctly about the need to increase resilience in the east and in the south by addressing a whole sub-chapter²⁷ on this topic. The lack of space is in fact the obvious result of a globalization that, whether we like or not, decreases the geographical distances by the speed of data transmission via networks, of crises of any kind transmitted from one country to another, of the welfare or poverty affecting important regions around the globe.

From the analysis of the two strategies we were able to extract the following main ideas: *The European Security Strategy* published in 2003, represented for the first time a strategic vision of the EU on the common foreign and security policy; this was followed by a five-year analysis report entitled *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World* -. The transition from “*in a better world*” to “*in a changing world*” indicated the dynamics of the EU in

Union's Foreign and Security Policy, 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf, p. 8, accessed on 25 Sep. 2019.

²⁶ Robert D. Kaplan, *Răzbuarea geografiei*, Grup Media Litera, București, 2015, p. 215.

²⁷ See subchapter 3.2 of the 2016 Global Strategy.

understanding the constantly changing and shifting security environment and, of course, adapting to them; eight years after this report and thirteen years after the European Security Strategy, in 2016 the following EU strategy appeared. As its title suggests, the 2016 strategy is a global one placing at its heart the EU's foreign and security policy and also the concept of a “*stronger Europe*”.

The evolution from the permanent orientation of the EU towards the outside, specific for 2003 and 2008, was replaced by a balance between the outside and the inside. This can be seen in the balancing in the title, but also the content of the strategy, between “*foreign and security policy*” and “*a stronger Europe*”. Also, the presence of the concept of *strategic autonomy* in the text of the 2016 strategy shows an EU that is confident about its future, considering that if it is stronger inside it can be stronger outside as well; the annual reviewing of the 2016 strategy, through three consecutive reports, shows once again the firm commitment of an initially politico-economic organization that evolves into a complete one that includes the components of foreign, security and defence policy.

To paraphrase Raymond Aron's statement on the United States of America, “*the power of a great power diminishes if it ceases to serve an idea*”²⁸ we can say that the strength of the EU increases if it continues to serve the idea of the 2016 global strategy.

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²⁸ *Apud*, Zbigniew Brzezinski, *A doua șansă. Trei președinți și criza superputerii americane*, Editura Antet, Filipeștii de Târg, 2007, p. 144.

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THE IMAGE OF SOCIAL ACTORS

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Abstract: „Image” has become an extensively used term nowadays with reference to the manner in which social actors are perceived in the public sphere. Public image has thus become an indicator for popularity and social success. The phrase „public image” is omnipresent in social, political, economic and scientific communication, usually in connection with social standards such as notoriety, prestige and reputation.

Key words: Images, Social Representations, Public Actors.

Introduction

The word IMAGE is commonly used to designate reproductions of reality on physical media such as paintings or pictures. But the term also refers to abstract, conceptual representations that only exist in our minds. The term comes from Latin, where the root "imago" meant the representation of something from reality, regardless of its physical or conceptual nature. Therefore, *image* designates a reflection of reality, be it abstract or concrete. Obviously, any element from reality has a representation, but we do not perceive them all, nor can we understand them all.

Images as Social Representations

Image as REPRESENTATION is also called "mental image" and refers to a person's awareness of reality elements when something draws their attention. Image can be perceptual, when formed directly in the process of perception, or conceptual, when evoked in the absence of the object or when we design abstract models of similar objects or situations. Image as representation is a conscious reflection of reality, a representation invested with meaning, according to

individual needs and experiences, with anatomical, psychological and cultural influences, that can be coded in some kind of language.

THE IMAGE OF REALITY, as a behavioral reference point is relevant for the present approach in the context of Walter Lippmann's¹ observation that people act, not in terms of reality, but in accordance with how they perceive this reality since most information available to us does not come directly, but from mediated experiences. Actually, the information we have about reality mainly comes from what we hear from others, from what we learn in school, from books or from the media, and not from personal experience.

In his book "Public Opinion" (1922), the American sociologist and political scientist Walter Lippmann writes about the "pictures in our heads" and states that people view things not as they are, but as they perceive them to be, gaining impressions from a "pseudo-environment". Images are cognitive simplifications of reality, created by distorting events and data, by emphasizing some at the expense of others through subjective evaluation,

¹Walter Lippmann, *Opinia publică*, comunicare.ro, 2009.

depending on different interests and values. Naturally, people living in the same community have similar experiences and develop representations of reality that coincide at least in some essential features. This is how collective representations emerge or social representations as they are called in social psychology.

SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS are collective mental images of reality, "a set of ideas about an object, shared by the members of a homogeneous group in relation to that object"² or socially developed and shared knowledge, having a practical purpose in building a common reality for a social entity."³ Social representations can be viewed as a structured set of beliefs, opinions and attitudes about an object, situation, event, phenomenon, person, social group, organization, institution or social entity.

In terms of content, social representations can be cognitive, axiological, motivational, affective, attitudinal or actional and in terms of their field of reference, they can be economic, political, educational, religious, ideological, scientific, artistic, etc. **SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS** are homogeneous and have an internal structure consisting of a relatively stable nucleus and flexible periphery. However, they are not fully frozen, being permanently influenced by societal transformations⁴. For an individual (as a member of a community), social representations become a grid for interpreting reality as they are strongly influenced by collective values. This fact leads to a certain evaluation of the environment and life events, and to particular behavior and conduct within a

² Claude Flament, *Structura, dinamica și transformarea reprezentărilor sociale în Psihologia câmpului social: reprezentările sociale*. Adrian Neculau (coord), Polirom, Iași: 1997, pp. 128-145.

³ Denise Jodelet, *Reprezentările sociale, un domeniu în expansiune*, in *Psihologia câmpului social*, 1997, pp. 85-106.

⁴ Mihai Curelaru, *Reprezentări sociale*, Polirom, Iași, 2009, p. 18.

community. Thus, social representations function as a buffer between individual constructs and social pressure. For Serge Moscovici they are not a mere collection of individual representations, but an image on the social, sprung from the social itself.⁵

The Image of Public Actors

The image of **SOCIAL ACTORS** is interesting from a sociological perspective because it represents that particular category of representations where the referent can consciously influence the way they are perceived. The **SOCIAL ACTOR** is an entity which plays a social role within a certain social framework. Their actions are influenced by objectives, resources, values, attitudes, motivation and by external systemic circumstances such as legitimacy, privilege, restrictions and social interactions with other actors. Social actors could be individuals or social groups, e.g. organizations, institutions, associations, enterprises, parties, unions or other social structures, which from the outside can be viewed as unitary entities.⁶ A social actor is therefore an individual or a structured entity, aware of their identity and set of values, having certain resources which allow them to act within social frameworks, according to their interests, goals and priorities. A social actor is an active element in social action. The term "SOCIAL ACTOR" builds on the view that the world is like a stage (*c.f.* the dramaturgical approach in sociology). The dramaturgical model was developed by the American sociologist Erving Goffman in his work: *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1956). Goffman develops his theory starting from the idea that in social life people behave like actors. As

⁵ Serge Moscovici, *Fenomenul reprezentărilor sociale* (1984) in *Reprezentările Sociale*, vol. coord. de Adrian Neculau, Societatea Știință și Tehnică, București, 1995.

⁶ <https://www.spektrum.de/lexikon/geographie/akteur/221>

the actors project a certain image through their play so do it individuals reveal only some dimensions of their personality, playing appropriate roles and concealing other features. In order to be successful an individual must play his role so as to be accepted by others and to be credible they should be well aware of the social rules. Goffman states that social actors exist and act in a social field of power and competition. The position of social actors is influenced by their competences and resources (*i.e.* educational, linguistic, and social) which are in fact symbolic capital. These impacts on the relation with other actors, but the social actor will only be powerful and influential if their partner acknowledges them as such. Thus, we can determine the role played by a social actor depending on the social mission they undertake. According to the theory of social roles, which was formulated within the Chicago School⁷, there is a strong correlation between social status and the role actors play in society.

The term PUBLIC ACTOR is usually used instead of *social actor* and vice versa. If we were to find a difference between the two terms (since we have not yet found a scientific definition of the *public actor*), we would say that a public actor is that type of social actor whose activity is relevant beyond their immediate social relations. (In other words, the actions of a public actor are also significant for people with whom they do not interact directly and consciously). The adjective *public* lays emphasis on the non-private dimension of a social entity meaning that their influence and actions reach beyond the narrow framework of private life. The term *public actor* is important in the context of sociological theories that deal with social interactions, *c.f.* the public sphere theory,

⁷George H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*. 1934; Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, 1949; Parsons, Talcott *The Social System*, 1951.

formulated by Jürgen Habermas⁸ in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1962) (original title: *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*), the theory of social fields, launched by Pierre Bourdieu⁹ in *Questions de sociologie* (1981) or the more recent social network theory from the '90s.

The Social Space

The PUBLIC SPHERE is a central premise of social life. In the context of public sphere we can see the relationship between society and the individual. The public sphere is for the individual an area of affirmation, of identification with the values of a social group, but also a space of alienation, of an anonymous existence within an amorphous mass. In the public sphere any social actor is exposed to anyone interested in them, simultaneously being an observer and an observed object, as the German sociologist Georg Simmel¹⁰ stated in his study "Die Großstädte und das Geistesleben" (The Metropolis and Mental Life, 1903). The public sphere builds up through people's behavior and is different from private sphere in several respects: functional, legal, social and symbolic. Usually, the public sphere is linked architecturally with institutional buildings. The public sphere is multifunctional, being used for traffic, consumption, communication or relaxation. Currently, public and private spheres overlap formally and functionally. The public sphere has been discriminatory ever since the Greek Agora, which remained a symbol of democracy. As a

⁸Jürgen Habermas *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1962.

⁹Pierre Bourdieu, *Limba și putere simbolică*, Art, 2013.

¹⁰Georg Simmel, *Die Großstädte und das Geistesleben*, 1903 in: *Die Großstadt. Vorträge und Aufsätze zur Städteausstellung*. Jahrbuch der Gehe-Stiftung zu Dresden, hg. von Theodor Petermann, Bd. 9, Dresden 1903, S. 185-206.

consequence it is utopian to believe that anyone can have access to the public sphere or public visibility.¹¹

The SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY or *network analysis* merged in social sciences in the 1990s and addresses the internal functioning of organizations and the relation between organizations and their environment. Network analysis allows the investigation of formal and informal, intra- or inter-organizational networks using the same parameters, observing how actors play their roles and develop their strategies. This type of analysis can also reveal how certain networks of informal relationships fill the gaps of formal structures and how formal structures influence informal behavior. At internal level, network analysis reveal show friendship, counselling or influence function beyond the formal boundaries set in the organizational chart.¹² There is a strong connection between the role played by a social actor and his social image. Image is how a social actor is viewed within the social framework in which they act, the impression their behaviour leaves on other social life participants. Thus, any social actor that exists in a social space has an image, sometimes independent from their intentions or social involvement. The theory of social roles has been mainly developed for individuals, but it is valid for any social actor, regardless of their size or complexity.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the PUBLIC IMAGE OF SOCIAL ACTORS is a ubiquitous social phenomenon. This syntagm is a fancy label for a commonfact today, a

¹¹Wildner, Kathrin, Berger, Hilke Marit, *Das Prinzip des öffentlichen Raums*, in Stadt und Gesellschaft, Bundeszentrale fuer politische Bildung, 2018,

<http://www.bpb.de/politik/innenpolitik/stadt-und-gesellschaft/216873/prinzip-des-oeffentlichen-raums?p=all>

¹² Claudette Lafaye, *Sociologia organizațiilor*, Polirom, Iași, 1998, pp. 94-97.

multifaceted manifestation that has always stirred bright minds (starting with ancient philosophers) and which has been dealt within many theories and fields of research: philosophy, psychology, sociology, physics, biology, anthropology, imagology, etc. and in social practices such as advertising or marketing. Promoting a favorable image has always been a great concern especially in the business field, which accounts for the fact that the latest approaches to public image contain a great amount of marketing terms.

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THE VISIBILITY OF SOCIAL ACTORS

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Abstract: PUBLIC VISIBILITY is a characteristic of all social actors. It varies and depends on the social importance of the actor and it is in direct connection with the actors' concerns for their own image. In the present article, we shall systematize the motivations and mechanisms behind public visibility, valid for any social actor.

Key words: Public Visibility, Social Actors.

Introduction

In social interaction we all project and receive images. We cannot deny the fact that in our daily life we simultaneously project an image for all those we interact with and we inevitably receive the public image of everyone and everything we come in contact with: people, public institutions, mass ideologies, brands, etc.

Need and Desire for Visibility

The NEED FOR VISIBILITY is an inherent characteristic of humans as social beings. To display a favorable public image is part of human nature and is practiced more or less consciously by any social actor. We can even take examples from the animal world, which display their qualities to dominate. In a competitive environment where many individuals have the same characteristics, the display of qualities is the peaceful way to obtain a privileged position in the group hierarchy.

The DESIRE FOR VISIBILITY is considered natural in social practice. To be more convincing, we show in public only the convenient side of our personality and we frequently strive to tell others what we think they would like to hear about us. Thus the public image differs from reality,

without being a lie. The displayed image is positive, coherent, competent, congruent, but not unrealistic.

It is not an ideal image because people do not display a fictitious perfection. It is not even the desirable image because people do not show what they would like to be, but how they would like to be seen. Unfortunately, however, the public does not perceive someone only from what is shown, but forms an impression from what they observe by themselves or hear from others. That is why any actor is concerned about projecting their image. Most do it intuitively, but some do it consciously, even professionally, and there are public actors willing to invest in creating a favourable image, hiring specialists to manage it.

Public Visibility

PUBLIC ACTORS WITH A MAJOR INTEREST IN PUBLIC VISIBILITY is individuals or organizations whose existence depends on social validation.

Highly interested in public visibility are, first of all, CELEBRITIES who aspire to be idols in the consumer culture such as movie or theatre stars (actors), singers and starlets.

As a rule, these public figures are promoted by the media, even created by the media in order to increase their profit. Behind each star there are usually complex business mechanisms since stars represent a great source of profit. Similarly, the image of well-known sportspeople is put to use. Another type of famous personality is the POLITICIAN, in fact an actor who represents his party in the media. Many times the public is not interested in doctrines or political programs and does not even have proper political education. Therefore, parties frequently rely on the seductive power of a charismatic political figure who becomes the media exponent of his party to reach the public and win votes. And there is another category of public figures, the representatives: heads of states, presidents of international organizations, leaders, managers, etc.

Organizations, as collective public actors, have different needs and interest in terms of public visibility. Commercial enterprises aim to build a good reputation especially through products or services. Governmental organizations seek to build trust by the ideologies they promote and the programs they implement for the general interest and public welfare. Police, the armed forces, fire-fighters, hospitals, schools, museums, theatres, etc. have to report for their use of public money. The NGOs show their involvement in social issues in order to obtain funds, the parties depend on the electorate, the Church depends on the faithful, the media on their audience, etc. Therefore, all these entities need followers and public support to be socially successful. Through PUBLIC VISIBILITY any social actor wants to gain *notoriety* and *prestige*, to build a *reputation*, a good reputation, in order to ensure success. The terms are close in meaning, but the differences are worth mentioning. *Notoriety* refers to how widely a social actor is known, *prestige* refers to how appreciated an actor's actions are, *reputation* refers to how beneficial the actor's activity is to the

public and *success* refers to achievements, to results.

THE CONTENT OF PUBLIC VISIBILITY involves *presence* and *discourse*. Depending on their goals and type of social activity, social actors will customize their public discourse, emphasizing the topics that appeal to their public, but in essence they intend to build trust and maintain public confidence. Each of them will try to convince us, in their own manner, that they are professional, competent, authentic, responsible, respectful, consistent, honest, loyal, empathetic, altruistic, etc., in short, that they are worthy of consideration and they deserve to be taken seriously. (Both the pop star and the stone merchant will tell us about authenticity. Both politicians and the Church speak of the common good. Those in power and the opposition invoke general interest, but everyone does it from their own perspective and in accordance with their own interests.) Each will try to convince us that they consciously and honourably fulfil their social roles as providers of security, information, goods, culture, entertainment, etc. All social actors launch a particular discourse, and therefore depend on public validation. Thus we can say that public visibility is essentially a communication issue.

Principles of Visibility

The PRINCIPLES OF VISIBILITY can be formulated based on the sender's cognitive premises and come to fruition in the practices of creating a successful public image, or in communication terms, an effective message.

1. **The principle of truthfulness** refers to formulating a favourable, but plausible message. A realistic and credible message implies good SELF-KNOWLEDGE. A pleasant public presence, the talent to discreetly highlight one's qualities, competent and grammatically correct discourse is definitely strong points for a public actor.

Being diplomatic does not mean being unassertive, but being modest within the limits of one's established goal. To know when to say "no", to refuse politely, to insist without offending, to pursue one's objectives without doing harm - all these are social intelligence skills.

2. **The principle of synchronization** refers to formulating a message appropriate for each situation and requires awareness of context and environment. Knowing the environment means evaluating the social context correctly for a realistic positioning especially by conforming to the existing trends and practices. Public actors must observe the community's conventions in use as regards public appearance, discourse, rules of social behaviour, conversation rituals. Social rules and behaviour must be taken into account in order not to be perceived as anachronistic or extravagant, but appropriate. Any society accepts and promotes actions that comply with the established codes of conduct valid for a certain place and time. A successful discourse should be authentic; admiring how others achieve social success does not mean imitating without discernment. Considering the techniques used by counterparts, that is by actors with similar goals and scope, *i.e.* one's competitors, is a good synchronization benchmark. Comparison with others helps to adapt and single out one's public discourse in order to establish one's identity as clearly as possible.

3. **The principle of appropriateness** mainly refers to adapting discourse to the target audience, which means that one has to know their interlocutors. An efficient evaluation of the target audience can be achieved through a hypothetical exchange of roles. Putting oneself in the recipient position can provide valuable information about the expectations and interests of the target audience, especially if we take into account socio-demographic characteristics: level of general knowledge, experiences,

stereotypes, taboos and prejudices, value-systems, preferences, tastes, priorities, etc.

Analyzing these data we can deduce how open the public could be to our offer, their willingness to follow us, if they are ready to understand our message, if they can be influenced and convinced. Before designing a message, one should take into consideration the recipient's perspective and try to answer questions such as: Would this draw my attention? Would I like the presentation? Would I find this idea interesting and convincing? Would I follow the speaker? Would I buy his offer or would I rather turn to their competitors? Visibility depends on a multitude of components.

1. The dynamics of the factors on which the public image depends is a vulnerability. It is obvious that all these factors evolve (It does not matter in what direction!). All change to some extent: the social actor, the environment, the public, competitors, communication technologies and each one does it at their own pace, depending on goals, interests, resources and context. This is why the fragile balance that keeps the public image within acceptable parameters can be easily disturbed.

2. The different interests of the players on which the public image depends is another vulnerability. It is obvious that each of the agents involved has their own interests, which, sometimes, do not coincide with those of the social actor in question: competitors, beneficiaries, the media, etching competition and during crises, other agents benefit from the weakness of a social actor, not necessarily to annihilate them because it is not always beneficial to eliminate a player, but to improve one's image at their expense. In crucial moments the information about a social actor will be the most difficult to control.

Mechanism of Public Visibility

THE MECHANISMS OF PUBLIC VISIBILITY work similarly for all social actors. To increase one's public visibility, actors need to go through three stages: intention, communication and action, which could be summarized as follows:

1. Any social actor wants to be visible (to make a favourable impression) because: 1. They have some interests (of self-realization); 2. They have desires and demands; 3. They can gain symbolic power (increasing the chances to influence other actors with whom they interact), 4. They increase the chances of fulfilling their intentions, plans, purpose, and mission.

2. Any social actor will project a favourable public image (with different intensity and magnitude, depending on their social importance and available resources) without lying, but highlighting the positive aspects (possibly by cosmeticizing them) and blurring the weak, dysfunctional points.

3. Any social actor, aware of the value of communication, will use: 1. any opportunity to make themselves visible in the public sphere, 2. any means of communication that they have access to, 3. any communication channel they can afford, 4. any psychological trick (communicative strategy) to draw attention, to "get noticed".

Conclusion

The MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC VISIBILITY can be intuitive or professional. We can see that some display a beautiful image almost instinctively, with intuition and talent, while others do it

if after learning how, but there are others who fail, despite training. We consider that promoting a favourable image is a skill that can be learned. Practice shows that common considerations such as those above are valid at professional level too, where specialists with appropriate training and wide experience are paid to create and analyze the public image for famous brands, VIPs, corporations, etc. All the above observations are applicable both at individual and societal level for all kinds of social groups and organizations. We would like to end our investigation with an open question: Are public actors keen on public visibility or compelled to it?

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FINANCING DEFENCE IN NATO MEMBER STATES AS A SOURCE OF DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND THE EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF NATO

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Abstract: *The concern on the part of European members of NATO for the possibility of the United States to leave NATO or to be less committed to article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, a hot topic since Donald Trump assumed office in January 2017, emerged as a result of Trump's strongly voiced dissatisfaction with what he perceived to be an unfair burden-sharing within NATO. His perspective on how the NATO burden-sharing has to be balanced triggered critical reactions of various European members of NATO and the disagreement on this issue could seriously affect the transatlantic relations. Therefore, this paper analysis and reconstructs Trump's view on NATO burden-sharing and identifies and classifies some of the most significant criticism of it by European members of NATO. The resulting typology of the main points of disagreement is further used in this paper for considering the position of Romania on NATO burden-sharing as perceived by Donald Trump.*

Key words: *NATO burden-sharing, Donald Trump, European members of NATO, Romania, defence budget.*

The NATO burden-sharing was turned by Donald Trump into one of the most important topics on the agenda of the transatlantic relations and he put forward his own view on what the European members of NATO have to do in order for the imbalance between their financial effort and the financial effort made by the United States to be eliminated. His solution revolves around the increase of the share of the GDP allocated to defence, the timetable for augmenting it, the mandatory nature of the increase of the defence budget, the military nature of the expenses to be made and the need of reimbursing the United States for the big financial losses it incurred over time because of the low defence budgets of the European members of NATO; all his demands are grounded on the assumption that the domestic political conditions in these states are favourable for complying with them. Various European members of NATO developed a critical reaction to Trump's solution and put forward their own perspective on the right way of improving the burden-sharing among

NATO members. The first section of this paper is concerned with the analysis and reconstruction of Trump's view on NATO burden-sharing, its second section is devoted to the identification and classification of some of the most significant criticism of it elaborated by European members of NATO and the last section of the paper applies the typology of the critical points of view developed in the previous section to the position of Romania on NATO burden-sharing as viewed by Donald Trump.

The position of President Donald Trump on rectifying the burden-sharing among NATO members

The issue of allocating 2% of GDP to defence was a topic approached by Donald Trump at his first meeting with a leader of a European member of NATO which took place at the White House on 27 January 2017 when he received the visit of Theresa May, the prime minister of the United Kingdom. At the press

conference that took place after their meeting, Trump did not mention the issue of the burden-sharing within NATO but May stated that the United Kingdom would support the Trump administration in its endeavour to determine all NATO members to reach that target for the defence budget¹. However, no reference to the schedule for reaching this target was mentioned which seemed to indicate that the deadline for it was 2024 as agreed at the Wales NATO Summit from 2014².

When, two months later, on 17 March, Donald Trump met at the White House the second leader of a European member of NATO, the German chancellor Angela Merkel, he turned the assignment of 2% of GDP to defence into an important topic of the statement he delivered on that occasion³. Thus, Trump mentioned that the members of NATO have long treated unfairly the United States by not paying their share for their defence and urged them to reverse that policy. Trump equally said that these states had accumulated debts because in previous years they did not pay what they should have paid. Besides that, he informed that he discussed with Merkel the possibility for Germany to allocate more than 2% of its GDP to defence and that she was willing

¹ White House, *President Trump and Prime Minister May's Opening Remarks*, 27. 01. 2017, available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-trump-prime-minister-mays-opening-remarks/>, accessed on 13. 08.2019.

² *Wales Summit Declaration*, 05. 09. 2014, paragraph 14, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm, accessed on 24. 08. 2019. It is to be remarked that the wording of this document do not seem to impose a strict obligation on the part of the member states to allocate the 2% of GDP to defence until 2024, given that it only mentioned that they will aim at this objective.

³ White House, *Joint Press Conference with President Trump and German Chancellor Merkel*, 17. 03. 2017, available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-press-conference-president-trump-german-chancellor-merkel/>, accessed on 24. 08. 2019.

to consider such an option. One day after his meeting with Angela Merkel, Trump posted on Tweeter a message in which he asserted in imperative terms that Germany owed money to NATO and that it equally had to increase the sums it pays to the United States for providing its defence⁴.

Trump's statements convey the idea that the allocation of 2% of GDP for defence was not a maximum value and that he was in favour of going beyond this percentage, a position which was not in line with the *Wales Summit Declaration* where this possibility was not mentioned. Albeit he did not explicitly say that the money was owed to the United States, the fact that he argued that the United States had been subjected to an unfair treatment by its allies from NATO could indicate that Trump intended to convey this idea. Such a reading of his statement show that he departed again from *Wales Summit Declaration* because, by making reference to the existence of a debt to the United States, it suggested that the NATO members had to reach the 2% target or an even higher value long before 2017, most probably right after the Wales Summit; consequently, the debts of these states were made up from the difference between the percentage of the GDP they allocated to defence each year since 2014 and the 2% of GDP or an unspecified higher value that they had to allocate for this purpose on an yearly basis from 2014 to 2017. It follows that it was the United States which covered what was missing from the defence budget of other NATO members and that this was how their debts accumulated.

In his first joint press conference with the Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, an event that took place at the White House on 12 April the same year⁵,

⁴ Donald J. Trump, 18 March 2017, available at <https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/843090516283723776>, accessed on 14. 08. 2019.

⁵ White House, *Joint Press Conference of President Trump and NATO Secretary General*

Donald Trump insisted again that all member states should devote 2% of their GDP to defence and renewed his complaint that the United States were paying for those states which yet failed to attain that percentage. His position reinforced the idea that he considered the allocation of 2% of GDP to defence as mandatory and made clear that he believed that to the United States the NATO members were heavily indebted. His view on the financial relationship between the United States and the other NATO members could be described as being somehow like a relationship between a debtor and a creditor, with the United States lending to them a part of the money for their own defence.

Attending the NATO Summit organised at Brussels between 24-25 May 2017⁶, Trump criticised once more those NATO members whose defence budget was still below 2% of GDP and which represented at that moment a vast majority of those members that is 23 states. Trump equally mentioned that many of the 23 members acquired debts from the past years and had to pay them given that what they failed to pay had been financed through the defence budget of the United States and argued that the 2% of GDP had to be considered not as a maximum value but as a minimal one. This statement made clear that for Trump the 2% of GDP was not the final target but only a first important step towards redressing the burden-sharing deficit and thus it gave prominence to an idea that he had

previous expressed in his press conference with Angela Merkel. Moreover, he once again explicitly mentioned that the debts accumulated by other NATO members were to be paid to the United States so that what was not directly asserted in Trump's speech after his meeting with Angela Merkel was clearly mentioned in his statement at the NATO Summit. One month later, in a joint press-conference he held together with the Romanian president Klaus Iohannis, Trump indicated that he said to the NATO members at the NATO Summit that they have to pay the debt accumulated from the past, a period that could be said to extend for a very long period of time given that he referred to it by using the words "many, many years"⁷. Based on this wording, it is possible to consider that he was of the opinion that the debt of NATO members to the United States did not begin to accumulate since 2014, which was not such a remote period, but well before the Wales NATO Summit so that one could argue that, according to Trump, these states had to allocate at least 2% of their GDP to defence much earlier and, consequently, could speak of the existence of a historical debt: by maintaining such a position, Trump was again advocating an idea which did not accord with the *Wales Summit Declaration*. It is reasonable to suppose that the existence of such a debt made Trump to consider that it must be paid as rapid as possible and that the year 2024 as a deadline for allocating 2% of GDP to defence was a much too distant one. It is to be supposed that the defence provided and partly financed by the United States that Trump referred to was conceived by him as encompassing only military aspects, which means that,

Stoltenberg, 12. 04. 2017, available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-press-conference-president-trump-nato-secretary-general-stoltenberg/>, accessed on 15. 08. 2019.

⁶ White House, *Remarks by President Trump at NATO Unveiling of the Article 5 and Berlin Wall Memorials – Brussels, Belgium*, 25. 05. 2017, available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-nato-unveiling-article-5-berlin-wall-memorials-brussels-belgium/>, accessed on 09. 09. 2019.

⁷ White House, *Remarks by President Trump and President Iohannis of Romania in a Joint Press Conference*, 09. 06. 2017, available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-iohannis-romania-joint-press-conference>, accessed on 09. 09. 2019.

according to him, only these aspects had to be paid from the defence budget of NATO member states. Moreover, it also to be supposed that, even after the historical debt was paid, the percentage of GDP allocated to defence had to be maintained at a high value, 4% being the optimal one, and had to be used mainly for paying for the defence that the United States would continue to provide to the other members of NATO.

The next NATO summit that took place at Brussels on 11-12 July 2018 provided Donald Trump with another opportunity to express again his dissatisfaction with the defence budget of NATO members. Writing on Tweeter he argued that it must reach 2% of the GDP not until 2024 but immediately and that this share of the GDP was not enough and should be raised to 4%⁸. Thus, Trump's dissatisfaction was expressed in more precise terms which, on one hand, confirmed the assumption previously made that he was in favour of a rapid increase of the defence budget up and beyond the 2% figure and which, on the other hand, indicated exactly how much above 2% of GDP the target for the size of the defence budget should be fixed at. The value of 4% advanced by Trump is significantly higher than the one decided at the Wales NATO Summit and thus it shows how much Trump's position differs from the agreement reached back then.

Summing up, Trump considers that a well balanced NATO burden-sharing requires the members of the Alliance to immediately allocate 2% of GDP to defence, to later rise at 4% the share of GDP attributed to this purpose, to use these money only for the military aspects of defence, for paying for the defence previously provided to them by the United States, thus clearing their historical debt to the United States, and for the defence that the United States will continue to provide

to them. Because Trump approaches in financial terms the problem of the burden-share within NATO, it results that he turns the size of the defence budget into the most or possibly the only criterion for the evaluation of the contribution of each member of the Alliance to the burden-sharing effort. It is also to be supposed, given Trump's insistence on a very rapid and significant increase of the defence budget, that he assumes either the existence among citizens and political forces of the European members of NATO of a significant support for such a budgetary allocation or the possibility of politicians to relatively easily build such a support. Considered from the view point of the agreements reached at the Wales NATO Summit, Trump's position was not reflecting them and was demanding NATO members to significantly go beyond them. For these reasons, the NATO members have generally not welcomed Trump's understanding of the NATO burden-sharing and put forward arguments against them which could be read as an alternative account of what a fair NATO burden-sharing means. By examining their position, which is the purpose of the next section of the paper, one could also better understand Trump's vision on this issue and has the possibility to assess the righteousness of its reconstruction elaborated in its first section.

The reaction of European members of NATO to Trump's view on burden-sharing within the Alliance: charting the main points of disagreement

An examination of the critical reactions of European members of NATO to Trump's perspective on the fair NATO burden-sharing reveals at least seven main points of disagreement: the existence of an obligation to allocate 2% of GDP for defence until 2024, the rapid allocation of 2% of GDP to defence, the increase beyond 2% of the GDP share allocated to

⁸ Donald J. Trump, July 12, 2018, available at <https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1017290478839050240>, accessed on 05. 09. 2019.

defence, the understanding of defence expenditures exclusively in military terms, the turning of the allocation of 2% of GDP to defence into the sole or the main criteria for assessing the contribution to the burden-sharing, the existence of debts that are to be paid to the United States for the defence it provided over the years, and the support on the part of the citizens and of the domestic political forces for a rapid and significant increase of the defence budget or the lack of serious difficulties in making them have such an attitude.

With respect to the first source of disagreement, it is to be mentioned that, shortly after the first meeting of Angela Merkel with Donald Trump, the then German minister for foreign affairs, Sigmar Gabriel, argued that what was decided at the Wales NATO Summit was to consider the 2% of GDP as a reference point and not as a firm target to be reached by each and every state⁹. According to Gabriel's reading of the *Wales Summit Declaration*, which he grounded on the phrase "lean towards" used therein with respect to that percentage, NATO members could spend less than 2% of their GDP without thus disregarding the provisions of that document.

The second element which generates dissensions was expressed by Angela Merkel at her first joint press conference with Donald Trump where she indicated as the timetable for reaching the 2% target the one agreed at the Wales NATO Summit from 2014 which established 2024 as the deadline for this objective¹⁰. After the Brussels NATO Summit from 2018, a similar point of view was

⁹ Sigmar Gabriel, cited in *Trump Administration Criticizes NATO Members for Failing to Meet Defense Spending Guideline; United States Joins Other NATO Members in Supporting Montenegro's Membership in the Organization*, p. 760.

¹⁰ White House, *Joint Press Conference with President Trump and German Chancellor Merkel*, 17. 03. 2017.

advocated by France, through the voice of its president Emmanuel Macron, who denied that the Wales NATO Summit agreement was renegotiated in view of accelerating the timetable for reaching the 2% of GDP for defence¹¹. With the same occasion, the prime minister of Czech Republic, Andrej Babiš, declared that he remained firmly attached to the Wales NATO Summit timetable¹², an attitude that was then shared by the prime minister of Slovenia, Miroslav Cerar¹³. At her turn, the president of Croatia, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic, who equally attended the Brussels NATO Summit, expressed her support for sticking to the financial commitments previously made at the Wales NATO Summit¹⁴. Another participant at that summit, the president of Slovakia, Andrej Kiska, mentioned that his country will allocate 2% of GDP for defence but that this would not happen until 2024, the replacement of the

¹¹ Judith Vonberg, *After NATO meeting, Macron Rejected Trump's Claim on Defense Spending*, 17 July 2018, available at <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/07/12/politics/trump-nato-spending-claims-reaction-intl/index.html>, accessed on 06.09.2019. See also Emanuel Macron, *Conférence de presse à l'OTAN*, available at <https://www.facebook.com/EmmanuelMacron/videos/conf%C3%A9rence-de-presse-%C3%A0-lotan/2209943825904858/>, accessed on 14. 08. 2019.

¹² Government of the Czech Republic, *At NATO Summit, Prime Minister Babiš confirmed further Czech support for Afghanistan*, 12. 07.2018, available at <https://www.vlada.cz/en/media-centrum/aktualne/at-nato-summit--prime-minister-babis-confirmed-further-czech-support-for-afghanistan-167876/>, accessed on 06. 09. 2019.

¹³ Permanent Mission of the Republic of Slovenia to the NATO, *Prime Minister Cerar attends NATO Summit in Brussels*, 16.07.2018, available at http://www.brussels.mission.si/index.php?id=1120&L=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=32824&cHash=de9a64bfe6e98c82efb86377dbe755fd&cHash=de9a64bfe6e98c82efb86377dbe755fd, accessed on 12. 08. 2019.

¹⁴ Lida Filippakis, *Grabar-Kitarović of Croatia pleased with NATO summit's outcome*, 12. 07. 2018, available at <https://balkaneu.com/grabar-kitarovic-of-croatia-pleased-with-nato-summits-outcome/>, accessed on 24. 08. 2019.

timetable established in 2014 with one based on shorter terms being unfeasible for Slovakia¹⁵.

The third aspect that underpins divergent opinions on NATO burden-sharing was put forward by more participants at the Brussels NATO Summit from 2018. Thus, Emanuel Macron sharply dismissed the possibility for going beyond the *Wales Summit Declaration* and increase the 2% of GDP allocated to defence¹⁶. The president of Croatia explicitly rejected the new threshold of 4% of GDP¹⁷ while the prime minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, aligned to this point of view by indicating that it is premature to discuss about a greater value of the defence budget until the 2% target was not reached by all members of NATO¹⁸.

The next controversial aspect was mentioned by Angela Merkel on the occasion of her visit to the White House in March 2017. Merkel said that the budget for defence and security had a wide scope which included elements such as the assistance for development and the financing of the United Nations missions in Africa. Shortly after the Trump-Merkel meeting, the German defence minister Ursula von der Leyen endorsed Merkel's idea that the money had not to be directed exclusively to NATO related activities and emphasized that Germany considered important to finance the UN peace keeping missions and the missions

conducted under the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, arguing that holding a narrow understanding of defence and security expenditures was obsolete and ran against how security had to be perceived in the present-day world¹⁹. The then German minister for foreign affairs, Sigmar Gabriel echoed the broad view on defence and security expenditures advanced by both Merkel and von der Leyen when he said in May the same year that it is impossible for Germany to allocate 2% of its GDP, that is around 70 billion EUR each year, entirely for military purposes because in such a case the military build-up will be an enormous one and Germany would simply be flooded with military assets²⁰. He argued that a broad understanding of security expenditures must encompass the support provided to refugees so that the huge amount of financial resources devoted by Germany to the support of the Syrian refugees had to be taken into account when assessing the percentage of the GDP allocated by Germany to defence and security, a calculation that he estimated to come close to the 2% value and thus to remove the criticism that Germany is an unfair NATO member²¹. Ahead of the NATO Brussels Summit from 2017, the Italian foreign minister, Angelino Alfano, made a statement in which he also advanced a broad interpretation of the defence expenditures which, in his view, had to include the money used to help migrants such as the money spent by Italy for finding and rescuing migrants in the Mediterranean Sea²².

¹⁵ President of the Slovak Republic, *Kiska after NATO Summit: Countries declared two percent for defense*, 12. 07. 2018, available at <https://www.prezident.sk/en/article/kiska-po-samite-nato-krajiny-deklarovali-dve-percenta-na-obranu/>, accessed on 01. 09. 2019.

¹⁶ Emanuel Macron, *Conférence de presse à l'OTAN*.

¹⁷ Lida Filippakis, *op. cit.*

¹⁸ Website of the Hungarian Government, *Press statement by Viktor Orbán after the NATO summit in Brussels*, 12. 07. 2018, available at <https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/press-statement-by-viktor-orban-after-the-nato-summit-in-brussels>, accessed on 14. 08. 2019.

¹⁹ Ursula von der Leyen cited in *Trump Administration Criticizes NATO Members for Failing to Meet Defense Spending Guideline; United States Joins Other NATO Members in Supporting Montenegro's Membership in the Organization*, p. 760.

²⁰ Sigmar Gabriel cited in *Ibidem*, p. 760.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 760.

²² *Trump Administration Criticizes NATO Members for Failing to Meet Defense Spending Guideline; United States Joins Other NATO*

The fifth point of disagreement was advanced before the Brussels NATO Summit from 2018 by the Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez who criticized Trump's reliance solely on the percentage from the GDP allocated for defence to assess how much a member of the alliance contributes to the NATO burden-sharing while the minister of foreign affairs of Spain, Josep Borrell, argued that the effectiveness of defence spending in creating military capabilities and the involvement in NATO missions and operations has to be the criterion used to make such an evaluation²³. Speaking after the 2018 NATO summit, the prime minister of Slovenia, Miroslav Cerar, mentioned the need to use more criteria for assessing how NATO members get involved in burden-sharing, suggesting also as a viable criterion the successful participation in the missions and operations undertaken by the Alliance²⁴.

As for the sixth problem on which different views are expressed, the German minister of defence, Ursula von der Leyen, in a statement made not long after Merkel's first meeting with Trump, argued that it was wrong to discuss about a debt owed by Germany or any other NATO member given that holding such a view disregarded the way NATO functioned²⁵.

The last subject which is discussed from different perspectives was asserted after the Brussels NATO Summit from

Members in Supporting Montenegro's Membership in the Organization, p. 761.

²³ Miguel González, *After Trump letter, Spanish PM avoids committing to more military spending*, 04. 07. 2018, available at https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/07/04/inenglish/1530694316_422100.html, accessed on 24. 08. 2019.

²⁴ Permanent Mission of the Republic of Slovenia to the NATO, *Prime Minister Cerar attends NATO Summit in Brussels*, 16.07.2018.

²⁵ Ursula von der Leyen, cited in *Trump Administration Criticizes NATO Members for Failing to Meet Defense Spending Guideline; United States Joins Other NATO Members in Supporting Montenegro's Membership in the Organization*, p. 760.

2018 by the president of Slovakia and by the president of Bulgaria, Rumen Radev. According to the former, it was essential to take into account the domestic political constraints, such as the reluctance of citizens to support an increase of the defence budget and the existence of political forces hostile to NATO, faced by politicians favourable to increase the defence budget, given that their effort to reach this objective could have the effect of distancing these the countries from NATO²⁶. The Bulgarian president equally emphasised the difficulty of winning the support of the Bulgarian citizens for directing more of GDP towards defence²⁷.

It is to be mentioned that the points of disagreement between Donald Trump and the European members of NATO seem to lessen given that at his press conference after the Brussels NATO Summit from 2018²⁸, Trump indicated that the value of 4% of GDP for defence was not an immediate urgency but an objective to be reached over the years, he mentioned the possibility for the target of 2% of GDP for defence to be attained during several years and he recognised the domestic political constraints faced by the leaders of the European members of NATO in their attempt to increase the national defence budget. With the second, the third and the

²⁶ *President of the Slovak Republic, Kiska after NATO Summit: Countries declared two percent for defense*, 12. 07. 2018.

²⁷ *President of the Republic of Bulgaria, Rumen Radev: NATO is not a Security Stock Exchange, but a Union of Sovereign States, United by Strategic Goals and Common Values*, 11. 07. 2018, available at <https://m.president.bg/en/news4521/rumen-radev-nato-ne-e-borsa-za-sigurnost-a-sayuz-na-suverenni-darzhavi-obedineni-ot-strategicheski-tseli-i-obshti-tsennosti.html>, accessed on 07. 09. 2019.

²⁸ *White House, Remarks by President Trump at Press Conference After NATO Summit, Brussels, Belgium*, 12. 07. 2018, available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-conference-nato-summit-brussels-belgium/>, accessed on 14. 08. 2019.

seventh points of disagreements having the potential to become less important or even to disappear, it follows that the rest of these points will be central for the NATO burden-sharing. However, taken into account that the first point of disagreement is not widely voiced among European members of NATO, its importance could be equally considered a low one.

Romania and Donald Trump`s account of the NATO burden-sharing

To increase the relevancy of the overview of the reactions of the European members of NATO to Donald Trump`s understanding of how NATO should approach the problem of the burden-sharing, it will be supplemented with the position adopted by Romania on the seven issues that generated controversies. With respect to the first of them, the relevant statements on the defence budget delivered since 2014 by the prime minister or by the president of Romania did not call into question the obligation to allocate 2% of GDP for defence. It is telling in this respect that, ahead of the Wales NATO Summit, Romania established as one of its priority objectives to secure the support of all member states for a defence budget representing 2% of GDP²⁹ which means that Romania was an active promotor of this target and was not in the position to be persuaded of the necessity to assume it. The then president of Romania, Traian Băsescu, justified the importance attributed by Romania to this issue by pointing out that its freedom would be endangered in case the NATO members provide an inadequate financing

²⁹ *Live Text Corespondență specială. Summitul NATO, a doua zi. Traian Băsescu: Libertatea nu este gratis. S-a decis prezența NATO pe teritoriul României. România este în zona de siguranță*, 04. 09. 2014, available at <https://www.caleaeuropeana.ro/live-video-corespondenta-speciala-summitul-nato-romania-cere-avioane-pentru-politie-aeriana-si-nave-la-marea-neagra/>, accessed on 23. 08. 2019

for their defence³⁰. It is equally significant that a few month before that summit, the then prime minister of Romania, Victor Ponta, mentioned that assigning this percentage for the defence budget was a priority for his government and he presented the steadily increase of the defence budget operated since he took office as a important achievement of his mandate³¹. Viorica Dăncilă, the incumbent prime minister, declared in 2019 at the celebration of 15 years since Romania became a member of NATO that allocating 2% of GDP for defence is an obligation assumed by Romania at the Wales NATO Summit and that Romania is determined to comply with it³².

The second issue is not a subject to dispute given that, beginning with 2017, 2% of Romania`s GDP is already assigned to defence. This outcome resulted from the fact that the commitment for fulfilling the 2% target agreed at the Wales NATO Summit was taken up by Klaus Iohannis who succeeded Traian Băsescu as President of Romania in December 2014. In January 2015 he devoted to this issue his first round of consultation with the political parties represented in Parliament and argued that his option for this topic was motivated by the serious threat that

³⁰ *Ibidem.*

³¹ *Guvernul României, Discursul primului-ministru Victor Ponta la ședința solemnă a Parlamentului României dedicată marcatării a 10 ani de la momentul aderării României la Organizația Tratatului Atlanticului de Nord*, 01. 04. 2014, available at <http://gov.ro/ro/stiri/discursul-primul-ministru-victor-ponta-la-edinta-solemna-a-parlamentului-romaniei-care-marcheaza-10-ani-de-la-momentul-aderarii-romaniei-la-organizatia-tratatului-atlanticului-de-nord&page=236>, accessed on 12. 08. 2019.

³² *Guvernul României, Discursul premierului Viorica Dăncilă în cadrul sesiunii solemne a Parlamentului cu ocazia aniversării a 15 ani de la aderarea României la NATO*, 02. 04. 2019, available at <http://gov.ro/ro/stiri/discursul-premierului-viorica-dancila-in-cadrul-sesiunii-solemne-a-parlamentului-cu-ocazia-aniversarii-a-15-ani-de-la-aderarea-romaniei-la-nato&page=11>, accessed on 11. 08. 2019.

the Russian Federation generated to both the security of Europe and the security of Romania, the latter being particularly affected given its proximity to Ukraine³³. Iohannis mentioned that Romania will allocate 2% of GDP for defence beginning with 2017 and would maintain this percentage for a period of 10 years. The consultation initiated by Iohannis led the same month to the signing by all political parties represented in Parliament of a document entitled *National political agreement on increasing the defence budget* which stipulated that for the period 2017-2027 the defence budget would receive 2% of GDP³⁴. The document justified the commitment in terms of the importance for the solidarity with the United States to be equally expressed in financial terms and on ground of the risks for the national security of Romania resulting from the actions of the Russian Federation.

The next issue could be said not to be a contentious one as a result of the *National political agreement on increasing the defence budget* allowing for the value of 2% of GDP allocated for defence to be increased, if necessary and if possible. In line with this provision, neither at the end of the last NATO summit, when a journalist asked his opinion about this

issue³⁵, nor the next year when, at the joint press conference with Donald Trump, he answered a question about the same issue³⁶, Klaus Iohannis did not express his dissatisfaction with the prospect of the defence budget going beyond 2% of GDP. In the answer he gave at the question addressed at the press conference organized when the Brussels NATO Summit from 2018 concluded, Iohannis argued that Romania is willing to work towards allocating a larger share of GDP to defence because national defence and national security are paramount objectives which justify any financial effort.

The fourth issue that has the potential of exposing the differences in understanding the NATO burden-sharing does not involve Romania because, as one could infer from the *National political agreement on increasing the defence budget* which makes reference to military training and equipment, the defence budget is devoted to the military aspects. The same conclusion could be derived from the fact that the former prime minister Sorin Grindeanu mentioned in an interview that he gave in 2017 in his capacity as prime minister that the allocation of 2% of GDP for defence would benefit the Romanian defence

³³ Preşedintele României, *Declarația de presă a Preşedintelui României, domnul Klaus Iohannis, la finalul consultărilor cu partidele și formațiunile politice reprezentate în Parlamentul României*, 12. 01. 2015, available at <https://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/declaratii-de-presa/declaratia-de-presa-a-presedintelui-romaniei-domnul-klaus-iohannis-la-finalul-consultarilor-cu-partidele-si-formatiunile-politice-reprezentate-in-parlamentul-romaniei1435304022>, accessed on 14. 08. 2019.

³⁴ Preşedintele României, *Acord politic național privind creșterea finanțării pentru Apărare*, 13. 01. 2015, available at <https://www.presidency.ro/ro/presedinte/documente-programatice/acord-politic-national-privind-cresterea-finantarii-pentru-aparare-13-ianuarie-2015>, accessed on 18. 08. 2019.

³⁵ Preşedintele României, *Declarația de presă susținută de Preşedintele României, domnul Klaus Iohannis, la finalul Summitului NATO de la Bruxelles*, 12. 07. 2018, available at <https://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/declaratii-de-presa/declaratia-de-presa-sustinuta-de-presedintele-romaniei-domnul-klaus-iohannis-la-finalul-summitului-nato-de-la-bruxelles>, accessed on 13. 08. 2019.

³⁶ Preşedintele României, *Declarații susținute de Preşedintele României, domnul Klaus Iohannis, și Preşedintele Statelor Unite ale Americii, domnul Donald Trump, la începutul întâlnirii de la Casa Albă (Biroul Oval)*, 20. 08. 2019, available at <https://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/declaratii-de-presa/declaratii-sustinite-de-presedintele-romaniei-domnul-klaus-iohannis-si-presedintele-statelor-unite-ale-americii-domnul-donald-trump-la-inceputul-intalnirii-de-la-casa-alba-washington-d-c-statele-unite-ale-americii>, accessed on 23. 08. 2019.

industry³⁷. A similar position was advanced by Klaus Iohannis in the context of his first meeting with Donald Trump that took place in 2017 when he said that the defence budget had to be spent mainly on strategic acquisitions³⁸. The incumbent Prime Minister, Viorica Dăncilă, in a message from 2018 that was occasioned by the celebration of NATO Day, emphasised that the defence budget aims at the endowment of the national armed forces³⁹, a point of view that she reiterated in January 2019 at her meeting with NATO Secretary-General⁴⁰.

Considering the fifth issue, it could be said that Romania considered the size of the defence budget as a paramount criterion for assessing the contribution to the NATO burden-sharing given that, in 2014, Victor Ponta considered that those NATO members allocating an important part of GDP to defence represented an example that Romania should follow⁴¹,

³⁷ Cătălina Mănoiu, *Grindeanu: 2% din PIB pentru apărare, angajament ferm; Mare parte din investiții să se facă în țară*, 29. 01. 2017, available at <https://www.zf.ro/eveniment/grindeanu-2-din-pib-pentru-aparare-angajament-ferm-mare-parte-din-investitii-sa-se-faca-in-tara-16141778>, accessed on 07. 08. 2019.

³⁸ Președintele României, *Declarația de presă comună a Președintelui României, domnul Klaus Iohannis, cu Președintele Statelor Unite ale Americii, domnul Donald Trump*, 09. 07. 2017, available at <https://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/declaratii-de-presa/declaratia-de-presa-comuna-a-presedintelui-romaniei-domnul-klaus-iohannis-cu-presedintele-statelor-unite-ale-americii-domnul-donald-trump>, accessed on 12. 08. 2019.

³⁹ Guvernul României, *Mesaj al premierului Viorica Dăncilă cu ocazia marcării Zilei NATO în România*, 01. 04. 2019, available at <http://gov.ro/ro/stiri/mesaj-al-premierului-viorica-dancila-cu-ocazia-marcarii-zilei-nato-in-romania&page=6>, accessed on 12. 08. 2019.

⁴⁰ Guvernul României, *Vizită de lucru la Bruxelles*, 23. 01. 2019, available at <http://gov.ro/ro/stiri/vizita-de-lucru-la-bruxelles-23-ianuarie&page=2>, accessed on 08. 08. 2019.

⁴¹ Guvernul României, *Discursul primului-ministru Victor Ponta la ședința solemnă a Parlamentului României dedicată marcării a 10 ani de la*

given that, ahead of the signing of the *National political agreement on increasing the defence budget*, Klaus Iohannis considered that the allocation of at least 2% of GDP for defence is indispensable for Romania's status as an internationally responsible state⁴² and also because in the *National political agreement on increasing the defence budget* it is mentioned that such an allocation would be used to measure the degree of Romania's solidarity with the United States. Two years later, Sorin Grindeanu maintained that he was proud that the budgetary policy for defence followed by this government enabled Romania to be considered a positive example among NATO members⁴³. The incumbent Prime Minister Viorica Dăncilă, in her address at the ceremony marking 15 years since Romania joined NATO, linked the credibility of Romania as a member of NATO to the allocation of 2% of GDP for defence⁴⁴.

As for the sixth issue, neither the prime minister, nor the president overtly rejected the idea that Romania is indebted to the United States for the defence it provided to it and that was not covered by the defence budget of Romania. President Iohannis emphasised prior to the signing of the *National political agreement on*

momentul aderării României la Organizația Tratatului Atlanticului de Nord, 01. 04. 2014.

⁴² Președintele României, *Declarația de presă a Președintelui României, domnul Klaus Iohannis, la finalul consultărilor cu partidele și formațiunile politice reprezentate în Parlamentul României*, 12. 01. 2015.

⁴³ *Update MAPN își face bilanțul pe 2016. Iohannis: Sunt prioritare consolidarea parteneriatului cu SUA și construirea unui profil mai puternic în NATO și UE*, 28. 02. 2017, available at https://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/mapn-isi-bilanțul-2016-prezenta-presedintelui-iohannis-premierului-grindeanu-1_58b511645ab6550cb8e365f3/index.html, accessed on 07. 08. 2019.

⁴⁴ Guvernul României, *Discursul premierului Viorica Dăncilă în cadrul sesiunii solemne a Parlamentului cu ocazia aniversării a 15 ani de la aderarea României la NATO*, 02. 04. 2019.

increasing the defence budget that unless Romania will allocate 2% of GDP for defence, the other members of NATO, and it was obvious that he referred mainly to the United States, would no more be obliged to pay for the defence of Romania⁴⁵. It is also relevant for this issue that at the joint press conference with Donald Trump that took place in 2017, Iohannis stated that the United States and Romania will closely cooperate in the field of strategic acquisitions financed through Romania's defence budget⁴⁶.

The final contentious issue is partly not relevant for Romania because, as proved by the signing in 2015 of the *National political agreement on increasing the defence budget* by all political parties represented in Parliament, there is a strong political support for the allocation of 2% of GDP for defence. However, according to a national survey conducted in the second half of 2018 by INSCOP Research upon the request of Informational Warfare and Strategic Communication Laboratory (LARICS) that functions within The Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations I. C. Brătianu at The Romanian Academy, only 23% of the population of Romania is in favour of the increase of the defence budget and just 40% of it believe that Romania should follow the decisions adopted by NATO with respect to the defence budget of its member states⁴⁷.

⁴⁵ Președintele României, *Declarația de presă a Președintelui României, domnul Klaus Iohannis, la finalul consultărilor cu partidele și formațiunile politice reprezentate în Parlamentul României*, 12. 01. 2015.

⁴⁶ Președintele României, *Declarația de presă comună a Președintelui României, domnul Klaus Iohannis, cu Președintele Statelor Unite ale Americii, domnul Donald Trump*, 09. 07. 2017.

⁴⁷ INSCOP Research, Informational Warfare and Strategic Communication Laboratory, The Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations I. C. Brătianu at The Romanian Academy, *Values, perceptions and representations of the population from Romania and the United States of America. 100 years since the Great Union of the Romanians and the 14 Points presented by*

Conclusion

Donald Trump's account of a fair NATO burden-sharing is built on the assumption that, for a long period of time, the United States incurred serious financial loss as a result of it being obliged to pay for the defence of the European members of the Alliance which did not fully cover the costs entailed by their defence albeit they could relatively easily do it. Based on this idea, he considers that these members of NATO owe vast amounts of money to the United States so that they have accumulated a historical debt to the United States which has to be paid very rapidly for causing no more financial disadvantages to the United States. More exactly, Trump considers that the European members of NATO must immediately allocate 2% of their GDP for defence and increase that value to 4% of GDP in the near future and equally must use the money for military expenses and with the involvement of the United States. By holding such a view, Trump implicitly expresses his dissatisfaction with the financial agreement secured by the Obama administration at the Wales NATO Summit as well as his determination to renegotiate it. His perspective on NATO burden-sharing is challenged by various European members of NATO that call into question his assumption and his departure from the commitments agreed upon at the Wales NATO Summit, a disagreement that could have potential serious adverse consequences on the solidarity within NATO and, more generally, on the solidity of the transatlantic relations. From the criticism advanced by them, the broad understanding of the concept of defence and the downplaying of the importance of the size of the defence

President Woodrow Wilson, October 2018, available at https://www.inscop.ro/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Comparative-Report-Romania-SUA_tpc.pdf, accessed on 12. 09. 2019.

budget as a criterion for responsible membership are to be considered the most important ones given that, unlike in the case of second, the third and the seventh criticism, Donald Trump does not seem inclined to accept a compromise and, also, because they undermine the possibility of reaching an agreement on these three points of disagreement. The persistence of the first criticism is dangerous because, even if the increase of the defence budget up to 2% or 4% of GDP would be decided and the substantial acceleration of the timetable for it would be also agreed upon, it will prevent the attainment of Trump's financial objectives because only a fraction of this budget will be allocated to military expenses and thus to paying the United States of the historical debt and of the defence it will continue to provide. The second criticism is detrimental to the relationship with the United States because it calls into question the need itself for the increase of the defence budget so that the reaching of the 2% of GDP becomes a subject of controversy. The elimination of these two criticisms represents therefore a prerequisite for reaching an agreement on the increase of the value of the defence budget and on reducing the time for achieving it. All these controversies are not relevant for Romania which, largely because of its geographic proximity to the Russian Federation, shares Trump's view on a fair NATO burden-sharing and thus could take on the role of advocating it among the other members of NATO.

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DRONES AND TERRORISM – A NEW THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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Abstract: *Over time, terrorists have adopted various tactics and tools to carry out their attacks: shootings, bombings, hijackings, suicide attacks using suicide vests, vehicle ramming and many others. In addition to weapons, explosives, knives, chemical agents, cars or trucks, the newest weapon used by terrorists is the drone. Devices of the latest technology, not very expensive, easy to handle from a distance, drones are a new, unexpected instrument used in terrorist attacks. Suddenly, the international community is facing a new kind of threat that it will have to counter. The use of drones by the terrorist organizations is already a certainty. Al-Qaeda, Talibans, Houthis, Jaysh Al-Fath, Hezbollah, Hamas, ISIS are some of the groups that have used and continue to use weaponized drones. One of the most known terrorist attacks using drones is the attempt to assassinate the Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. Being easy to buy, easy to modify depending on the purpose for which they are intended to be used, easy to handle and difficult to detect, in the wrong hands it could become feared weapons that threaten people's lives. This is why weaponized drones used by terrorists have become a major concern for both the US and the European Union, both countries being interested in the security of their citizens.*

Key words: *drones, terrorism, security organizations, international security, European Union.*

Concerns and warnings by authorities in the security field regarding the use of drones in terrorist attacks

Terrorist tactics are changing by adapting to new realities. Always in search of weapons as easily as possible and without incurring significant costs, to help them achieve their goals, terrorists have used, in the long history of terrorism, firearms, daggers, explosives, rented vehicles with which they entered in crowded pedestrian areas. Military drones, used by various armies, have proven effective for many purposes. Perhaps that is why, when civilian drones have become increasingly attractive as price and easy to buy, with no restrictions in this regard, numerous officials from various states but also security institutions and organizations have signalled a new threat to security - the use of drones by terrorists.

In this regard, in the 2017 European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report it is mentioned that in terms of technical trend terrorists will use drones as

a weapon to reach their goals: Regarding the potential use of alternative and more sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the current trend in using weaponised unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as a drone, in the Syria/Iraq conflict zone might also inspire other jihadist supporters and increase the use of this kind of tactic¹.

In the same vein, EU Security Commissioner Julian King said that “drones are becoming ever more powerful and smarter, which makes them increasingly attractive for legitimate use, but also for hostile acts”², warning of the

¹ ***2017 EU Terrorism Report: 142 Failed, Foiled And Completed Attacks, 1002 Arrests And 142 Victims Died, 15 June 2017, Press Release, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/2017-eu-terrorism-report-142-failed-foiled-and-completed-attacks-1002-arrests-and-142-victims-died>, accessed on 12.09.2019.

² Nik Martin, *Drones could be used in terror attacks, EU security chief fears*, 03.08.2019, <https://www.dw.com/en/drones-could-be-used-in->

possibility that they could be used in terrorist attacks on the citizens of the European Union.

Also in the US there are concerns about the threat posed by the use of drones by terrorists: Civilian drones pose a “steadily escalating threat,” as the devices are likely to be used by terrorists, criminal groups or drug cartels to carry out attacks in the U.S., FBI Director Christopher Wray told a Senate committee. “Terrorist groups could easily export their battlefield experiences to use weaponized” drones, Wray said in written testimony for a hearing Wednesday of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. “The FBI assesses that, given their retail availability, lack of verified identification requirement to procure, general ease of use, and prior use overseas,” drones will be used in an attack in the U.S. including “a mass gathering,” Wray said³. On one hand, these statements within the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee are clear evidence that this is an imminent security threat which implies an increased concern of the FBI. On the other hand, the emergence of a new threat requires taking measures to counteract it in order to ensure the security of citizens.

In addition, concrete actions by terrorist groups increase the concern of US authorities: Islamic State propaganda posters have already depicted a drone attack on the Eiffel Tower in Paris and New York City, and former U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, Kirstjen Nielsen has warned that the threat from drones “is outpacing our ability to respond... terrorist groups such as the Islamic State aspire to use armed drones against our homeland

terror-attacks-eu-security-chief-fears/a-49876427, accessed on 12.09.2019.

³ Chris Strohm and Alan Levin, *FBI Warns That Terrorists With Drones Pose ‘Escalating Threat’ in U.S.*, October 10, 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-10/fbi-warns-terrorists-with-drones-escalating-threat-in-u-s>, accessed on 17.09.2019.

and US interests overseas... We have already worked with our partners to stop terrorist plots that could have involved drone technology”⁴. These Islamic State propaganda posters depicting drone attacks on some reference buildings and tourist objectives in France and the USA are irrefutable evidence of the threat that drone attacks intend to exert on target states outside the battlefield. In addition, the existence and the publicity of these posters is an argument in favor of the fact that the terrorists went from the intention to the planning, remaining to achieve only the last stage - putting into practice.

Remember, IS operatives have extensive drone experience from the Middle East. As U.K. police counter-terror lead Neil Basu pointed out, drones "have been used on the battlefield and what's used on the battlefield will eventually be adapted to be used on domestic soil"⁵. Having a rich experience in using drones on the battlefield, terrorists already have the know-how to use them against civilians - an additional argument for materializing the threat of using weaponized drone in terrorist attacks.

Interpol also warns of the imminent possibility of countries being attacked by weaponized drones, devices that can be easily purchased: The potential use of drones in a terrorist incident or attack against a critical infrastructure and soft targets is a growing concern for law enforcement as the availability of drone technology becomes more widespread globally. As drones become less expensive and their potential applications continue to expand, it is expected that countries will witness an increase and evolution of this threat⁶.

⁴ Zak Doffman, *Warning Over Terrorist Attacks Using Drones Given By EU Security*, Aug 4, 2019, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/08/04/europes-security-chief-issues-dire-warning-on-terrorist-threat-from-drones/#543d1cba7ae4>, accessed on 17.09.2019.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ *Drone technology: security threats and benefits for police focus of INTERPOL forum, 30 de agosto*

Drones – the new weapons of terrorists

According to the European Aviation Safety Agency, in technical terms, drones are unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), as they are aircraft operated with no pilot on board. They can vary from very small aircraft as big as a fly on your finger (nano-drones weighing just 10-20 grams) to very large ones such as the Global Hawk with its 15 tons, used by NASA for scientific purposes. Major aviation companies already have projects for cargo aircraft the size of an A320, and their next step will be to propose projects for passenger flights⁷. Initially developed for military and defence purposes, they are increasingly used for various civil purposes, including photography, rescue operations, infrastructure monitoring, farming and aerial mapping⁸.

On one hand, the use of drones in the military field is well known. “While some 90 countries have drones in their military arsenals, only 11 of these have armed drones”⁹. According to the article *A guide to military drones*¹⁰ written by Ben Knight, there are several types of drones of various sizes with different uses: micro- and nano-drones, small tactical drones, medium-sized reconnaissance drones and large combat and surveillance drones. For

example, in the fight against terrorism, “from September 2011 to August 2016, the US Army killed 20 jihadist militants”¹¹ using drones.

On the other hand, it is no longer a secret that non-state actors develop or already own the technology needed to build and use weaponized drones. The use of weaponized drones by states implies responsibility, respect for human rights, respect for international law, otherwise assuming responsibility. In the case of the use of weaponized drones by non-state actors, especially by terrorist groups or organizations, they do not respect any rights and no laws. They can use these drones without any respect for human life or security of people. Attacks can occur anytime and anywhere on the globe.

Mauro Lubrano considers that terrorist interest in UAVs dates back to 1993/4, when the apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo considered dispersing Sarin gas by means of two remotely controlled helicopters¹².

The MEMRI Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor Project has been monitoring jihadis' use of drones over the past decade, and has seen their advances in research and development culminating in the Islamic State (ISIS) Ninawa province's release, on January 24, 2017, of a 40-minute video showing its new weaponized drones¹³. Today, drones are a strategic

de 2018, <https://www.interpol.int/es/Noticias-y-acontecimientos/Noticias/2018/Drone-technology-security-threats-and-benefits-for-police-focus-of-INTERPOL-forum>, accessed on 17.09.2019.

⁷ European Aviation Safety Agency, *Safe operation of drones in Europe. Update on EASA's activities*, https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/dfu/217603_EASA_DRONES_LEAFLET%20%28002%29_final.pdf, accessed on 18.09.2019.

⁸ European Parliament, *Civil drones in the European Union*, October 2015, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/571305/EPRS_BRI%282015%29571305_EN.pdf, accessed on 15.09.2019.

⁹ Ben Knight, *A guide to military drones*, 30.06.2017, <https://www.dw.com/en/a-guide-to-military-drones/a-39441185>, accessed on 20.09.2019.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹¹ Steven Stalinsky and R. Sosnow, *A Decade Of Jihadi Organizations' Use Of Drones – From Early Experiments By Hizbullah, Hamas, And Al-Qaeda To Emerging National Security Crisis For The West As ISIS Launches First Attack Drones, Inquiry & Analysis Series*, No.1300, February 21, 2017,

<https://www.memri.org/reports/decade-jihadi-organizations-use-drones---early-experiments-hizbullah-hamas-and-al-qaeda> accessed on 22.09.2019.

¹² Mauro Lubrano, *Threats from Above: Terrorism and Commercial UAVs*, February 23, 2018, <https://theforeignanalyst.com/threats-terrorism-commercial-uavs-2/>, accessed on 20.09.2019.

¹³ Steven Stalinsky and R. Sosnow, *A Decade Of Jihadi Organizations' Use Of Drones – From Early Experiments By Hizbullah, Hamas, And Al-Qaeda To Emerging National Security Crisis For The*

cyber element for not only Al-Qaeda but for ISIS, the Taliban, the Houthis in Yemen, and other jihadi organizations in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, and elsewhere. As jihadist began using drones, they also began to share technology with each other – including technology they obtained from U.S. drones¹⁴. For instance, ISIS formally announced in January 2017 the establishment of a new “Unmanned Aircraft of the Mujahideen” unit, a fleet of -modified drones equipped with bombs, and claimed that its drones had killed or wounded 39 Iraqi soldiers in a single week¹⁵. According Asaad Almohammad and Anne Speckhard, authors of a research paper regarding the analysis of using drones by ISIS, the terrorist organisation used drones across Iraq, Syria, and Libya since august 2014¹⁶. The group had managed to take advantage of drone usage in recent years, namely to utilize them from gathering intelligence through aerial photography, to making aerial video recordings of their attacks for use in their propaganda films, to geographic mapping, to border control surveillance and delivery of explosive, chemical and biological weapons¹⁷. Also, the Lebanese militant

West As ISIS Launches First Attack Drones, Inquiry & Analysis Series, No.1300, February 21, 2017,

<https://www.memri.org/reports/decade-jihadi-organizations-use-drones---early-experiments-hizbullah-hamas-and-al-qaeda> accessed on 22.09.2019.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ Joby Warrick, *Use of weaponized drones by ISIS spurs terrorism fears*, February 21, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/use-of-weaponized-drones-by-isis-spurs-terrorism-fears/2017/02/21/9d83d51e-f382-11e6-8d72-263470bf0401_story.html, accessed on 21.09.2019.

¹⁶ Asaad Almohammad and Anne Speckhard, *ISIS Drones: Evolution, Leadership, Bases, Operations and Logistics*, May 5, 2017, *International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism*, <https://www.icsve.org/isis-drones-evolution-leadership-bases-operations-and-logistics/>, accessed on 19.09.2019.

¹⁷ Anne Speckhard and Ardian Shajkocvi, *Terrorists' Use of Drones Promises to Extend*

group Hezbollah is reported to have the most advanced drone technology of any non-state actor¹⁸. According to the extremely well documented analysis, reports and articles quoted above it appears that the number of terrorist groups and organizations that own and use drones is increasing and their number is worrying. They also use drones on the territory of several countries, causing the deaths and injuries of dozens of people in each weaponized drone attack. In addition, US drones have been used to improve their technology, which represents a vulnerability exploited by them. Moreover, the fact that they share their technologies helps them gain more efficiency and more experience in this issue.

Terrorist attacks using drones

The first use of drones for an assault against the Turkish Armed Forces units was carried out on 27 September, 2016, by Daesh, during Operation Euphrates Shield in Syria. Later, as of the last quarter of 2016, drones were used intensely for assaults by Daesh, both against security forces in Operation Mosul in Iraq, and against the PKK/YPG terrorist organization, which were included in Operation Raqqa in Syria, and against the Syrian regime forces. The use of drones by Daesh against the PKK/YPG also caused this terrorist organization to use drones itself¹⁹. In august 2018, while Venezuelan

Beyond Caliphate Battles, March 5, 2019, *Homeland Security, Today.US*, <https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/terrorism-study/terrorists-use-of-drones-promises-to-extend-beyond-caliphate-battles/>, accessed on 22.09.2019.

¹⁸ Nik Martin, *Drones could be used in terror attacks, EU security chief fears*, 03.08.2019, <https://www.dw.com/en/drones-could-be-used-in-terror-attacks-eu-security-chief-fears/a-49876427>, accessed on 12.09.2019.

¹⁹ Serkan Balkan, *How Cheap Drones Became Assets for Terrorist Organizations*, January 17, 2019, <https://thenewturkey.org/how-cheap-drones-became-assets-for-terrorist-organizations>, accessed on 24.09.2019.

President Nicolás Maduro was speaking at a military event in Caracas, two drones loaded with explosives exploded. According to the Venezuelan authorities seven soldiers were injured²⁰. The drone attack was orchestrated by a group in which deserters of the Armed Forces of Venezuela participated, with the aim of assassinating Maduro²¹. It was an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the Venezuelan President, but at the same time, a warning about the danger of using drones by terrorists in order to kill civilians.

Without being terrorist attacks, incidents involving politicians and drones existed since 2013 when a UAV flew very close to the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and other officials during a campaign event²². Also, in 2015, a drone carrying radioactive sand²³ was found on the roof of the Japanese prime minister's office. Although not many in number, these incidents have contributed to taking into account the use of drones in purposes related to terrorism.

²⁰ *Venezuela President Maduro survives 'drone assassination attempt'*, 5 August 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-45073385>, accessed on 14.09.2019.

²¹ *Detalles exclusivos del plan para asesinar a Maduro con drones en agosto*, Por Nick Paton Walsh, Natalie Gallón, Evan Perez, Caitlin Hu, Barbara Arvanitidis, Diana Castrillon, 14 Marzo, 2019, <https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2019/03/14/detalles-exclusivos-del-complot-para-asesinar-a-maduro-con-drones/>, accessed on 14.09.2019.

²² Mauro Lubrano, *Threats from Above: Terrorism and Commercial UAVs*, February 23, 2018, <https://theforeignanalyst.com/threats-terrorism-commercial-uavs-2/>, accessed on 20.09.2019; Friederike Heine, *Merkel Buzzed by Mini-Drone at Campaign Event*, September 16, 2013, <https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merk-el-campaign-event-visited-by-mini-drone-a-922495.html>, accessed on 22.09.2019.

²³ Mauro Lubrano, *Threats from Above: Terrorism and Commercial UAVs*, February 23, 2018, <https://theforeignanalyst.com/threats-terrorism-commercial-uavs-2/>, accessed on 20.09.2019; *Japan radioactive drone: Tokyo police arrest man*, 25 April 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32465624>, accessed on 20.09.2019.

On January 10, 2019, a Houthi drone attacked a Yemeni government military parade in Al Anad airbase in Lahaj province some 60 kilometers north of Aden, killing seven people and injuring 11 others²⁴. Some rebel groups are already using drones repeatedly, causing dozens of human losses and injuring civilians including women and children. In May 2019, “the Yemeni rebel group had launched a drone attack on Najran airport in Saudi Arabia which caused a fire to break out at the facility”²⁵. According to a statement by the Western-backed Saudi coalition, a missile fired by Iran-backed Shiite Houthi rebels in Yemen targeted the arrival hall of the Abha airport in southern Saudi Arabia. The attack reportedly wounded 26 people, including three women and two children²⁶. In July 2019, Houthi rebels launched a drone attack on a civilian airport in southern Saudi Arabia near the border with Yemen. As a result nine people were injured²⁷.

In Mexico, two drones, one equipped with a camera and the other armed with two fragmentation grenades, flew over the home of Gerardo Sosa Olachea, the Secretary of Public Safety of Baja California, in July and landed in his yard. The grenades failed to detonate²⁸.

²⁴ Shaul Shay, *The Houthi Drone Threat in Yemen*, 03/02/2019, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, https://www.ict.org.il/Article/2331/The_Houthi_Drone_Threat_in_Yemen#gsc.tab=0, accessed on 23.09.2019.

²⁵ *Yemen: Houthi drone 'hits Saudi arms depot'*, 21.05.2019, <https://www.dw.com/en/yemen-houthi-drone-hits-saudi-arms-depot/a-48811412>, accessed on 12.09.2019.

²⁶ *Iran-backed Yemeni rebels attack Saudi civilian airport*, 12.06.2019, <https://www.dw.com/en/iran-backed-yemeni-rebels-attack-saudi-civilian-airport/a-49154184>, accessed on 12.09.2019.

²⁷ *Yemen: Houthi rebels attack Saudi airport with drone*, 02.07.2019, <https://www.dw.com/en/yemen-houthi-rebels-attack-saudi-airport-with-drone/a-49437476>, accessed on 12.09.2019.

²⁸ Brian Blodgett, *Drones Becoming Frightening Weapon of Choice for Terrorists*, May 6, 2019, <https://in homelandsecurity.com/drones-frightening-weapon-terrorists/>, accessed on 23.09.2019.

On 14 September 2019, drone attacks claimed by Yemen's Houthi rebels struck two key oil installations inside Saudi Arabia, damaging facilities that process the vast majority of the country's crude output and raising the risk of a disruption in world oil supplies²⁹.

Although only a part of the terrorist attacks with drones are presented, it is clear that they represent an emerging security threat. Whether drones used in terrorist attacks are purchased, or are built by members of terrorist organizations, they represent a feared weapon of an unseen enemy.

Conclusions

Terrorists have found and will permanently find new ways to spread terror and generate a state of insecurity in order to achieve their goals. They have an increased capacity to adapt to new technologies and they have a lot of creativity, being able to identify tools to use as means of accomplishing their goals. It remains the task of the counterterrorism experts, once the new threats are identified, to find the appropriate measures to counteract them effectively and to ensure the security of the citizens.

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EASA_DRONES_LEAFLET%20%2802%29_final.pdf

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²⁹ Ben Hubbard, Palko Karasz and Stanley Reed, *Two Major Saudi Oil Installations Hit by Drone Strike, and U.S. Blames Iran*, Sept. 14, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/14/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-refineries-drone-attack.html>, accessed on 24.09.2019.

THE YEAR OF 1990 – CHANGE OF COMMUNICATION PARADIGM IN EUROPE

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***Abstract:** Europe has been the continent most marked by the evolution and development of human society, throughout its multi-millennial existence, an aspect that has generated profound changes in the systems of relations between European regional or state communities, both within the continent and in the human interrelations between the old continent with communities from other continents. A summary x-ray of European geopolitics of the twentieth century shows the fall of the imperial regimes and the emergence of new states after the First World War; the rise of extremist regimes on the left and the right, the seizure of power and the generation of the world's largest conflagration; the division of the spheres of influence, the establishment of communist regimes and the emergence of the cleavage between the east and the west of the continent, in the post-war period. The last decade of the last century is marked by the collapse of the communist states in the Eastern bloc of Europe, by the return to the democratic systems and by the accentuation of the influence of the factors of globalization, elements that generated, in 1990, the change in the communication paradigm on the old continent, for the fourth time, over the past century.*

***Key words:** communication; paradigm; cold war; communism; the year 1990.*

Introduction

The first change in the communication paradigm in twentieth-century Europe came at the end of World War I, when three European empires disappeared from the geopolitical map of the world, which created the birth of a new continental political order, by establishing new ones states, based on the principle of asserting national identity. The Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Tsarist empires left behind complex state organization systems, deployed over large geographical areas, which were based on archaic communication processes and not adapted to the evolutionary aspects of the national societies they encompassed.

After the Paris Peace Conference (1919) and the conclusion of the Paris Peace Treaty (1920), in the inter-war period, Europe was marked by the second change in the typology of intra-continental communication processes, by the rise of extremist regimes in power and by developing communication processes carried out by these regimes, especially in

Russia and Germany, but also in other states led by dictatorial regimes. Extremists both left and right, used propaganda in particular, with all its techniques, as a form of mass manipulation, to implement its ideological principles, to legitimize its actions and to consolidate its power. The evolution of the two extremist forms generated, after only two decades, the largest conflict in the history of mankind, with tens of millions of victims and immeasurable material damage.

The end of the Second World War produced the third change of the whole communication process on the old continent, by dividing Europe into two antagonistic parts, the communist east being delimited by the capitalist west through the unseen Iron Curtain. There followed almost five decades in which the two antagonistic ideological macro-entities confronted each other in many fields in the social, political, economic and cultural spheres.

Communication played an important role in the second half of the last century,

especially in the development of the means by which information transfers were carried out between different state, supra-state or non-state entities. The need to increase the speed of the flows of communication processes has led to the emergence of new technical means, through which the transfer of information is carried out. Thus, in the 1950s, television and artificial satellites appeared, two new technical procedures, which radically changed the speed of information propagation, and in the 1970s, the Internet appeared, a technical means that contributed substantially to the reshaping of the process flows, communication, as well as the development of competition between east and west, between capitalism and communism.

The flows of the communication processes during the Cold War (1945-1990) were influenced, to a very large extent, by the relations between the two world superpowers, the US and the USSR, together with their allies. The two antagonistic camps did not use classical methods of direct confrontation, according to the typology of the war, but used different forms of war for supremacy, atypical of a war, which targeted the political-ideological, strategic-military and economic fields.

The camp of the states of the "Free World", under US leadership, emphasized the values of liberal democracy, the doctrine of the market economy, and the common military segment was embodied by the establishment, in 1949, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Also, the secret services of the states in the democratic bloc have played an important role in the political, economic, military decision making, as well as in the communication processes, used both in the interrelation with the bloc of the communist states, and in informing their own nations, through the media.

On the other side, in the camp of the communist states, which formed the "Eastern Bloc" under the leadership of the

USSR, from an ideological point of view, centralized and authoritarian management regimes were imposed, with closed companies, with restricted contacts with the western states, the economy was also centralized. From a military point of view, in 1955, the Communist states signed the Warsaw Pact as a form of collective defense against external aggression. In the field of secret services, several famous political police and intelligence services, such as the KGB (State Security Committee, USSR), established in 1954 and abolished in 1991, have functioned; STASI (Ministry of State Security, Democratic Republic of Germany), the "*shield and sword*"¹ of the Communist Party of East Germany, which operated in the period 1950-1990; Department of State Security or "Securitate", a name used in the Socialist Republic of Romania for the intelligence service.

In order to analyze the fourth change in the paradigm of the communication process in Europe of the last century, since the 1990s, it is necessary to look in depth at the communication processes between Eastern and Western Europe from 1945-1990. Globally, in 1945 the five new powers that were to recreate the world order after the end of the Second World War were established. In 1946, the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and China signed the constitution of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, thus becoming permanent members of this international body, through which world peace was ensured.

This great global conflagration has left European countries devastated, both economically and socially. As a result, the United States devised, the Marshall Plan, immediately after the end of the war, for the reconstruction of the states of Europe and to ensure a military presence on the old continent. Initially, this plan was addressed to all European states and

¹ Electronic page of the former East Germany State Security Archives Federal Commission, <https://www.bstu.de/en/>

provided for emergency financial aid for restoring economies, but was rejected by the USSR and its satellite states, on ideological principles. The Marshall Plan was signed in 1947 by 16 West European states, and by the 1970s they had had an explosive economic development.

The discrepancies between the two European camps deepened in the 1980s, generating dissatisfaction and social tensions in the eastern states. In addition, the growing influence of the process of globalization, to which the Eastern European economies were subjected, as well as the pressures of the Western media on the populations of the communist countries, regarding the violation of human rights and individual freedoms, caused the collapse. the communist dictatorial regimes and the production of the last profound change in the typology of the communication process at European level, in the last century.

The Communication Processes of the Two European Sides/Groups in the 1945-1990 Period

In order to capture the change of the communication paradigm since 1990, in Europe, it is necessary to analyze the intra- and interstate communication processes, which took place in the two antagonistic camps during the previous period. The flows of the communication processes from 1945 / 1947-1990, known as the "Cold War" period, were influenced, to a very large extent, by the relations between the two world superpowers, the US and the USSR, together with their allies.

The two combative camps did not use classical methods of direct confrontation, according to the typology of the war, but they resorted to different forms of struggle for supremacy, atypical of a war, which targeted the political-ideological, strategic-military, economic and social fields, in which they used different tactics and methods of communication.

Forms of Communication Used by Communist States

The USSR was the "*engine*" of the communist world, the state that implemented and imposed the Marxist-Leninist ideology, in the form of communism, in about 20 states in Europe, Asia, Africa, Central and South America. In Europe, the satellite states of the Soviets were the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, but also other Euro-Asian states that were part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, such as the Baltic States, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine and others.

From a politico-military point of view, the power element of the Communist Bloc was the Warsaw Treaty, an alliance established in Europe, but to which other communist states in the world joined. The most commonly used means of communication between the communist states and those from the opposite camp were ideological, military and economic propaganda campaigns, diplomatic pressure, espionage, small-scale military operations, increased rivalry in continental or global sporting events, sometimes the assassination of personalities and the distortion of reality.

The technical means, used in the second half of the twentieth century, were the media, especially the radio, television, written / printed publications and later the internet and online/ social-media. This aspect was due to the technical-material development of the means of propagation and transmission of the information during the analyzed period.

Propaganda, in the Communist Bloc, was carried out in two forms. First, it was aimed at public opinion in communist countries, in order to strengthen the links between the people living in these states. The sources that broadcast propaganda information were both internal sources, such as the existing internal media, radio,

television, print media, but there were external sources for counteracting, located on the opponent's field, such as "Voice of America" or "Free Europe" radio stations, which had a large audience in the communist states (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, Albania²).

The second type of propaganda was to convey false messages, which were made to sound plausible, credible. This type of informational influence was used by the communist states, both internally, to their own populations, as well as externally, to create a distorted image of truth among the public opinion in the capitalist / antagonistic states, in order to destabilize the beliefs of the citizens regarding the rules of the democratic system in which they lived. The technique of influence, used by the communist agencies, was to construct erroneous conceptions of Western citizens about the benefits of the communist state system for the development of society. Their influential actions were based on the seduction mechanism of public opinion, being more a method of psychological influence, than an informational one.

Misinformation was one of the most used tactics in confrontations in the information field, during the Cold War period. According to the theoretical concepts, misinformation is based on the persuasion of the receiver in the communication act and has a high degree of complexity, which starts from true information and reaches the message that the issuer wishes to convey. Persuasion, in communication processes, has well-defined goals. Vladimir Volkoff said about persuasion in his book *"Treatise on misinformation. From the Trojan Horse to the Internet"* that (...) *"it is a form of subtle communication with clear objectives: to finally change an opinion, an attitude or a behavior, but with the agreement and*

*through pseudo-convict internalization from the target. (...) It is widely used in complex strategies such as manipulation techniques. Its use has been driven by the social successes of the political-propaganda and publicity communications"*³.

This type of persuasion was very often used by the states of the Communist Bloc in the communication processes inside this interstate organization, with very clear messages, coming from the main transmitter, the USSR, but also with messages transmitted from the communist states to the Western Bloc states. Both internally and externally, the process of persuading the communist state transmitters in communication acts was based on psychological constitutive elements of the receiver, as well as on semiotics, being a subtle and at the same time complex technique, based on cunning and humor.

One of the forms of diversion, which was used by the communists, was information poisoning, by using subtle and diverse means of convincing capitalists to act in a certain way, in which they would not have acted, if there had not existed a stimulus. The provision of false information or the distorted presentation of truths entered and well-fixed in the ontogenetic baggage of the opponent's consciousness were only two examples of the intoxication used by the communist decision-makers during the Cold War period. Informational intoxication is a superior form of misinformation, because it manages, if very subtly and very well structured, to influence the adversary's decision-making process. Counter-intelligence services, both from the West and from the East, used this method to provide the opponent with misinformation, but which were based on truthful elements, in order to persuade the enemy to agree that they are headed in the wrong direction

²<https://editiadedimineata.ro/fenomenul-radio-europa-libera-simbol-al-rezistentei-anti-comuniste/>

³ Vladimir Volkoff, *Tratat de dezinformare. De la Calul Troian la Internet*, Editura Antet, 2015, p. 42.

and, thus, to act as the issuer wanted. The area of action of information intoxication was quite small; it focused only on political, military, economic and information services, in general the institutions with an important decision-making power in the society and not the public opinion.

In the case of using misinformation, public opinion was the targeted side of society, the target on which the influence and propaganda were aimed, as forms of the confrontation between East and West Europe. Misinformation was made by lying, targeting very large groups, to deceive public opinion, to confuse the receivers, by overwhelming them with false information. The misinformation action involved the use of large resources, being coordinated institutionally, according to well-defined objectives, established and transmitted by the broadcasters. This was done in large areas (parts of countries or whole countries / regions, etc.) very well delimited, over large periods of time and was achieved after the targets, (the target audience), were selected, analyzed and known. They followed the operations of setting the target and formulating the disinformation purposes and selecting the channel through which the messages were to be transmitted. Once all the operations were established, the misinformation process was implemented, using the lie and seduction, and the issuer activated the mechanisms for collecting the effects of the misinformation action on the target, to improve their procedures or to use the same stereotypes and in other misinformation processes on other targets.

Using this method, the USSR succeeded in establishing, during 1945-1947, communist regimes in Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary and other states that became the satellites of Moscow for decades to come. "Governments, intelligence services, military major states, social, political or economic entities can also be victims and beneficiaries of

misinformation actions. Also, the population of state, certain clearly defined human communities, are the favourite target of misinformation campaigns", written in an article Remus Ioan Ștefureac, in 2013⁴.

In our country, the communist regime initially developed, in the years 1945-1950, together with the Soviet Communists, a set of propagandistic techniques and methods by which they projected in the West a positive image of the "*democratic*" way that governs Romania. With the passage of time, the Romanian Communist propagandists resorted to the most treacherous tactics and managed, in many cases, to make friends from enemies, through seduction and controlled lies, turning them into sweeteners (agents of influence).

Communist propaganda had the objectives derived from Moscow for each satellite state. After Stalin's death, in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev changed the strategy of interrelation and propaganda that the countries of the communist bloc had to carry out on the "*capitalist camp*". In an interview with a specialist magazine in 2015, historian Lavinia Betea said that "*(...) the new leader of the CPSU, Nikita Khrushchev, decided that the Soviet Union and the entire communist camp would have a different kind of relationship with the opposing party, then called the imperialist camp; relations that had subsumed the principle of peaceful coexistence. That is, both systems can coexist peacefully together; they will compete through work, a certain ethics, etc. Khrushchev believed that, in the end, the system represented by him would emerge victorious*"⁵. According to this new Soviet strategy, in 1955, repatriation commissions were set up in all socialist countries, which aimed not to bring people who had fled communism into the

⁴ <https://intelligence.sri.ro/pe-scurt-despre-arta-dezinformatii/>

⁵ <http://betea.ro/index.php/2015/10/16/propaganda-comunista-tehnici-de-prestigiu-si-influenta-externa/>

countries of origin, but to seduce populations from the opposing camp. In Romania, the "Voice of the Fatherland" Magazine was published by the Repatriation Committee under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, between 1955-1972, through which the messages of former political prisoners rehabilitated after accepting to collaborate with the communist government and were inserted in the Romanian cultural life.

The writer and literary critic George Ivaşcu was named editor-in-chief of this publication, who, after being arrested, sentenced to death and then pardoned by the communists, agreed to collaborate with the regime, under the umbrella of anti-communism through culture. Ivaşcu succeeded in fulfilling his mission to seduce the intellectuals of the West, by attracting renowned names, such as Nichifor Crainic, Constantin Noica, C.C. Giurescu, Vladimir Streinu, Ion Vinea, Radu Gyr, Dumitru Stăniloae, Şerban Cioculescu, Păstorel Teodoreanu, Tudor Arghezi, who published in the "Voice of the Fatherland" Magazine critical articles on the communist regime, but also self-critical articles, such as the one written by Constantin Noica, in 1965, in which he said, *"If anyone would say: you were deceived before 1944, you were deceived after 1944, you see that you were not deceived also in 1965 - I would answer: I admit that I am not with those who are entitled to express an opinion. But I wrote the above in order to urge others to acknowledge their mistakes and to join, through work, for the interests of the new Romania"*⁶.

The communist regime in Bucharest broke away from the Soviet propaganda system, in the period 1962-1964, by eliminating the Soviet advisers (1964), the release of the political prisoners from prisons (1962-1964), eliminating the jamming of the programmes broadcast by

"Free Europe" Radio (1962) and through other pseudo-democratic measures, which have contributed to a great extent to changing Romania's image abroad and to strengthening the prestige of "dissident" of our country. In this way, the regime in Bucharest won the sympathy of the West, and the propaganda actions of Romania were easier to enter the camp of the capitalist states. Later, the regime led by Nicolae Ceauşescu diversified the techniques used for influence, by using the universal art and symbols. Thus, Romanian artists were sent abroad as agents of influence, presenting to the western audience performances of folklore, music, theatre, film, painting exhibitions, works of art and literature, but they were given signals strong opposition to the USSR, through the foreign policy of Romania. A significant example is given by the non-intervention of the Romanian Army in Czechoslovakia, in 1968, which multiplied the positive effect of the image of the Romanian communist leader Nicolae Ceausescu.

The international context of 1960-1970, in which Romania became the rebel child of the socialist camp, was fraught with social tensions and military conflicts. The national liberation movements of the former British, Dutch, Portuguese and French colonies, the demonstrations and protests of the US population of color for equality of rights between races and sexes, but also for the right to vote (assassination of movement leader Martin Luther King), the war in Vietnam, the exaggeration of the arms race, the conflicts in Israel, the establishment of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (1960) and the strengthening of its power on the world market, the tensions within the Warsaw Treaty (the invasion of Czechoslovakia by military forces of allied states, in 1968, the withdrawal of Albania in 1968), out of these are just some of the imbalances and tensions on the basis of which Romania has consolidated its prestige abroad,

⁶ http://www.cnsas.ro/documente/materiale_didactice/D%20008712_001_p26.pdf

through its propagandistic actions from abroad, but also through foreign policy.

In the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the propaganda and misinformation system has focused, in particular, on its own population. The principle used was based on Marxist-Leninist doctrine and was adapted to the needs of the German Communist ruling class. According to this principle, "*History is never pure, but it is the leadership that decides what is to be researched and learned.*"⁷ As in Romania, History teachers presented socialism as the next step, after capitalism, of the historical evolution of human society, followed by communism.

In the GDR, the past of Greater Germany and the Federal Republic of Germany were negative elements of German history, characterized by fascism and capitalism, two attributes with common destiny, which were overtaken by socialism. It was created through this manipulation technique the idea that those who identify ideologically with fascism or capitalism are against the progress of the country and are in opposition to the ideals of social progress of the communist society. Through continuous propaganda and repressive measures of STASI (Ministry of State Security), all forms of opposition of East Germans to the authoritarian regime in Berlin were annihilated in the RDG, not only former Nazis but also politicians and others imprisoned people who were unwanted by the regime.

The period of communism in Bulgaria is divided into two parts. The first, between 1944 and 1954, was characterized by hard radical measures of Bolshevism of the country and of repression of all opposition movements. Also during this period Bulgaria was transformed into the "satellite" of Moscow, diplomatic relations with the US and other capitalist states were

broken, cross-border disputes were opened with Greece and Yugoslavia, the Turkish minority began to be persecuted, the head of the Bulgarian Orthodox church it was placed under strict supervision in a monastery, and opponents of the communist regime were imprisoned in forced labor camps. In the second period, between 1954 and 1989, the communist regime relaxed internal coercive measures, but did not give up loyalty to the USSR, even asking for Bulgaria to be admitted to the Soviet Union, but the communist leaders in Moscow rejected this proposal by the Bulgarian president.

The evolution of communist Hungary can be, like that of Bulgaria, divided into two parts, with the mention that the delimitation is made in 1956, the year in which the bloody repression of the Hungarian Revolution by Soviet tanks took place. Following the reprisals on the revolutionaries, carried out by the new Hungarian Communist regime led by Janos Kádár, Hungary focused on economic development and small-scale political reforms, in order to ensure relative social tranquillity. Towards the end of the period of communism, civic activism intensified, and at the end of 1989 the reformist movements came to have enough power to peacefully change the communist regime to a democratic one.

Another European state, in which the flows of the communication processes between east and west have met and have had effects on the population, territorial integrity and on the economic, military, political system, is Ukraine, more precisely the Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine, as it was called until 1991. This Eastern European country was created in 1917, after the Bolshevik Revolution, and in 1922 became one of the four signatory states of the documents of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). During the Second World War the Ukrainian population suffered great losses of human lives and economic damage, due to significant confrontations of this

⁷ <https://www.historia.ro/sectiune/general/articol/cum-era-manipulata-istoria-in-rdg>

conflagration on its territory. After the war ended, Stalin imposed a regime of terror on the population of Ukraine, but a few constitutional amendments gave this Soviet communist state a degree of international freedom, which allowed it to become one of the founding members of the UN, even though it did not have its own foreign policy.

After the collapse of the USSR, in 1991, Ukraine became an independent state, but the umbilical connection with Russia was not immediately completely broken. By the memorandum⁸ signed in Budapest in 1994, Ukraine ceded to Russia its nuclear arsenal, inherited from the former USSR, in exchange for guaranteeing the independence, sovereignty and integrity of the Ukrainian state borders agreed by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation. The memorandum was not ratified, and the Russian Federation imposed new forms of informational aggression on the Ukrainian territory, culminating with the Russian interference in the 2004 Kiev Revolution in Orange, the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, and the hybrid war in the east, Ukraine and the Sea of Azov, which is still in progress.

Forms of Communication Used by Western-European Countries in the Period of The Cold War

The communication policies of the "capitalist" states in Western Europe, after the end of the Second World War, aimed primarily at defending democratic values and strengthening economies, but Western Europeans also developed information protection systems and militia, to counteract the various forms of information aggression (misinformation, espionage, etc.), coming from the communist countries and, in particular,

from the USSR. Also, the communication policies of the Western European states were closely linked to those of the USA, the exponent of world democratic values and, at the same time, the main opponent of the USSR.

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had been publicly aware of Soviet expansionist policy since 1946, drawing attention to the fact that English-speaking people should unite to oppose communist ideological ambitions. Shortly thereafter, US President Truman launched, in 1947, the doctrine that bore his name, by which the US offered its support to support free peoples fighting threats from armed minorities or external pressures toward their democracy. Through the Truman Doctrine, the US assumed the role of world leader in the fight against communist doctrine. Also in 1947, the Marshall Plan, designed by the USA for the reconstruction of Europe, was launched, which developed the Western European economies and strengthened the appearance and existence of the elements of globalization on the European continent.

Great Britain came out of the war with very serious economic damage and was financially dependent on the Marshall Plan. It benefited from the largest amounts of this plan, but the social problems in the overseas colonial territories influenced the policy of rapid economic recovery of the United Kingdom. In 1947, India and Pakistan received the requested independence, and over the next three decades many colonies of the British Empire were recognized as independent nations within the Commonwealth. This decolonization policy weakened the economic and financial power of the UK worldwide and limited its influence internationally. Also, the Suez crisis, from 1956, the para-military violence in Northern Ireland (1960-1980), the conflict in the Falkland Islands with Argentina (1982) limited the kingdom's economic performance.

⁸ <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/507/64/pdf/N9450764.pdf?OpenElement>

The communication policy of the United Kingdom was based on the same principles as that of the United States and other European democratic allied states, such as France, West Germany, Italy, considered the engines of Europe's economic recovery, but also continental military powers.

France, like the United Kingdom, went through the "process" of decolonization and diminishing its role internationally immediately after the war. The economic recovery of France occurred quickly, through the implementation of the Marshall Plan, and the consolidation of its military status was achieved by signing the act establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in 1949. After the social crises and the French decolonization of Africa, from 1945-1974, France has entered a process of civil society reforms.

During the Cold War, confrontations between East and West in the field of international relations had consequences in all areas, including the communication between states. Of particular importance were the speeches of the officials of the two camps, who reached the target directly, through television or the print media. Through these speeches, messages, signals and codes were issued, which, after deciphering, generated reactions from opponents. An example of this can be given by the resolution of the Berlin crisis, 1948-1949, when the United Kingdom, France and the US decided to establish, in the western part of Germany, a separate German government and a currency, and the USSR reacted, via an interview with Stalin, with an American journalist.

Another type of communication used by the western states was propaganda, a method used by communist opponents, but with other valences. Westerners used propaganda to combat communist ideology, but also to transmit to the eastern populations the cultural and democratic values of the West, and through indirect persuasion informed the target audience about the high quality of life of the

ordinary western man. The messages transmitted through these two modes of communication reached Eastern Europe through food and clothing, through artistic films, music, novels and fashion magazines, media products that apparently did not pose any danger to the communist doctrine, but which changed the way people think and perceive the reality in which they lived.

Change of the Typology of Communication Processes after the Fall of Communist Regions in Europe

Economic failure, the pressure of globalization, divergences between the interests of the USSR and those of the subordinate communist countries, the use of state institutions against their own citizens were just a few of the factors that led to the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe. In addition to the above-mentioned factors, geopolitical causes and social mimicry can be added, which have united the populations of each state in the fight for the change of the ruling political class. The revolutions that took place in the Eastern bloc were favored by the reforms of the USSR, initiated in the period 1985-1989 by Mihail Gorbachev, the last Soviet communist leader, by which the conservative elements of the Moscow power were marginalized. But we can also mention the effects the election of John Paul II, the first Polish pope in the history of the Vatican, or the shaking of the Chinese Communist regime by the bloody commotion of the Tiananmen Square uprising.

Communist leaders were not able to understand the role of information and the power of the media over the masses they were leading. The legitimacy of the communist regimes has been shaken, over the decades in which they came to power, firstly by transmitting information about how fraudulently they were installed and how they eliminated their national political

opponents, through imprisonment, blackmail and suppression. Then, this so-called "legitimacy" was lost, morally, because of Stalinist excesses and abuses on their own populations, and from the political point of view Soviet interventions in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia proved that the communist states are the victims of Soviet imperialism.

1989 was the year in which most of the communist regimes in Europe fell and the states in the Eastern bloc adopted measures of democratic, political and economic changes, orienting themselves towards the Western model. The revolutions started in Poland and continued in Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia and, at the end of the year, in Romania. In 1990, the communist regime in Albania fell, the USSR disbanded, in 1991, resulting in 14 independent states and the Russian Federation, and Yugoslavia was divided, in 1992, into five distinct countries, from which Serbia and Montenegro separated subsequently.

The flows of the communication process between Eastern and Western Europe reached high levels in the years leading up to 1990, when pressures from the West were influential in changing the communist regimes. The effects of these pressures materialized, in 1990, by unifying Germany and dismantling the USSR, eliminating the monopoly of political leadership by a single party and organizing multi-party elections in 22 European states. In addition, the communist parties, which were supported by the USSR in different countries, not only in Europe, but throughout the world, were abolished, dissolved or reformed.

Also in 1990, economic reforms began in the former communist countries, by adopting measures to move from the centralized economy to the market economy, the results of which began to appear in 2004, when eight states in the Eastern bloc became members of the

European Union, and later in 2007 and 2013, when three other Eastern European states were included in the union. At the same time as the political, economic and social reforms, since 1990, the military field reforms have taken place. In January 1994, NATO launched the "Partnership for Peace" program, whose main objective was to build trust between NATO member states and European states or former Soviet republics that were not part of the alliance. In the following years, 21 countries joined this program, 13 of which later became full members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

The unifying factor of the unification of Europe, under the umbrella of the European Union, was the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany, achieved in October 1990, when Europeans, both Eastern and Western, understood that only together they would be able to build a common future and will be able to become a powerful voice worldwide. The process of intra-European social communication has embraced all forms and typologies of social communication, and the communication flows have taken into account, first of all, the social context in which they took place.

As early as the mid-1980s, Eastern Europeans understood that the Euro-Asian model of Soviet communist society was not a successful one, and began to focus on the model of Western-European societies. Mass media outlets, existing at that time, played an important role in transmitting and fixing information regarding the need for changes in closed companies in the east of the continent. The election of a Polish pope, the riots of the Romanian workers in Brasov, the manifesto of the Czechoslovak citizens, in front of Vaclav Havel and many other manifestations of opposition to the communist regimes in the east of Europe were taken over and disseminated by the radio stations and by other European media, to amplify and spread protest actions against communist regimes.

The flows of social communication benefited from the help of the media for the transmission of information, in particular through radio stations, which broadcast in the languages spoken by the target audience where the messages had to reach, thus eliminating the language barriers that obstructed the reception of the messages.

After 1990, English replaced the Russian language, which was used as a common medium of communication in many Eastern European countries, and became the main way of exchanging information between East and West Europe. This aspect of the way of transmitting messages between European transmitters and receivers has increased in size, as generations of exchanges have taken place in the states of Eastern Europe.

Conclusions

The retrospective of the twentieth century, from the perspective of the communication processes that took place on the European continent, shows us that the communication paradigm has been subjected to radical changes several times, the last one taking place in 1990. Communication is a vague concept, which the theoreticians frame in numerous ideological and theoretical concepts. The study of communication and the flows of its processes cannot be integrated only into a single scientific theory or thinking, but must be carried out through well-defined theoretical approaches or by applying communication theories in well-delimited areas of study. This working method I tried to use to capture the flows of the process of social communication from a well-defined geographical area, namely

that of continental Europe, over a period of five decades.

Theoretical models of social communication, which I applied to approach the theme I proposed, led me to the conclusion that the common cultural values of the population from a geographical area are primed by the influences and pressures that come from other populations, with different cultural, conceptual, ideological and sociological values. Also, communication plays a decisive role in the implementation of novelty elements in state organizations, in changing social, political, economic and military norms, but it has less significant influence in changing the cultural values of a community.

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PLANNING OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS SUPPORTING MILITARY ACTIONS

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Abstract: *At the beginning of the XXI century the world is marked by some regional conflicts that affect directly or indirectly the regional international relations at the regional and global level. Globally, these conflicts attracted the main security actors and in their political approaches to situations there are many differences which have led to the creation of new interstates agreements. Also, the differences could be observed in the approaches of the military operations, having in this sense two great approaches, on the one hand NATO whose main engine is the USA, and on the other hand the Russian Federation and its allies. No matter the NATO or non-NATO operational approaches, Intelligence plays a major role in the planning and development of military operations. In turn, Intelligence operations require careful planning followed by a deployment that will provide competitive Intelligence products to military leaders in a timely manner.*

Key words: *military operation, Intelligence operations.*

The XX century was marked by two global conflagrations and other small conflicts during which the Intelligence played a very important role. During the World War II the Intelligence actions have been present in all spectrum of operations and in all phases of these.

The second decade of the XXI century finds the main security actors of the world involved in different conflicts such as in Eastern Europe and Caucasus, in Africa or Middle East, in Asia and South America.

Nowadays, there are two approaches of conflicts on the one hand NATO which like to assume the role of the security provider in the world and on the other hand Russian Federation which is trying to assert itself as a world power and at the same time to block in their areas of interest NATO influence.

The Intelligence operations play a very important role in the planning and development of military operation in these conflicts. Although no one is talking about this topic, all military interventions in these conflicts were preceded before and afterwards during the development

supported by Intelligence operations. A proof in this regard could be Vladimir Putin's statements that he planned both actions the escape of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich and the annexation of Crimea with the heads of the Russian special services. It's happened only with four days before that the unidentified „little green men” to appear in the peninsula.

Personally, I cannot understand when the Russian special services had in half time to plan and to develop the Intelligence operations. This uncertainty that was born in my mind led me to the idea that there was prepared an action plan that was immediately adopted at the situation. This scenario is supported by an article written by Mr. Vadim Vasiliu in August 2015 in which were taken the news published by the Russian news agency *Kommersant* and according to which in a discussion between the US President George W. Bush and the Russian President Vladimir Putin that took place behind the closed doors after Bucharest NATO Summit, the first let it be understood that if

Ukraine continues its pro-NATO policy, the Russian Federation can initiate the process of annexation of Crimea.

What is an Intelligence operation?

The Intelligence operations that support a military operation are developed by the military special units trained to gather and to analyze the information in order to convert its in Intelligence products which need to the commanders in the military decision-making process (MDMP). Being developed by the military units we can say that the Intelligence operation is also a military operation developed in order to support another large-scale operation. In the specialized literature this kind of operations are known as support operations.

“*The Free Dictionary*” defined Intelligence operations as “*The variety of Intelligence and counter Intelligence tasks that are carried out by various Intelligence organizations and activities within the Intelligence process. Intelligence operations include planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback.*”¹.

The Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 2-1 (*Intelligence Operations*) approaches the Intelligence operation as a number of separate and distinct activities performed by Intelligence personnel and organization conducted in order to provide Intelligence in support of the decision-making process of the military leaders.

The FM 2-0 (Intelligence) defined Intelligence operations as “... *functions that constitute the Intelligence process: plan, prepare, collect, process, produce, and the three common tasks of analyze, disseminate, and assess*”².

¹ <https://www.thefreedictionary.com/Intelligence+operations>, accessed at 30.10.2019

² *** FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC, March

The main tasks of the Intelligence operations are providing competitive Intelligence products that support to conduct all phases of military operation.

One of the differences between the Intelligence operations conducted by military Intelligence units in order to support a military operation and any other Intelligence operations is that the task of the first is to provide the actionable Intelligence products based on the combat data. The combat data could be defined as that kind of information gathered by the specialized units or any other military units from the battlespace and many times could be used without a complicated analyze process. On the other side the Intelligence operations conducted by the civilian organizations would support military operations with Intelligence products but more in the strategic level. A good example on this topic could be the Russian military actions developed in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine that were supported by military (Главное Разведывательное Управление GRU – Main Intelligence Directorate) and civilian Intelligence services (Федеральная служба безопасности FSB – Federal Security Service; Служба внешней разведки SVR – Foreign Intelligence Service) as it is mentioned by authors in the report with title „*Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine*”.

In order to accomplish their missions, the military Intelligence units follow the operation process as any other military units. The operation process includes the activities of planning, preparation, execution and assessment.

Although, the military Intelligence units have to develop the operations process like any maneuver units the phases of Intelligence operations process do not correspond in time with the phases of the supported maneuver unit’s operations

2010, available on <http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-0.pdf>.

process.

*Planning*³ is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about.

*Preparation*⁴ consists of activities that units and Soldiers perform to improve their abilities to execute an operation.

*Execution*⁵ is putting a plan into action while using situational understanding to assess progress and adjust operations as the situation changes.

*Assessment*⁶ precedes and guides the other activities of the operations process and concludes each operation or phase of an operation.

Planning process

All phases of the military Intelligence operation process play a very important role in successfully fulfilling the mission objectives, but our study pays a special attention to the planning.

The authors of the article "*Intelligence Operations – Conception and Structure*" mentioned that "... *the Intelligence operations planning represents first phase in process of operations management, which contains definition of aims, directions and global development strategy, specification of measures and means for achievement of established goals and selection of best alternative*"⁷.

³ *** ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, Headquarters, Department of the Army, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN18323_ADP%205-0%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf, accessed at 30.10.2019

⁴ *Idem*.

⁵ *Idem*.

⁶ *Idem*.

⁷ Dragan MANOJLOVIC, Sasa MIJALKOVIC, Bozidar BANOVIC, *Intelligence Operations – Conception and Structure*, available on http://www.adbrana.mod.gov.rs/odbrana-stari/vojni_casopisi/arhiva/VD2011-zima/14.%20Intelligence%20Operations%20%E2%80%93%20Conception%20and%20Structure;%20Dragan%20Manojlo

The planning process of Intelligence operations is methodology that helps Intelligence staff and Intelligence units to understand the situation, the mission of supported maneuver units, Intelligence tasks, develop an Intelligence operation course of action, and produce an operation plan or order.

A model of the operation process is presented by the American specialists in the US Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0 and US Army Doctrine Publication 5-0. According these the operation process has seven steps. We agreed for the Intelligence operation planning process six of them:

- receipt of mission;
- mission analysis;
- Course of Action (COA) development;
- COA analysis; COA comparison;
- COA approval;
- orders production and dissemination.

Depending on the importance of the mission and the tasks to be performed the planning process of the Intelligence operation could be led by the chief of Intelligence staff or the commander of the military Intelligence unit.

The planning process of Intelligence operation is initiated by the chief of Intelligence staff and it begins with receipt of information collection tasks in the form of a mission. The information collection tasks are included in the lists of Commander's Critical Intelligence Requirements (CCIRs) which is managed by the Intelligence staff in the planning phase of supported maneuvers units.

The next step of the planning process is the mission analysis which is conducted by the chief of Intelligence staff or the commander of the military Intelligence units in order to better understand the purpose of the Intelligence operation, what the Intelligence staff must accomplish, the

vic,%20Sasa%20Mijalkovic%20i%20Bozidar%20Banovic.pdf, accessed at 30.10.2019

timeline when it must be done and very important why.

The COA of Intelligence operation step generates options for subsequent analysis and comparison that satisfy the intent of the chief of Intelligence staff or the commander of the military Intelligence unit and planning guidance. During the development of this step the Intelligence staff involved in the planning process uses the CCIRs, intent of the chief of Intelligence staff or commander of military Intelligence unit, planning guidance and knowledge products developed during the previous step.

The next step of Intelligence operation process is COA analysis. During this step the Intelligence staff involved in the planning process will identify the advantage and disadvantage, Intelligence resources, limitations and rules of engagement and others significant factors for each possible COA identified during the previous step.

During the COA comparison step the Intelligence staff involved in the planning process will present to the chief of Intelligence staff or commander of military Intelligence unit the problems identified during COA analysis in order to identify the best COA.

Following the COA comparison the chief of Intelligence staff or the commander of military Intelligence unit will generate the final guidance with some modifications of the COA or will approve it without any modification. If the chief of Intelligence staff or the commander of military Intelligence unit rejected the COA, the planning process will be restarted from the COA development step.

During the final step the Intelligence staff will elaborate the order and will disseminate it to all military Intelligence unit involved in the Intelligence operation.

Depending on the time available, the chief of Intelligence staff or commander of Intelligence unit will follow all the steps of the planning process or will adopt a shorter version by which certain steps that he does

not consider necessary will be eliminated.

Operation „Gayaneh”

On 2nd of February, 1943 at the Stalingrad, the Field marshal Friederich Paulus together with 23 German generals surrounded to the soviets the 6th German Army. After this important victory the soviet leader Iosif Visarionovich Stalin understood that this the beginning of the end of Nazi Germany. Second day Stalin had a long meeting with Lavreti Beria who was the chief of the Intelligence Service of Soviet Union. During this meeting it was planned that until 1948 in all the European countries which would be liberated by the Red Army would be set up communist governments.

The main challenge of the Soviet Intelligence service was that all the countries that were the subject of the discussion did not have a communist party. Due this situation the Soviet Intelligence service planned a large scale Intelligence operation, which aimed at exporting communist revolutions to all Eastern European countries.

Stalin gave this vast operation the codename “*Gayaneh*”, after seeing the premiere of the ballet with the same name by Aram Hacıaturyan and he was very impressed by the rhythm of the music allegory in this piece.

The operation had two phases. The main purpose of the first phase was the export of communist revolution in the states of Eastern and Central Europe. During the second phase, the operation aimed at creating specialized institutions in each state controlled by the Red Army, such as political police, as well as the preparation and infiltration of some soviet Intelligence officers to lead them.

In the book “*The legacy of the Kremlin - The role of espionage in the communist system of government*”, the author Ion

Mihai Pacepa⁸ describes in detail the second phase of this operation, carried out on the territory of Romania. In 1930, the Soviet Intelligence service sent Pantiuşa to Romania to support the illegal activity of the Romanian Communist Party. He was arrested and spent several years in the prisons in Doftana and Caransebeş, where he meets Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej. Pantiuşa was a Soviet citizen with vague Romanian origin, with real name Panteleimon Bondarenko, who became the head of the Romanian security service. Pantiuşa is none other than General Gheorghe Pintilie. After the central planning of the operation „*Gayaneh*” by the leaders of the Soviet Intelligence service, between February and March 1943, Pantiuşa, who was at the time in Caransebeş prison, was appointed to set up a service in Romania like political police. Pantiuşa is recruiting agents for the Soviet Intelligence service, among which Teohari Georgescu and Emil Bodnăraş. They injected in the Romanian institutions created after August 23, 1944, Russian agents, recruited generally from Romanian prisoners of war, from camps in the USSR.

We can observe that the operation “*Gayaneh*” was an Intelligence operation which was developed in order to support the final phase of the war (stability

operation). The Intelligence operation „*Gayaneh*” was planned during two months which represents a huge resource of time compared with same resource of classic military operation. Also the execution phase of the operation used a huge time resources.

Other resources that were used in this large-scale operation were human resources. According to Ion Mihai Pacepa, all government institutions in Romania were run by Russian agents, and the tasks of the operation were successfully fulfilled.

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⁸ Ion Mihai Pacepa is a former General of the communist Intelligence service from Romania, known as „*Securitate*”, which in July 1978, defected and requested political asylum in the US. Around this flaw, a series of scenarios were developed, according to which Ion Mihai Pacepa was a KGB agent, and his failure was directed by Moscow, in order to create a negative image for Nicolae Ceausescu in the West. On August 17, 1978, the Supreme Court of the Socialist Republic of Romania sentenced him to death. On August 16, 2013, the Institute for the Investigation of the Crimes of Communism and the Memory of the Romanian Exile sent an invitation letter to Ion Mihai Pacepa for a visit to Romania, to participate in a series of conferences and meetings with students from different universities, but he did not accepted the invitation. At the level of Intelligence specialists from Romania, Ion Mihai Pacepa is still considered a traitor.

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NATO'S RESILIENCE AGAINST CRISIS UBIQUITY

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Abstract: *Societal disruption and political interference are identified with life itself. In a bold interpretation, the book that fascinates mankind from ancient times - the Bible - can be perceived as an initiating exposure to violent crises that have influenced humanity. Cosecutively, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ could represent the anecdotal argument of history in demonstrating that no one (and nothing) remains set in stone (nailed) ... This research attempts to outline the contemporary challenges that echo in the Alliance's dimensioning and transformation, throughout medium and long terms. All the aspects are interconnected and only an integrated approach and synergic solutions can successfully translate into timeless allied stance.*

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is far from being a comprehensive orderliness. Theoretically, the mechanisms of the Alliance are optimally generated, however, the transposed reality is oftentimes corrigible. The element of certainty is represented by the transformational and adaptive capaciousness of NATO to continuously emerging threats.

Key words: *crises, transformation, core tasks.*

Generalities

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was conceived as a defensive military alliance, meant to unite individual forces and doctrines into a unitary system, capable of overcoming extreme situations, but above all, anticipating emerging threats. At the time of the organizational genesis (April, 1949), Western Europe aimed the safeguard, by restoring the strategic balance against USSR's expansionism.

Subsequently overcoming the *cold bipolarism*, NATO has transformed from a defense organization into a security organization, now offering its members and partners a range of security services, from immediate protection to long-term cooperation. The turning point is identified by Poland's entry into the orbit of the West, translated into changing power relations in central Europe and NATO insinuation into the area dominated by the Soviet Union for almost half a century. The Alliance has expanded progressively, reaching today a global network of 29 member states, establishing partnerships with over 40 countries and organizations spread across 5 continents. The entity is meant to act

firmly, in a flexible, pragmatic and innovative way, in the direction of building and strengthening security globally.

The Strategic Concept adopted at the NATO Summit in Portugal (*Active Engagement, Modern Defense - 2010*) resulted from the need to adapt the command structures, resources, capabilities structures and agencies to the current security environment.¹

The generic goal of global peace to which NATO aims is transposed into the 3 essential organizational tasks:²

- *collective defense* - by which NATO members reaffirm their obligation to provide mutual assistance both in case of external aggression on any member and in the event of an emerging threat to the security of any member;

- *crisis management* - through which the Alliance is committed to getting involved, using a variety of

¹ Daniel GHIBA, *Studiu privind adaptarea NATO la transformările mediului internațional de securitate*, „Carol I” National Defence University Publishing, Bucharest, 2014, p. 59.

² *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty*, Lisbon, 2010, art. 4. Link: <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf>.

political-military methods and means, in preventing potential crises that can affect the security of the organization, in managing those already triggered and in strengthening the post-conflict stability, if it ensures value of Alliance security; for the first time, this issue has a holistic approach, which means that all Member States, as well as partner states, must adapt their policies and actions in a coherent manner in order to prevent and manage crises.

- *security through cooperation* - through which NATO will be involved in international security issues, acting both in the direction of establishing partnerships with countries or international organizations relevant for maintaining a stable security environment, and in the direction of arms control, for their non-proliferation. Corollary, the organization is open for European democracies who want to join it.

Considering that the European and Euro-Atlantic present time is outlined under the crisis paradigm, the Alliance committed to involve itself in all its stages, by adopting a comprehensive and holistic approach. NATO reaffirms the issue of cooperation between all partners, and possibly with new partners, through joint consultations and activities on common threats and challenges of the security environment.

Crisis paradigm

We reassert that the 21st century is part of the crisis paradigm; without having the pretense to launch an original or propulsive idea³, we consider that humanity seems to plunge, the crises generated and regenerated constitute a pernicious spiral, without exit ...

³ See Lucian BLAGA, *Trilogia cunoașterii*, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 2013 (digital edition). *Propulsive ideas facilitate the transition from problem itself to solving it; these are the path to paradigmatic changes and add value to societal civilization.*

Summarizing the problem reveals a multiversity of crises, with interdependent processes and overlapping plans in factual and causal terms. At the individual level, we are in the middle of a tornado embodied by multi-crisis (started and felt at the individual/micro level, propagated and amplified at the societal/macro level), being able to vocalize the omnipresence of the crisis, found in the above register, and under the attribute of *ubiquity*⁴.

We are not mistaken if we consider that the present (questionless aspect) and the future can be traversed only if we metabolize a generalized *modus vivendi* under the auspices of crises! In trying to draw optimistic results from the epochal uncertainty, we can note that, in the moments of disappointment and negative tensions, the context offers exceptional opportunities. We only mention the Allied safeguarding of Europe as a solution for balancing the confrontation agenda at the end of the Second World War; we come to argument, with the imperatives of those times and the crucial importance of NATO genesis and multiplication.⁵

Crisis are the result of multiple causes, which interact over time to produce a potentially devastating threat; at the same time, they will continue to challenge leaders, given the precariousness of their prevention. Let us recall anecdotally and paradoxically the paraphrasing of President Richard Nixon - *life is a crisis*.⁶

⁴ Arjen BOIN, Paul't HART, Eric STERN, Bengt SUNDELIUS, *The Politics of Crisis Management*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005, p. 4.

⁵ See Floris IONESCU, Arthur ELISEI, *Chronical Cold War. Knowledge for the future of NATO*, Proceedings of the 13th International Scientific Conference *STRATEGII XXI – STRATEGIC CHANGES IN SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*, Volume 2, „Carol I” National Defence University Publishing, Bucharest, 2017.

⁶ Richard Milhous NIXON (January 9, 1913 – April 22, 1994) was an American politician who served as the 37th president of the United States from 1969 until his resignation in 1974. He is associated with the Watergate scandal: “*Life is not meant to be easy. It's hard to take being on the top - or on the bottom. I guess I'm something of a fatalist. You have to have a*

A common belief is that a combination of factors generates/causes a crisis, these disturbance agents being both internal and external. However, we believe that the root cause of the crisis lies in the inability of a system (entity, organization) to cope with the disturbance. Contemporary systems face fewer derailments due to improved methods of protection, but it is no less true that societal resistance has deteriorated, suffering disproportionately versus crisis, be it of any kind.

In the genesis of a crisis, seemingly harmless factors emerge and multiply in disruptive forces, which later translate into an undeniable threat to the system. The increasing complexity of systems of any kind (technological, social, political, etc.) and their interconnection exponentially increases their vulnerability to disruptions, leading to the multiplication and propagation of crises. Warning signs that are misinterpreted and misapplied can have no other result than exacerbating the problem itself. Another aspect determined by complexity is the alteration of its full understanding; in this regard, the close connection between the parts of the system and those of other systems allows the rapid proliferation of interactions (as well as errors) throughout the system.

NATO adaptation

The experience of NATO in crisis management began since its creation as an alliance and continues today. NATO crisis management goal is "*preventing violent conflict through a controlled reaction*"⁷.

The military-political crises can be painted using these shades:

- ✓ identifies itself with the reconfiguration of a *status-quo* and contradicts the equilibrium state;

sense of history, I think, to survive some of these things ... Life is one crisis after another."

⁷ Daniel Ghiba, *Studiu privind managementul crizelor politico-militare*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing, Bucharest, 2014, p. 51.

- ✓ it has a relative character in terms of the different metabolism within the actors;
- ✓ the potential for escalation to military confrontations;
- ✓ the decision-making process is dynamic and accelerated, solutions are required in the absence of complete intelligence, in an often chaotic and temporarily restricted setting.⁸

We will not insist on the historical landmarks of the political-military crises, without challenging the necessity of knowing the past and assuming the mistakes, but also the metabolization of the lessons learned from the passing of time. We consider it beneficial to orient the analysis proactively (in the NATO area of interest and influence), in an attempt to capture the future security vulnerabilities.

The near future reveals the following outbreaks with potential for crisis:⁹

- ✓ severe crisis in North Korea caused by testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles / ICBMs;¹⁰

- ✓ deliberate or unintentional military confrontation between the Russian Federation and NATO members, resulting from the assertive behavior of the former

⁸ Daniel GHIBA, *Managementul crizelor – curs universitar*, „Carol I” National Defence University Publishing, Bucharest, 2017, pp. 30.

⁹ Micah ZENKO, *The Crisis Manager's Cheat Sheet for 2017*, in *Foreign Policy* (electronic version), 27 December 2017. Link: https://www.google.ro/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwj2tdSXxJ3UAhWHVRQKHZELA2AQFggmMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fforeignpolicy.com%2F2016%2F12%2F27%2Fthe-crisis-managers-cheatsheet-for-2017-syria-north-korea-russiairaq%2F&usq=AFQjCNFbd9TEpH9_VUHL5WX2_8kzO0faRw&sig2=KXyMC7GxsQj5PNnLOD-4Dg.

¹⁰ The intervention/interference of the international community also seems imminent from the perspective of the UN principle regarding the responsibility to protect (R2P or RtoP). "*Humanitarian intervention has remained a controversial concept even when it happened, and when it did not happen.*" in *** *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2001.

in Eastern Europe;¹¹

✓ massive, extremely disruptive cyber attack on the critical infrastructure of one or more states;

✓ political instability within EU exacerbated by the flow of refugees and migrants, with accentuated civil riots, isolated terrorist attacks or violence against refugees and migrants;

The present it is contrasting in defining terms versus previous decades, with the focus being on the security register. The daily security threats, risks and vulnerabilities for the countries of the Euro-Atlantic region are multiplied, difficult to quantify and define, having to do with terrorism, drug trafficking, people, weapons and technologies, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, militant extremism, natural disasters, etc. A common feature of the ones mentioned above is appealing to the cross-border nature, as a consequence their restriction and eradication impose a joint international effort. This is an argument for overcoming (the historical) isolationist paradigm and forcing NATO involvement!

The cyclicity of history brings NATO back to the primary state of existence - tempering Soviet expansionism. Therefore, the European area becomes the focal point of the effort after the expeditionary war in Afghanistan. The general perception of the Alliance as a symbol of the defeat of the Soviet bloc in strategic terms, accentuated by the complex of the defeated one, affects the interaction of the two entities. At the opposite end, NATO proclaims itself the most prestigious military alliance in history, yet recent history events have accentuated certain sensitive points. The Ukrainian crisis denotes that the hybrid dimension has disproportionately increased versus the Euro-Atlantic reaction.

¹¹ The Russian Federation has carried out numerous intimidation maneuvers in the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, the North Sea air space and even in the area of the English Channel; cascades of provocative military exercises, probably meant to test the reactions of allied states.

The contradictory dialogue with the Russian Federation, doubled with force demonstrations, will extend in the long term in terms of inclusion, exclusion, tolerance, acceptance - *Cold War 2.0*. Corollarily, the eastern expansion of NATO is delayed/diminished by the reaction of Moscow, which feels suffocated and threatened.

Placing NATO permanently (apparently) on the edge of the existential chasm is problematic for at least three reasons. The first argument - the narrative about the crisis is imprecise; the terminal critical point and the dissolution of NATO are equally vague. Secondly, NATO has often exceeded moments of imminent collapse, making the disappearance (dismantling) thesis unlikely and unrealistic. Finally, we can say that the Alliance has an inexhaustible capacity for recovery or regeneration. Of course, mere survival is not enough, it matters how far the being is reflected in the adaptation to the new realities. Certainty best describes the fact that NATO is a living, transformational and inspirational organization.

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KEY POINTS IN ROMANIAN LAW SYSTEM OF THE OPERATIONALISATION PROCESS OF THE ESSENTIAL INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN STANDARDS FROM PUBLIC SECTOR ACCORDING WITH NON-CURRENT ASSETS, INVENTORIES AND HUMAN RESOURCES EXPENDITURES IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND IN ARMED FORCES FROM 1990 TILL PRESENT

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***Abstract:** European states currently implement two sets of accounting standards: national accounting standards and International Financial Reporting Standards. International financial reporting standards require clear, precise and common rules for everyone involved at the international level. International accounting standards were the first international accounting standards developed by International Accounting Standards Committee, created in 1973. Currently, 16 IFRS and 29 IAS are in use. Starting with 2021, a new IFRS, called IFRS 17 Insurance Contracts, will become active. The reform of the international public sector has brought a series of changes including the elaboration of International Public Sector Accounting Standards, especially, in the European space.*

***Key words:** international financial reporting standards; international accounting standards; international public sector accounting standards*

Introduction

The geopolitical context in which our country was at the beginning of the 21st century has imposed Romania to join international organisations that ensures the security, independence and sovereignty of the country, but also its economic stability. Thus, following Romania's adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation/NATO in 2004 and to the European Union/UE in 2007, measures were needed to modernize and reform the public sector in Romania, a sector that had to be aligned with the new requirements specific to the two entities/alliances in which our country was integrated.

Currently in Romania, the economic difficulties are reflected in the social plane and affect the behavior of the people. The transition to the market economy is a process that takes longer

than expected. The population perceives this process differently, not only because of the individual well-being, but especially of the degree of optimism that each one enjoys. The public sector in our country has undergone substantial changes in recent years regarding the size and intensity of the actions.

In this material we intend to carry out an analysis of the implementation of the International and European Standards in the public sector in our country and, in particular, in entities within the Ministry of National Defense.

Conceptual delimitations of international and European accounting standards

In order to have an overview of the implementation of international and European accounting standards in the public sector in our country, we consider

that it is necessary to make some clarifications on what these mean and suppose.

The increasing complexity in the economic sector required the emergence of new rules and classification methods for more accurate and common accounting for all actors involved in the international economic process.

From our point of view, the International Accounting Standards are a set of tools or rules designed to regulate the specific areas of the accounting process in order to standardize and standardize it. The evolution and challenges that have emerged in the international accounting process have led to the need for such a toolkit.

Generally, European states currently implant two sets of accounting standards: national accounting standards and International Financial Reporting Standards/IFRS. According to the International Accounting Standards Board/IASB, the financial reporting system is an essential condition for economic development.

International financial reporting standards impose clear, precise and common rules for all those involved at international level so that financial statements are characterized by consistency, transparency and can be comparable across the entire international economic environment. The IFRS are prepared by a committee of specialists meeting internationally, called the International Accounting Standards Board.

The standards regulate how states, economic actors and other entities participating in the international economic sector have to make the accounting records, defining the typology of transactions, as well as other events/situations that may have financial impact. IFRS have emerged as a necessity to realize a common accounting language. In this way, the entities involved, as well as their financial statements, reflect

consistency and reliability regardless of where they come from.

The IFRS Foundation establishes the standards for "bringing transparency, accountability and efficiency to financial markets around the world ... fostering long-term financial confidence, growth and stability in the global economy"¹. Companies benefit from IFRS because investors are more likely to make money in a company if the company's practices are transparent.

International Accounting Standards/IAS were the first international accounting standards developed by the International Accounting Standards Committee /IASC, created in 1973. At that time, the main objective, which is valid even nowadays, it was to facilitate the comparison of the business environment worldwide, to increase transparency and confidence in financial reporting, as well as to favor international trade and investment.

IAS internationally ensures "transparency, accountability and efficiency in financial markets around the world. This allows investors and other market participants to make informed business decisions about investment opportunities and risks and improves capital allocation"². They also minimize the costs of reporting and regulation, especially for economic actors with international representation.

Studying and analyzing the main provisions at international level, we will observe that at present the following standards, namely 16 IFRS and 29 IAS are in force:

“IFRS 1 First-time adoption of international financial reporting standards;
IFRS 2 Share-based payment;
IFRS 3 Business combinations;
IFRS 4 Insurance contracts;

¹ <https://www.ifrs.org/about-us/who-we-are> accessed on 25.08.2019.

² www.investopedia.com/terms/i/ias.asp accessed on 03.09.2019.

IFRS 5 Non-current assets held for sale and discontinued operations;
 IFRS 6 Exploration and evaluation of mineral resources;
 IFRS 7 Financial instruments: disclosures;
 IFRS 8 Operating segments;
 IFRS 9 Financial instruments;
 IFRS 10 Consolidated financial statements;
 IFRS 11 Joint arrangements;
 IFRS 12 Disclosure of interests in other entities;
 IFRS 13 Fair value measurement;
 IFRS 14 Regulatory deferral accounts;
 IFRS 15 Revenue from contracts with customers;
 IFRS 16 Leases;
 IAS 1: Presentation of financial statements;
 IAS 2: Inventories;
 IAS 7: Cash flow statements;
 IAS 8: Accounting policies, changes in accounting estimates and errors;
 IAS 10: Events after the reporting period;
 IAS 11: Construction contracts;
 IAS 12: Income taxes;
 IAS 16: Property, plant and equipment;
 IAS 17: Leases;
 IAS 18: Revenue;
 IAS 19: Employee benefits;
 IAS 20: Accounting for government grants and disclosure of government assistance;
 IAS 21: The effects of changes in foreign exchange rates;
 IAS 23: Borrowing costs;
 IAS 24: Related party disclosures;
 IAS 26: Accounting and reporting by retirement benefit plan;
 IAS 27: Separate financial statements;
 IAS 28: Investments in associates and joint ventures;
 IAS 29: Financial reporting in hyperinflationary economies;
 IAS 31: Interests in joint ventures;
 IAS 32: Financial instruments: presentation;
 IAS 33: Earnings per share;
 IAS 34: Interim financial reporting;
 IAS 36: Impairment of assets;

IAS 37: Provisions, contingent liabilities and contingent assets;
 IAS 38: Intangible assets;
 IAS 39: Financial instruments: recognition and measurement;
 IAS 40: Investment property;
 IAS 41: Agriculture”³.

Specialists in the field at international level are constantly concerned about updating these standards to meet the new challenges of the market economy. Thus, starting with 2021, a new IFRS, called IFRS 17 Insurance Contracts, will enter into force.

Implementation of International Accounting Standards in the public sector of our country

The public sector encompasses the forms of national, regional, local government, as well as associated government entities such as councils, commissions, agencies and public interest undertakings that are in a single or complementary relationship of public money financing.

Given the current reality and the general context of globalization, and considering international accounting standards as a guide to what the European accounting profession means, we can delimit the public sector as the International Federation of Accountants/IFAC appreciates, through the International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board/IPSASB and simultaneously appreciated that the public sector was and is obliged to adhere to these standards and to make quarterly and annual reports to the European structures of analysis and control, respectively for the entities within the Ministry of National Defense at Directorate-General for Financial Accounting.

The reform of the international public system has brought a series of changes

³ <https://www.wikiaccounting.com/list-ifrs-ias/>
 accessed on 02.09.2019.

including the elaboration of International Public Sector Accounting Standards/IPSAS, in particular, in the European space. These have been adopted by the International Accounting Standards Council in the public sector in order to harmonize the international accounting system and especially the European accounting system. The basic idea was to standardize the public systems of the member countries of International Federation of Accountants/IFAC (IPSASB being a body formed within the IFAC) in order to obtain beneficial effects in the world economy. IFAC member countries are permanently motivated to implement IPSAS at the level of their public institutions and also to develop new national standards taking into account the particularities of their public system.

Following the emergence of IPSAS and the elaboration of its own national standards and at the level of our country, a number of changes have been made in the Romanian accounting legislation in order to align it with the new provisions. Thus, the 32 IPSAS are:

IPSAS 1 - Presentation of financial statements;
 IPSAS 2 - Cash flow statements;
 IPSAS 3 - Accounting policies, changes in accounting estimates and errors;
 IPSAS 4 - The effects of changes in foreign exchange rates;
 IPSAS 5 - Borrowing costs;
 IPSAS 6 - Consolidated and separate financial statements;
 IPSAS 7 - Investments in associates;
 IPSAS 8 - Interests in joint ventures;
 IPSAS 9 - Revenue from exchange transactions;
 IPSAS 10 - Financial reporting in hyperinflationary economies;
 IPSAS 11 - Construction contracts;
 IPSAS 12 - Inventories;
 IPSAS 13 - Leases;
 IPSAS 14 - Events after the reporting date;

IPSAS 15 - Financial instruments: disclosure and presentation;
 IPSAS 16 - Investment property;
 IPSAS 17 - Property, plant and equipment;
 IPSAS 18 - Segment reporting;
 IPSAS 19 - Provisions, contingent liabilities and contingent assets;
 IPSAS 20 - Related party disclosures;
 IPSAS 21 - Impairment of non-cash-generating assets;
 IPSAS 22 - Disclosure of financial information about the general government sector;
 IPSAS 23 - Revenue from non-exchange transactions (taxes and transfers);
 IPSAS 24 - Presentation of budget information in financial statements;
 IPSAS 25 - Employee benefits;
 IPSAS 26 - Impairment of cash-generating assets;
 IPSAS 27 - Agriculture;
 IPSAS 28 - Financial instruments: presentation;
 IPSAS 29 - Financial instruments: recognition and measurement;
 IPSAS 30 - Financial instruments: disclosures;
 IPSAS 31 - Intangible assets;
 IPSAS 32 - Service concession arrangements: grantor

In the following, we will discuss the main provisions of these standards that are relevant to the subject of our work and we refer here to: IPSAS 1 - Presentation of financial statements; IPSAS 12- Inventories; IPSAS 17-Property, plant and equipment; IPSAS-25-Employee benefits and IPSAS 31 - Intangible assets.

General aspects of IPSAS 1 - Presentation of financial statements

As stated in the specialized literature, financial statement is “a structured representation of the financial position

and financial performance of an entity”⁴, whether it is public, private or non-profit.

General purpose of financial statements may also “have a predictive or prospective role, providing useful information in forecasting the level of resources required”⁵ for ongoing activities, the resources that could be created by the ongoing activities, as well as the associated risks and aspects that are not very cleared.

The objectives of the general purpose financial statements are “to provide information on the financial position, financial performance and cash flows of an entity, useful for a wide range of users in making and evaluating the decisions related to the allocation of resources”⁶.

A full set of financial statements includes a statement of financial position, a statement of financial performance, a statement of changes in net assets / equity, a statement of cash flows and when the entity discloses its budget which was approved, an analysis of budgetary values. With the real ones, either as an individual supplementary financial statement, or as a column of the budget in the financial statements and, last but not least, the notes, which include a synthesis of the relevant accounting policies and, at the same time, other explanatory notes.

The individual annual financial statements “complying with IFRS prepared by the credit institutions and by the entities authorized, regulated and supervised by the Financial Supervisory Authority, according to the accounting regulations issued by the National Bank of Romania, respectively the Financial Supervisory Authority, have the components provided by the International

Standards of financial reporting (IFRS), according to the provisions of art. 28 paragraph (3) of Law no. 82/1991, republished, as subsequently amended and supplemented”⁷.

General aspects of IPSAS 12-Inventories

Inventories are assets that can take the following forms: “in the form of materials or consumables that will be used during the production process, in the form of materials or consumables that will be used or distributed in the process of providing services, held for sale or distribution during the normal course of activity and during the production process for sale or distribution”⁸.

Inventories include goods purchased and held for sale, including, for example, goods purchased by an entity and held for sale or land and other property held for sale.

Inventories also include finished products made or production in progress within the entity. The inventories also include the following goods: materials and consumables to be used in the production process and goods purchased or produced by the entity that will be distributed to third parties free of charge or at a nominal price.

In the public sector, inventories may include: ammunition, consumables, maintenance supplies, spare parts for property, plant and equipment other than those treated in the tangible assets standards, strategic provisions (eg energy reserves), non-cash money stocks, stocks

⁴ Modifications of IAS 1 „Prezentarea situațiilor financiare”, published in EU Regulation no. 475/2012.

⁵ www.slideshare.net/citestebiblia96/contabilitate-publica accessed at 31.08.2019.

⁶ www.portal-contabilitate.ro/standardul-international-de-contabilitate-1-prezentarea-situatiilor-financiare accessed on 01.09.2019.

⁷ OMFP nr. 10 din 3 ianuarie 2019, privind principalele aspecte legate de întocmirea și depunerea situațiilor financiare anuale și a raportărilor contabile anuale ale operatorilor economici la unitățile teritoriale ale Ministerului Finanțelor Publice și pentru reglementarea unor aspecte contabile, publicat în *Monitorul Oficial al României*, nr. 35 din 14 ianuarie 2019.

⁸ www.mf.gov.md/sites/default/files/Glosarul%20SNCSP%20%281%29.pdf accessed at 01.09.2019.

postage held for sale (eg stamps) and products in progress, including: materials for educational / training courses, customer services (eg, audit services), where these services are sold at normal market prices, as well as land / property held for sale.

General aspects of IPSAS 17-Property, plant and equipment

The objective of this standard is to state the accounting treatment for tangible assets, so that those entities who utilize the financial statements can discern the information regarding the investment of an entity in its tangible assets, as well as the changes that have taken place in such an investment.

Regarding the scope, an entity that draws up and presents financial statements according to accrual accounting must apply this standard in accounting for tangible fixed assets, unless a different accounting treatment has been adopted in accordance with another IPSAS and it is about heritage assets.

This standard applies to all entities in the public sector, except state economic entities (which apply the IFRSs issued by the IASB).

General aspects of IPSAS-25-Employee benefits

Expenditure on human resources is a component part of expenses that is reflected in the financial performance of a public entity.

Expenditure on human resources, higher or lower to different public entities, will influence inversely proportional to the period surplus or deficit. Thus, the expenditures with large human resources generate the decrease of the surplus or the appearance or increase of the deficit of the period and conversely, the expenses with small human resources determine the

increase of the surplus or the avoidance or decrease of the deficit of the period.

As a novelty regarding the benefits granted to the employees, starting with 2018, the staff employed in the public institutions of our country benefit annually from their vouchers for holidays / their value in the amount of 1450 lei. This benefit was introduced on the basis of Law no. 165 of July 10, 2018, published in the Official Gazette no. 599 of July 13, 2018. According to the law, holiday vouchers are “valuable tickets that are granted to the employees to cover expenses incurred by performing the rest leave in domestic tourism”⁹.

Within the entities of the Ministry of National Defense, the personnel benefit from the value of the holiday vouchers, the expenses incurred, within the limit of 1450 lei, during the leave being settled after the submission of the supporting documents, namely: invoice and fiscal receipt issued by the tour operators.

Also as a novelty element, starting with the year 2019, the personnel of the Ministry of National Defense can request the settlement of the value of the holiday vouchers and for periods outside the rest leave, in this case the value of the voucher is subject to the income tax in the quota of 10%.

General aspects of IPSAS 31 - Intangible assets

In this standard the following aspects are presented: the objective, scope, definitions, recognition and evaluation, recognition of an expense, subsequent evaluation, useful life, fixed intangible assets with fixed useful life, intangible fixed assets with indefinite useful life, recoverability of the carrying amount - impairment losses, withdrawals and disposals, information presentation, transition.

⁹ Legea nr. 165 din 10 iulie 2018, publicată în *Monitorul Oficial al României*, nr. 599 din 13 iulie 2018.

The goal of this standard is to state the accounting treatment for intangible assets which are not specifically treated in any other IPSAS. An entity will accept an intangible asset if the specified criteria are expressly met. The standard also states the method of measuring the carrying amount, the intangible assets and requires detailed presentations regarding the intangible assets.

Conclusions

The contemporary international environment is a dynamic one which involves substantial changes and permanent adaptations to its specific requirements. The international community is constantly concerned with adapting to the new challenges and requirements, as well as harmonizing and standardizing the international economic market. These are just a few of the foundations that underpinned the need to develop international accounting standards.

Thus, as we have studied and analyzed throughout this material at international and European level, international financial reporting standards and international accounting standards have been developed over time, which have been implemented in the public sector as international accounting standards in the public sector.

Romania as a NATO member state and of the EU has aligned itself with the reality of the two international alliances, as well as the challenges of the international economic environment and has implemented these standards, including in the public sector and obviously within the entities of the Ministry of National Defense.

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SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES REGARDING THE NON-CURRENT ASSETS, INVENTORIES AND HUMAN RESOURCES EXPENDITURES IN ROMANIAN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS, ENTITIES OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PRIVATE SECTOR INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE FOR INCREASING THE RELEVANCE OF THIS ACCOUNTING INFORMATION FOR MANAGERIAL STRUCTURES OF ARMED FORCES

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Abstract: *In order to function in optimal conditions any entity of the Ministry of National Defense needs a series of tangible and intangible assets such as machinery, installations, buildings, furniture, computers, software, patents, licenses, etc. In organizing the accounting of public institutions an important role is played by the knowledge and respect of the budget classification. Unlike the public institutions whose main objective is to provide goods and services to the population or social aid, the entities from the private sector are looking to obtain profit. Entities of the Ministry of National Defense carry out the process of accounting on the same principles and respecting the same norms as the public institutions, but at the same time, considering the belonging of our country to the strongest political-military alliance of the world, as well as to the European Union, the military institution permanently adapts its internal procedures to ensure the financial interoperability of the participating troops throughout the range of NATO and / or EU military operations.*

Key words: *accounting; non-current assets; inventories; human resources expenditures.*

Introduction

The Armed Forces of Romania following the adherence to the strongest alliance in the world went through the most complex period of modern and contemporary history and, at the same time, it was necessary to find viable solutions in order to establish a better and efficient form of organization and functioning, which it allows it to adapt rapidly to the missions and requirements imposed by the social control and the new types of threats, due to the unprecedented development of the human society specific to any system of evolution.

Continuing the good collaboration existing between the basic structures that act in the economic field to provide the combat forces with what is necessary for them to carry out their missions, both

under conditions of peace, and in crisis/war situations, in different theaters, operations or places of dislocation, the General Directorate of Financial Accounting participates in the complex restructuring effort of the Romanian Armed Forces and from the conceptual structure posture.

The great classic of universal literature, Goethe, defined accounting as "one of the most ingenious creations of the human spirit that every good householder should use in his household"¹, but to understand this science we must have first, its theoretical basis.

¹ <https://contullataifas.wordpress.com/2013/03/29/ce-este-de-fapt-contabilitatea> accessed on 03.09.2019.

Conceptual delimitations of non-current assets, inventories and expenditures with human resources

By their destination, tangible and intangible assets contribute to the activity of any public institution, as opposed to a commercial company whose main purpose is to obtain profit, the non-current assets contribute to the realization of new goods, works of services, these being directly subject to commercialization.

Since its establishment, in order to operate under optimal conditions, any public institution and implicitly any entity of the Ministry of National Defense needs a series of tangible and intangible assets such as machinery, installations, buildings, furniture, computers, software, patents, licenses, etc.

Studying and analyzing the main references in the specialized literature, we will find that any source controlled by the institution that appears as a result of past events and from which certain future economic benefits (advantages) are expected is an asset.

The patrimonial assets, as informational structures of the actual balance sheet, in relation to their destination and liquidity, are classified in two categories: fixed assets and current assets (current).

Fixed assets are assets held by public institutions for their long-term use. The period of usefulness and liquidity of these values is greater than one year. It is not consumed and is not replaced after the first use.

In relation to the usefulness and the concrete form of presentation, the fixed assets are delimited in:

- a) intangible assets (also called intangible or intangible assets);
- b) tangible assets (tangible assets or tangible investments);
- c) financial assets (long-term financial investments).

Following, we would like to bring some clarifications on this classification of

assets by studying and analyzing the categories that are part of them.

a) Fixed intangible assets

An important part of the assets, but which are recorded only in a small part of the balance sheet, consists "of:

- development costs;
- concessions, patents, licenses, trademarks, similar rights and assets, except those created internally by the institution;
- recordings of theatrical performances, radio or television programs, musical works, sporting events, literary, artistic or recreational works performed on films, magnetic tapes or other media;
- other intangible fixed assets;
- advances and intangible fixed assets in execution"².

b) Fixed tangible assets "include:

- land and land development;
- construction;
- technical installations, means of transport, animals and plantations;
- furniture, office equipment, equipment for the protection of human and material values and other bodily assets;
- advances and fixed assets in progress"³.

c) Fixed financial assets

A financial asset is any asset that represents: deposits, an equity instrument of an entity, a contractual right.

The financial assets "include:

- participation titles;
- other fixed assets;
- fixed assets"⁴.

Within the balance sheet that reflects the financial position are also fixed assets or non-current assets, among which the fixed assets occupy a very important place. These are regulated and very clearly defined by International Public Sector Accounting Standards / IPSAS, notably IPSAS 1 - Presentation of financial

² www.scribd.com/document/177112056/CONTABILITATEA-BUGETARA accessed on 05.09.2019.

³ *Ibidem.*

⁴ *Ibidem.*

statements, IPSAS 12-Inventories, IPSAS 17 - Property, Plant and Equipment, IPSAS-25-Employee benefits and IPSAS 31 - Intangible assets.

Accounting within public institutions

Within the category of public institutions are those state institutions formed for the purpose of carrying out social-cultural activities. By their specificity, they do not carry out directly productive economic activities and can be classified as follows:

- a) units in the field of education, scientific research, youth and sport;
- b) units subordinated to the Ministry of Health;
- c) units in the field of culture and cults;
- d) the organs of state power and administration: the Presidency, the Parliament, the Government, the Prosecutor's Office, the judicial bodies, prefects and mayors;
- e) The armed forces and other institutions in the defense system, public order and national security (MAI, SRI, SIE, SPP, STS, etc.).

The essential feature of public institutions is the fact that within their activity the incomes needed for self-financing are not obtained, they receive funds from the state budget.

The object of the accounting of public institutions is the public and private patrimony in their administration, the revenues and expenses budgetary and extra-budgetary, the rights and obligations resulting from the activity carried out, in compliance with the legal provisions. The object of the budgetary accounting includes the recording of the patrimonial operations that occur within the public institutions in the process of budget execution.

Public institutions and public services with legal personality and whose managers have the status of authorizing officers, regardless of the way of financing the expenses, have the obligation, according to

the law, to lead the accounting in the double party (except for the municipal mayors who lead the accounting in the single party.), to prepare a balance sheet and a budget execution account.

„The responsibility for organizing and managing the accounting at public institutions lies with the authorizing officer”⁵.

In the organization of the accounting of public institutions an important role is played by the knowledge and respect of the budgetary classification, that is to say the correct identification of the incomes and expenses on predetermined structures.

„Expenditure accounting is based on the types of expenses, according to their nature or destination, as the case may be. Income accounting is based on income types, by their nature or source, as the case may be. Accounting of budget revenues, special funds and extra-budgetary revenues is kept on the subdivisions of the budget classification.

The accounting of public institutions financed from budgetary credits, special funds and extra-budgetary income ensures the recording of cash payments and actual expenses, on the subdivisions of the budget classification, according to the approved budget.

In the public institutions the result of the budget execution is established annually by closing the actual expenditure accounts and the source accounts from which they were executed”⁶.

The particularities and specificity of the activity of the public institutions requires that the accounting information from different sectors of the budget execution be centralized in order to have a clear image on the overall budget execution, thus combining the current accounting with the centralizing accounting and allowing the quantification of the step-by-step data at the end.

⁵ Legea contabilității nr 82/1991, republicată, *Monitorul Oficial al României*, nr 48/2005.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

According to the accounting law, „The Ministry of Public Finance prepares quarterly and annually the general balance of the state treasury in the structure established by it which is approved under the conditions of the law”⁷.

According to the regulations in force, the public institutions, according to the structure established by the Ministry of Public Finance, present to the Government the annual balance sheet with the general annual account for the execution of the state budget.

Accounting in private entities

The process of accounting for the entities from the private environment is performed according to the law no. 31 of November 16, 1990, republished regarding the commercial companies, with the subsequent modifications and completions.

The natural or legal persons from the territory of Romania can be associated in commercial companies in one of the “following forms:

- a) company in collective name;
- b) a limited partnership;
- c) joint stock company;
- d) limited partnership company;
- e) limited liability company”⁸.

Unlike the public institutions whose main objective is to provide goods and services to the population or social aid, the entities from the private environment are looking for profit generation. From here, certain peculiarities of the accounting process specific to the entities from the private environment are different from those of the public sector..

The private environment is characterized by dynamism and flexibility, taking into account the frequencies and the multitude of factors involved in trading, exchanges, foreign exchange market and

the marketing of goods. Thus, the accounting specialists in this environment need to adapt to the new challenges in order to reach the final objective of the entity and, of course, its long-term development.

Both the accounting activity and the structure of the financial statements of the companies are regulated from the point of view of the form and component elements of OMFP 1802/2014⁹ for the approval of the Accounting Regulations regarding the individual annual financial statements and the consolidated annual financial statements.

According to this order, companies that have “subunits, organize and manage the accounting so that the necessary information regarding the activity carried out by these subunits is available.

Subunits without legal personality, belonging to legal persons based in Romania, represent branches, agencies, representations or other such units without legal personality, established according to the law.

Subunits without legal personality, which belong to legal entities based in Romania, organize and manage their own accounting records, so that it can determine the information and obligations provided by law, and the legal entities to which they belong can draw up annual financial statements”¹⁰.

We will not develop these aspects very much because we propose in this material to study and analyze the strengths of the accounting process in entities within the Ministry of National Defense, part of the national security and defense.

⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁸ Legea nr. 31 din 16 noiembrie 1990, Republicată privind societățile comerciale, cu modificările și completările ulterioare, *Monitorul Oficial al României*, partea I/14.034.2009.

⁹ Publicat în *Monitorul Oficial al României*, Partea 1, Nr.963 din 30.12.2014.

¹⁰ OMFP 1802 din 29 decembrie 2014 partea 1 pentru aprobarea Reglementărilor contabile privind situațiile financiare anuale individuale și financiare anuale consolidate.

Accounting in entities within the Ministry of National Defense

Romania's adherence to the North Atlantic alliance also required the alignment of the financial-accounting management used in the army to that practiced within the alliance. It is known that the financial management is designed by NATO so that the final control of the expenditures is carried out by the countries covering the costs of the respective activities and is subject to consensus. The control can be carried out at all levels of the decision-making process either by general limitations or by specific restrictions.

General limits may be imposed by setting fixed resources or ceilings for operating and equipment expenses (according to the decisions of the Higher Resources Commission) or for supplementation of civilian and military personnel, in which the responsible for financing (Secretary General, strategic commanders, commanders subordinates and other designated heads of NATO bodies) enjoy a certain freedom of movement in the proposal and use of budgets.

The financial-accounting activity of the Ministry of National Defense, as an information system, consists of a set of complex operations, studies, analyzes, norms and norms, programs and plans, records and reports that ensure:

- a) the real dimensioning of the volume of financial means necessary to fulfill the objectives and tasks set;
- b) optimization of the distribution by means of financial means by authorizing officers, by actions, objectives, tasks and programs;
- c) the establishment and use, according to the law, of own income funds;
- d) transferring to the destination, on time, the amounts due to the state budget and special budgets;
- e) performing all internal and international settlements with operability;

f) establishing the volume of investigations and financing them according to the regulations in force;

g) the legal and maximum efficiency of financial means, regardless of their source;

h) the accounting of the economic-financial operations;

i) the control of the use of financial means, as well as the realization of financial indicators and programs, at all stages of the economic-financial circuit;

j) operative and periodic information of the authorizing officer, of the management of the Ministry of National Defense and of the institutions and bodies outside the ministry under the conditions established by the legal provisions.

The financial-accounting activity in the army, as an integrated system, groups the information and data used in the following subsystems (main sub-activities):

- a) budget planning;
 - b) budget execution;
 - c) keeping the financial means and the cash operations;
 - d) domestic and international settlements;
 - e) the salary of the personnel;
 - f) establishing and paying military pensions and social rights;
 - g) the activity of the economic agents from the coordination of the Ministry of National Defense;
 - h) the pursuit and realization of the monetary debts, debts, compensations, insurances;
 - i) financial control;
 - j) accounting of economic-financial operations;
 - k) the balance sheet and the execution account;
 - l) the inventory, evaluation and reassessment of the heritage;
 - m) heritage management;
 - n) training of specialists, etc.
- Accounting, as a subsystem of the financial-accounting activity of the army, aims at systematic and permanent monitoring, through a reflection and generalization of the data, of the way in

which the budget is executed, as well as of the results obtained, in order to take the appropriate measures to it ensures the improvement of the activity at the level of each authorizing officer.

In order to be able to respond effectively to the new demands, mainly determined by our country's membership in NATO, the financial-accounting management must provide the combat forces with the ability to acquire and maintain substantial fighting power in different regions of the world, according to the requirements of the collective defense and the effective financial support of the operations in different theaters. In order to materialize this desire and to materialize the participation in the achievement of the objectives of the national security policy, the General Financial Accounting Department has intensified its efforts to contribute, according to its competences, in the following priority areas of action of the Ministry of National Defense:

- a) completing the restructuring of the military system;
- b) fulfilling the obligations assumed by Romania as a NATO member and part of the European Union;
- c) increasing the fighting capacity of the armed forces - the efficiency of the military system so as to ensure the commanding capacity of the command and the combat force of the troops, necessary to participate in the entire range of military operations of the alliance;
- d) improving the management of human resources;
- e) increasing the efficiency of the military cooperation that will give priority to the efforts to fulfill the commitments / obligations within NATO and the EU.

Specific to entities within the Ministry of National Defense, as part of public institutions in our country, we can say that accounting information is used in two forms: financial accounting and management accounting (managerial).

The dualistic representation of the operating cycle involves the split of the

accounting into two parts, the financial and managerial accounting, obtaining the same result in two different ways.

The financial accounting considered as a tool of knowledge, which ensures the management and control of the movements of the patrimonial elements and of the obtained results, has the objective to elaborate and provide synthesis documents that ensure the faithful image of the patrimony, the financial position of the entity at a certain moment, the specification.

The results, performance and evolution of the entity's finances. Financial accounting based on intermittent inventory does not reflect what is happening at the level of production and costs, it is regulated and provides public information for all users.

Management accounting (managerial) based on permanent inventory, reflects what happens at the level of production and costs, providing information exclusively for management.

Entities within the Ministry of National Defense carry out the process of accounting on the same principles and respecting the same norms as the public institutions, but at the same time, considering the belonging of our country to the strongest political-military alliance of the world, as well as to the European Union, the military institution permanently adapts its internal procedures to ensure the financial interoperability of the participating troops throughout the range of NATO and / or EU military operations.

Both the NATO and EU partners, in order to standardize the different sectors of activity, have developed a series of standards for guidance that the partner countries could implement given the complexity of the contemporary security environment and the emergence of new types, more sophisticated of threats to which the military instrument must respond quickly and efficiently. In order to provide an adequate response to these threats, military forces from different

countries and partners should "play" on the same principles, being able to provide military or elements within military structures set up as needed or even replacing some of partner countries.

Conclusions

We have studied and analyzed within this material, the international trend of uniformity regarding the accounting of non-current assets, stocks and expenditures with human resources through the implementation of those international accounting standards for the public sector. These required legislative and procedural changes on the part of the state and, in particular, on the part of the line ministries, in this case the Ministry of Public Finance. Thus, the implementation of IPSAS in the public sector in our country has brought a new modern image to the accounting process being at the same level as that of partners within the European community.

A series of norms and directives have been elaborated meant to bring the accounting process to the level of the partner countries, these being implemented in all public institutions in Romania and implicitly within the entities of the Ministry of National Defense.

The General Financial-Accounting Directorate is part of this effort and regulated the process of accounting for non-current assets, stocks and expenses with human resources within the Ministry of National Defense at the level of the entire Romanian public sector. At the same time, following the international commitments made by our country, the military system also had to adapt to the international demands of NATO and the EU.

In view of the permanent concern of achieving and maintaining the interoperability and on the financial-accounting line, the specific procedures for the military units participating in operations in different theaters have been adapted.

We can conclude that specific to the Ministry of National Defense, the process

of accounting for non-current assets, stocks and expenditures with human resources was adapted at the level of the Romanian public sector, but at the same time, it took into account the specific features of NATO and EU.

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CONCEPTUAL LANDMARKS ON THE EVOLUTION OF MILITARY ART

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Abstract: *Military art is the fundamental component of military science and has as its object the war as a whole and the armed struggle. Over the years, military art has seen spectacular evolutions and mutations in strategy, operative art and tactics, by assimilating and integrating the achievements of the technical-scientific revolution. From this perspective, we aim to highlight the main conceptual landmarks in which military art evolved also targeting the high technology, network-based warfare, the planned operation on the effects of using ISTAR systems and the hybrid operation that integrates and associates several military and non-military components. This comprehensive approach to the evolution of military art gives us the possibility to evaluate the multidimensional operational environment, to highlight the characteristics and physiognomy of the future military operations through the integration of new technological and information systems and equipment. In this context, we state that the success in planning, training, execution and evaluation of military operation in the future will depend on the professionalism of the human resource and the degree of assimilation of technologies and intelligent systems within the management and execution structures. In recent years, the art of war has undergone major changes at all levels (strategic, operational and tactical). Due to the new information phase of the scientific and technological revolution, in the near future, several theories of armed struggle will arise influencing the social and economic life of all states.*

Key words: *military art, high technology, hybrid operation, security.*

The global crisis at the beginning of the 21st century has also made its mark in the field of international military art, limiting as much as possible exercises, naval and aeronautical operations, leaving deep and inexcusable traces of military professionalism.

We can say that in recent years, the history of military art evolution at the international level is one of the most tragic and at the same time heroic themes in the history of modern global military policy. On the one hand, it can be argued that in the field of military art, i.e. the development of methods and forms of use of military force, for many years we have noticed its degradation and, on the other hand, at tactical level new methods have

been developed and sometimes significant progress has been made in the field of military art. Unfortunately, these developments have been done with much blood in the conflicts in Korea (1950-1953), Afghanistan (1979-1989), Falklands 1982, Iraq 2003, Georgia 2008 and last but not least Crimea, 2014.

Contemporary military conflicts have highlighted new orientations and concepts of military action, characterized by complexity, mobility, dynamism, the use of high technology and almost totally professionalized forces, integrated actions of all categories of arms and military branches. The space for the armed struggle in its terrestrial, air, maritime and cosmic dimension tends to become more

integrated, fully cybernetic, with increasing tendencies to expand into the electromagnetic environment based on spectacular developments in the technical-scientific field.

Operations at strategic level target national or alliance/coalition objectives - in multinational operations.

To achieve the strategic military objectives, *campaign operations (strategic level operation)* are carried out.

Achieving the strategic goals requires the following requirements to be met:

- ✓ identification of strategic military objectives, definition and approval of campaign objectives to ensure success;
- ✓ identification of political, financial or legal limitations imposed by the use of forces;
- ✓ defining the capabilities of strategic force and reserve;
- ✓ establishing the command line and financial resources and supporting materials;
- ✓ analysis of military risks.

Elements with a power to modify the military phenomenon:

- phasing and proportionality of the military action;
- reassessment of the post-conflict stage and the role of the army;
- designing, deploying and hiring multinational force;
- increasingly combining the political and military elements in the management of a crisis (conflict);
- the flexibility of the perpetual feature in the attitude of confrontation.

Reevaluating the objectives of the conflicts and the main ways and means used in the war, we can distinguish three distinct levels of the armed forces:

- modern armed forces that use state-of-the-art technologies (US, Russia, China and a number of other states) in their actions;
- armed forces of the traditional type, using the doctrine of mass army and military art used in the second half of

the 20th century (Ukraine, Turkey, Georgia, Syria, Iran, Iraq);

- irregular armed formations of non-state actors acting both internationally and within their own countries (Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Syria).

Starting from the changes in military art at the beginning of the twentieth century, we can consider World War I (July 28, 1914 - November 11, 1918) the first beneficiary of the development of global science, technologically speaking. In the First World War, all scientific discoveries accumulated in the Renaissance era were put into practice. The novelty of this war in terms of military art was represented by the Position War or the Trenches War. The strategic balance reached by the European nations in the conflict had reached almost the same level, from which they could hardly get out¹.

The influence of World War I on global politics is, as is said in mathematics, a point of bifurcation. Then everything has changed as a result of and, in particular due to, the political map of the world. All the major empires that existed on the European continent have disappeared and many new independent states have emerged².

Basically, this has been reflected in politics around the world - the world order has not been further defined by the great empires, but has developed on the principles that have declared sovereignty and the right of the people to form their own state³.

World War II (1939-1945) had an even greater influence on military art due to technology, which played a crucial role in the outcome of World War II. Much of

¹General dr. Popescu Mihail, General de brigadă (r) dr. Gheorghe Văduva, General locotenent (r) dr. Valentin Arsenie, *Arta militară de-a lungul milenilor*, p. 383.

²Alexander Tsyganov, cronicar ITAR-TASS interviu.

³Alexander Tsyganov, cronicar ITAR-TASS-interviu.

these technologies were developed in the interwar years, 1920-1930, some developed as a result of the lessons learned during the war and others towards the end of the war⁴.

The areas that developed due to the second world conflagration were as expected, the battle technique and medicine, namely:

- **Weapons:** ships, vehicles, airplanes, missiles, artillery equipment, infantry weapons and atomic weapons.
- **Military logistics:** vehicles for the transport of soldiers and equipment (trucks, jeeps, ships, planes).
- **Communications, espionage and counterintelligence:** communication, navigation, remote detection and espionage equipment.
- **Medicine:** developing surgical techniques, discovering new medicines.

Due to the development of the fighting technique, a new concept, namely the blitzkrieg, which sustains a generalized military offensive, followed by massive air strikes and massive bombings, and at the end of the military operation high mobility forces are introduced.

Politically, in order to promote international stability and prevent future conflicts, the United Nations (UN) has been established. Victory powers - the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the United Kingdom and France have become permanent members of the UN Security Council⁵. Amid rivalry between the two

⁴https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noi_tehnologii_%C3%AEn_timpul_celui_de-al_Doilea_R%C4%83zboi_Mondial, accessed at 18.02.2019.

⁵Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council; José Manuel Durão Barroso, President of the European Commission (10 decembrie 2012). *“From War to Peace: A European Tale”*. Prelegerea în numele Uniunii Europene de la decernarea Premiului Nobel, accessed at 04.01.2014.

superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union have prepared the Cold War scene, which lasted for 46 years.

World War II changed the political alignment and social structure of the world. Against the backdrop of the Cold War, in 1948, NATO's political-military alliance was established, through which France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg are committed to supporting each other in the event of war.

On March 20, 2003, the United States, in co-operation with 45 other countries, launched the war against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, giving birth to the first war of the third millennium and contributing to strategic military development. Many military specialists claim that this war fits into a new concept, namely the military strategy of the future, introducing in the strategic concept a new form of war - the digitization of the battlefield and the integration of operations.

Today, command and control issues of troop and combat operations using automation equipment are closely related to information warfare.⁶

“Network-based War” is based on the superiority of information on the enemy, which transforms into an overwhelming battle power by connecting intelligent objects (sensor networks, headquarters and executive locations) into a unique information space in the theater of operations. At the same time, the transformation of the concept of “battlefield” into the notion of “battle space”, the concept of “network-based warfare” as virtual objectives, besides

⁶<https://psyfactor.org/news/webwar.htm>, accessed at 19.02.2019 16.50.

traditional ones, symbolizes human emotions, human psyche etc.⁷

After a moment of peace and exploration, another military power makes its mark on military art, developing the hybrid war. This war is as dangerous as the classic one, leading to the occupation of a state or more, with a much greater number of victims. In the *hybrid* war, the weapons can defend until the end, but until then words are used, a propaganda bombardment, full of misinformation and manipulation in all the basic structures of a state. Most people do not perceive this type of war because it does not manifest physically at the moment of its emergence. As we mentioned earlier, the hybrid war weapon is the word. We hear the word every day, it is present everywhere, in the world of communication, it is like it is alive, in printed shape, then by voice on the radio, in television and, more recently, it is uncontrollably multiplied into the infinite world of the Internet.⁸

In conclusion, wars have always reflected the level of technological development, and in the modern post-industrial era, Western countries, especially the United States, are actively developing a new type of war model. This theory is called network wars. Attitude to the Internet or computer games is relative. Network warfare is a theory of the qualitative change of military technology and the structure of modern societies as a whole. Over time, people have learned collectively in the community, not how to save or help one another, but how to annihilate each other and possibly how to sustain themselves in order to survive, in order to stay alive, in conflicts. That is

⁷<https://psyfactor.org/news/webwar.htm>, accessed at 19.02 2019.

⁸Marian Hogeia - *Războiul hibrid - un concept nou, sau o strategie veche de mii de ani? Caracterul hibrid și asimetric al acțiunilor militare contemporane.*

why military art seems to be, in a way, an art of death and, at the same time, the art of survival. Man, himself, is neither a hero, nor some random fellow, neither a fighter nor a pacifist. At least, that is how it should be. Man is simply a man, that is, a being who cares about his life, whose thoughts are stronger than life. Not because he wants it, or because it would be good, but because it was given to him. Man's life only makes sense if it is thought of as being in a system of common, social and moral values, and the community, society and morality means, above all, identity, differentiation, limitation, and thus struggle. That is the way things are and will always be. The disappearance of border differentiation means the disappearance of identity, information, the attainment of the ultimate degree, that of zero entropy. More precisely, motionless, that is, death⁹.

The trends of evolution of the military art content are closely correlated with the evolution of the military phenomenon as a whole, and the military art constantly adapts its principles, methods, procedures and rules of preparation and conduction of the military actions so that they correspond to the organizational, structural changes and endowment, specific to the modern military system.

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ELEMENTS OF A NEW WAR STRATEGY AGAINST TERRORISM

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Abstract: *As a form of violence in the field of social-political relations, terrorism is as old as human history. Over the years and in one form or another, terrorism has made its presence felt in the streams of most peoples. It was manifested by acts of violence, which aroused in the consciousness of the people revolt and indignation, having, as a rule, negative consequences on the normal development of social relations. As a phenomenon it has prevailed in the modern era.*

Terrorism is, in essence, a very serious social danger to the structure, social cohesion and security of individuals and states. As we know it today - better organized, with those who practice it better educated and trained, having available networks of conspiracy houses and their own secret structures, to provide them with false identities, means of transport, information, weapons and a range varied links and secure contacts abroad - terrorism only appeared after the end of the Second World War.

Key words: *terrorist threats; preventing and combating terrorism; counterterrorism.*

Introduction

Nowadays it can be seen that while the information and security communities are still debating the role of information in a conflict, new threats of the information age and new enemies are on the horizon. Many states, even at the individual level, without being part of an alliance and without having the traditional sources of military power, can threaten the peace and security of the surrounding states or others where they have interests.

Faced with this new destructive potential, the armed forces must understand the power of information and know how to organize their actions to achieve success and achieve the goals set. An important move must be made in military thinking; the prospect of the Cold War has come to an end and now threats and adversaries belonging to a new era are on the alert.

For Romania, the need to prepare modern information structures also stems from its political option to actively participate, as an ally, in the global war against terrorism, in all its forms of manifestation. Internationally, it is noted that, as the number of troops and military

technique is reduced, the military information structures develop.¹

Threats and Risks of a Terrorist Nature against the National Security of Romania

It must be stressed from the outset that Romania has not faced and does not face major risks of a terrorist nature against it. Although our country is on the verge of colliding with some geopolitical and geostrategic interests, it is not yet a space for terrorist confrontation, no one for generating terrorism and it is not a favorable environment for the development of such actions. This is due to the characteristics of the Romanian people, his vocation for peace and dialogue, his long resistance to oppression and repression of all kinds.

However, over time, the Romanian space has endured numerous actions that can be considered terrorist, starting with those generated by the barbaric attacks and the destructive strategy of the Romanian legions and continuing with the actions of the hordes in Transylvania occupied from

¹*Patterns of Global Terrorism*, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/>, 2002.

1940 - 1944 and with terrorism of the totalitarian state from the first years of communism.²

Of course, terrorism has many other forms and formulas that, in a way, can affect our country. Certainly, Romania was not, is not, will not be and cannot be a terrorist generator.

From these considerations, we consider that major threats of a terrorist nature against Romania, insofar as they will exist, can only be temporary and transitory. They may result from an extension of the space of confrontation of fundamentalist or other ideologies and practices and in areas close to those of strategic interest for Romania (Balkan area, Transnistria, Caucasian and Black Sea areas), from aligning Romania with the global anti-terrorist coalition or from the significant degradation of the internal institutions and the proliferation in our country of the networks and structures of the mafia and organized crime.³

Currently, and probably in the short term, the threats and risks of a terrorist nature that may affect our country result from:

- further degradation of the human condition and proliferation of crime of all types;
- further expanding in our territory drug trafficking, prostitution networks and trafficking in live meat;
- evolution of underground economy structures, money laundering and illegal activities;
- the existence of Kurdish, Muslim, Islamic minorities who, in the shelter of the country's non-involvement in spectacular antifundamentalist operations, could try to establish some bases, points or structures to support terrorism (Islamist, in particular), which is being hunted everywhere;

²Stancilă Lucian, *Participation of the Romanian Army in combating terrorism*, National Defense University Publishing house, Bucharest, 2005.

³ Lesser, Ian O., *Countering the New Terrorism: Implications for Strategy*, 2018.

- the existence of persons who, in the absence of other means and activities that bring them prosperity, can be recruited in terrorist organizations, structures and networks.⁴

Political options, actions or compromises on the part of the political factor that can promote violent terrorism, which produces victims and damage, are impossible in Romania.

From the analysis of the current situation, as well as from the evaluation and prognosis

of its short-term evolution, it is also possible that in Romania it is possible to outline and even manifest threats of a terrorist nature, direct or mediated, against the country, of Romanian institutions, organizations and citizens. Romanians, as well as to individuals, groups, international institutions or from different states (embassies, representations, companies, consulates, missions, tourists, delegates, etc.) who are temporarily or permanently in the territory of our country. These threats can be elements of the terrorist war that is believed to have been unleashed around the world; we consider that, as a rule, such actions - for the most part, marginal or punctual - will have limited objectives and only indirectly will contribute to the extension, and in the area of strategic interest for Romania, of the terrorist war.⁵ These threats are:

- the possibility for the terrorists and terrorist organizations to obtain nuclear, chemical and biological means to be used in or outside the country in terrorist actions;
- attacking Romanian armament and ammunition depots in order to obtain

⁴Enache Doru, Mureșan Mircea, Stancilă Lucian, *Aspects of the military conflicts of the future*, publishing house of the National Defense University/2 Carol I", Bucharest, 2006.

⁵Atanasiu, Mirela, Repez, Filofteia. *Security and defence of the country in the context of terrorist threats*, Bucharest: Publishing House of the National Defence University "Carol I", 2013, p. 21.

the necessary means for terrorist actions and not only;

- organizing ambushes or assassinations targeting European, American, Russian, Muslim, etc. political leaders on the territory of the country. you are in visits, in official activities or with other occasions in Romania, or other persons, groups, institutions, etc.;
- actions of international terrorist organizations to recruit persons (even specialists) or personalities from Romania to be part of the respective networks or to perform temporarily, against large sums of money or by virtue of convictions, punctual missions (assassinated, cyber terrorist missions, influence trafficking, destruction, etc.)
- area organizing, on the territory of the country, some bases, networks, subversive points, communication nodes, transfer areas and other elements related to terrorist structures of different shades and orientations;
- terrorist attacks on representations of the great powers, NATO structures, international bodies or structures to combat international terrorism;
- harassment of individuals, companies and even institutions to obtain profits and create a state of insecurity that will facilitate the underground economy, money laundering, etc.;
- actions of ethnic terrorism, corroborated with influences of the fundamentalist or nationalist networks;
- actions of cyber terrorism and psychological terrorism, pathological, genetic and random terrorism;
- actions of media terrorism.⁶

Under the apparent freedom of the press and the word, in Romania in the last decade, in the media, a media terrorism of the most virulent species has been

installed, comfortable and undisturbed by anyone, wherever it was desired.⁷ With all the freedom of expression and the actions that defused some dirty business or some actions meant to transform the territory of Romania into a toxic waste dump, a fierce media terrorism was introduced and exercised which contributed to the degradation of the economy and the life of the citizen, the national values system, the humiliation and terrorization of people and personalities, the restoration of the fear of tomorrow, of their own institutions and of international ones.

Possible Political Coordinates for Combating Terrorism

With all the degraded systems of values in the Romanian society, the political class, as a whole, without exceptions, is never generating, nor promoting, nor protecting a form of terrorism. The care of terrorism manifests itself, however, and it is not yet seen, in the Romanian society it is the media whose victims are nevertheless the political class and, in the care of the measures, psychologically, the care is getting more and more worrying in the electoral campaigns. Also, however, it is said that counselling terrorism exists during electoral, regulatory campaigns, it is not an organized, led or coordinated one, but an implicit one, caring until the Romanian society since it is known.⁸

The political institutions of the Romanian state, of the Romanian society, including those that make up the civil society, are anti-terrorist. It is true that, until September 11, 2001, there was no express anti-terrorist strategy, for the reason that such threats and risks did not significantly affect the Romanian society. The fight against terrorism came from the

⁶ Wilkinson, Paul, *International terrorism: the changing threat and the EU's response*, Published by the European Institute for Security Studies, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Brussels, October 2015, p. 5.

⁷ Romanian Intelligence Service, Security culture Information Center, *Terrorism in the World*, Bucharest 2014.

⁸ Schmid, Alex, *Terrorism: The Definitional Problem*, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, vol. 4, 2014.

structures of the Ministry of Interior, helped, if necessary, by the special forces or the Ministry of National Defense (in principle, units and sub-units of research) that were also trained for such missions.⁹

However, it has never happened that, on the territory of Romania, there will be extensive anti-terrorist operations. But the reality has changed. Since the terrorist threats have exceeded, in many places on the planet, the framework of organized crime and crime, the Romanian state, aligning itself with the international anti-terrorist coalition, is defining itself through its leadership documents (National Security Strategy and Military Strategy), a clear and distinct conception of response organized within this type of war, which consists of:¹⁰

- elaboration of a concept of counter-terrorism, integrated to the European and Euro-Atlantic conception on this subject;
- establishing concrete measures to protect the population, values, state institutions, property and community against terrorist actions;
- establishing the structure of forces that will carry out such missions;
- establishing the competences, the mode of cooperation and the responsibilities of each of the institutions employed in this regard;
- establishing the system of training of forces;
- allocation of the necessary resources.¹¹

Non-Military and Military Anti-Terrorist Action Structures

It is very difficult to configure the forces structures that have to solve the

⁹ Laqueur Walter, *A History of Terrorism*, Transaction Publishers, NEW Jersey, USA, 2012.

¹⁰ Rik Coolsaet, *A European Security Concept for the 21 st Century*, in "Diplomatic News", nr. 14, dec. 2013 - ian. 2014.

¹¹ Record, Jeffrey, *Boundingthe Global War on Terrorism*, Strategic Studies Institute, New York, Dec. 2013.

complex situations that are created in the case of the existence of the terrorist danger. Normally, these structures must constitute a system of protection, preventive action and adequate response not only against terrorism, but in any other limit situation. A normally functioning society, in a normal security environment, should be less vulnerable (even invulnerable) to terrorist attacks.¹²

Sometimes it has been proven that traditionally democratic societies, such as the American one, become, in certain circumstances, highly vulnerable to terrorism. Only perfectly integrated societies, such as those militarized or those organized strictly, hierarchically, are able to ensure a proper response to such situations. Liberal societies or liberal, tolerant and open democracies are very vulnerable to terrorist attacks, especially when they disturb or curb such anti-terrorist policies through their policies.

To protect against terrorism, a society must, in principle, have the following structures¹³:

- systems for complex surveillance and operational evaluation of terrorist-type risks and threats (for this, specialized means are not sufficient, no matter how complex and sophisticated they are; the company must have a very high degree of integrity and integrity. Homogeneity);
- fast and secure communication systems;
- adequate legislation, but which, as far as possible, does not offend other states, other structures, value systems, etc., which is very difficult to achieve, especially if the respective companies are big powers;
- high-performance information structures;
- well-established and perfectly integrated public order structures;
- special forces.

¹² *Romanian National Security Strategy*, Bucharest, 2016, pp. 8-9.

¹³ Morgan, Matthew J., *The Origins of the New Terrorism*, 2014.

Possible Role of the Army in Counter-Terrorist Actions

It is not, of course, the task of an army to carry out anti-terrorist actions. But after the attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as after careful analysis of the new risks, especially those of an asymmetrical nature, it was concluded that the armed forces cannot remain outside these challenges, that they must participate in forms specific, but within a complex and unitary system, to the war started against terrorism.¹⁴

The first reactions to this new dimension of the role and place of an army in a type of "war", which, in fact, is not a war in the classic sense of the word, but a large-scale action and a great complexity triggered against terrorism, they were

somewhat dubious.¹⁵ Some have considered that terrorism is not a war, so it does not involve the armies, but the law enforcement and surveillance forces. The involvement of the armies would diminish their functions, weaken their responsiveness in case of war and, thus, the vulnerability of the entities for the defense and protection to which they were constituted, that is, endangering the identity and sovereignty of the states (to the extent that state identity, sovereignty and independence are also considered as political and national values of civilizations). Others believe that terrorism, through its acts and through the grim and particularly threatening perspectives that have emerged since the attacks of September 11, 2001, is effectively a war against current and future order, against normal life, democracy, law

¹⁴David Rapopor, *The four waves or terror of the rebels and September 11th*, Anthropoethics, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2002.

¹⁵General Dr. Mircea Mureșan, Brigadier General (R) Dr. Gheorghe Vaduva, *WAR of the future, the FUTURE of WAR*, UNAp, Publishing house, Bucharest, 2004.

and law and, as such, all forces, including the military (especially the military) must be involved in the response.

In order to fulfill this new role, the army is obliged to achieve the necessary structures (design, management and execution), a proper training system, a tailor-made strategy and the means it needs. In principle, the role of an army in the antiterrorist war (which the army alone does not carry) consists of:¹⁶

- collecting and analyzing information on terrorist structures, training bases, warehouses, action systems, communications networks, management mode, etc.;
- protection of strategic value objectives and other important objectives against terrorist actions;
- the search, discovery, attack and rapid destruction of terrorist structures and infrastructures;
- participating in the settlement of the consequences of terrorist attacks (when they occur by surprise);
- strong actions on the strengths of terrorist networks (structures);
- actions, within the anti-terrorist coalition, against international training bases and other terrorist structures and infrastructures.

Conclusions

Terrorism is a war of a special kind, aimed at destroying lives and value systems. Never does an ordinary war aim to destroy a value system. The war aims only at the defeat of an army, if possible without even the bloody battles, loss of human lives and material damage, the subjugation of a country, the achievement of a political purpose. Only terrorism is about destruction for the sake of destruction. Is a much more complex phenomenon even than war, which must be studied and deepened not only to limit

¹⁶ Romanian intelligence Service, Security culture Information Center, *Terrorism in the World*, Bucharest 2014.

its effects and to punish those who are guilty, but especially to understand and eradicate its mechanisms and causes.

Terrorism usually strikes by surprise, at vulnerable points, so as to kill, destroy and frighten, create spectacular effects and an atmosphere of human hell and misery, taken to the abject and unbearable. Is becoming more and more an instrument of politics, namely its fastest, most hidden, most venomous, most difficult instrument to stop, but also to control and control. Terrorism is not a unitary phenomenon, although its highly diversified actions have the same philosophy of destruction, of terror. It has numerous structures and forces, infiltrated in all levels and branches of human society - some of these structures being active, others, in conservation - and is able to act quickly, anytime and anywhere. Terrorism uses a strategy of rapid-type actions that, in short, give the image of a war-mosaic.

His main weapon is man - the intelligent man, the fanatic man, the missionary man - who, in the name of beliefs that cannot be easily shaken, is capable of any sacrifice and, above all, is capable of inventing intelligent means of action and particularly effective, as he puts in what the whole religion and all his being does. Such people cannot be easily turned off. It is expected that terrorism, despite the measures being taken to eradicate it and destroy its structures and networks, will proliferate, especially in the unconventional, atypical and asymmetric area. The company remains very vulnerable to the attacks of nuclear, radiological, chemical and bioterrorism terrorism which, in the next stage, will multiply and diversify, the effects being particularly serious.

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